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Religion, Culture, and the Secular 
The Case of Islam 
 
1  Introduction
Why jump into a sea, where everything is seemingly fleeting, floating, 
and fluid? There is not a single concept that offers solid ground to stand 
on: ‘religion’ is problematic, ‘culture’ elusive, ‘secularity’ contested, and 
‘Islam’ one big question mark. ‘Identity’, to name that which looms so 
large in modern contexts, fares no better. Yet jump we must if we are to 
do more than critique conceptualisations that we consider flawed, and 
instead provide what is expected of academics: critical reflection that does 
justice to the subject at hand, while at the same time speaking to wider 
intellectual, moral, and political concerns. This paper contributes to the 
debate on multiple secularities by discussing conceptualisations of religion 
and culture and their relevance to articulations of secularity ‘in Islam’. 
Written from the perspective of historically grounded Islamic studies, with 
a focus on the period up to 1500, this paper nonetheless addresses current 
concerns, for while the secular and hints at secularity can be identified in 
pre-modern Muslim majority contexts, they only emerged as themes of 
theoretically informed debate in the modern period.
The illustration shows Kay Khusraw crossing 
Lake Zara, facing all sorts of dangers. Safavid 
Shahname 1590–1600. Washington, Freer 
Sackler Gallery FS-S1986.265_001.
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Islam invites reflection on the concepts of religion and culture because, 
as a global phenomenon with a historical depth spanning well over a 
millennium, it has been plural from an early date. Plurality evolved into 
diversity as Islam expanded geographically and socially to become a 
world religion (well before world religions were supposedly “invented” by 
European scholars of the 18th and 19th centuries). To identify the ‘Islam’ 
resulting from these processes, the interplay of religion and culture, or 
civilisation, has been regularly invoked. Significantly, culture has usually 
been defined in relation to religion, as ‘Islamic culture.’ As Louis Gardet 
stated several decades ago: 
Islam is a religion. It is also, almost inseparably from this, a community, 
a civilization and a culture. It is true that many of the countries through 
which the Qur’anic faith spread already possessed ancient and important 
cultures. Islam absorbed these cultures, and assimilated itself to them in 
various ways, to a far greater extent than it attempted to supplant them. But 
in doing this, it provided them with attributes in common, with a common 
attitude to God, to men and to the world…The history of the Muslim 
peoples and countries is thus a unique example of a culture with religious 
foundation, uniting the spiritual and the temporal, sometimes existing side 
by side with ‘secular’ cultures, but most often absorbing them by becoming 
very closely interlinked with them.1 
The prevalent view today is that Islam is a religion that forged a civilisation, 
and that the two are difficult to keep apart. Islam is internally diversified 
along various lines, some of them manifested in ‘sectarian’ affiliation (such 
 I am greatly indebted to my fellow members at the Centre for Advanced Studies in 
the Humanities and Social Sciences “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond 
Modernities” at Leipzig University, in particular Florian Zemmin, Monika Wohlrab-
Sahr, Sushmita Nath, Mohammad Magout, Elliot Lee, Christoph Kleine, Markus Dreßler, 
and Vanya Bhargav for their knowledge, insights, and stimulating discussion. Warm 
thanks also go to Sarah Stroumsa, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Claus-Peter 
Haase, Freie Universität Berlin, for their critical comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. As always, the remaining errors are my own.
1 Louis Gardet, “Religion and Culture,” in The Cambridge History of Islam: 2B Islamic Society 
and Civilization, ed. Peter Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 569. The claim to uniqueness should be treated with 
caution, as should several other claims contained within these few sentences. Islam is 
not as unique as Gardet and others may think. ‘Catholic culture’, ‘Protestant culture’, and 
perhaps even more so, ‘Jewish culture’ have been subject to intense debate regarding 
their constituent parts. If one were to look beyond the three monotheistic religions, 
Confucianism would offer itself up for inspection. More on this below.
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as Sunni, Shiʿi, or Alevi), others in specific understandings of theology 
and piety (Sufi, Salafi), and yet others tied to culture and region. Culture 
and region are seen as interlinked, and the Islamic world as divided 
into a number of culturally distinct zones (the Arab world, a Persianate 
sphere including Anatolia, the Indian subcontinent, and Central Asia, 
Southeast Asia, China, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe), within which Islam 
is considered to be inflected in characteristic ways. Some question the 
purpose and validity of drawing such lines, however, while others deny 
that Islam can even be Islam if it recognises culture as a factor ‘inflecting’ 
it. The controversy over ‘European Islam’ is a case in point. At the same 
time, contemporary discussions of Islam and Muslim identity, and 
about Islamic reform, ethics, and politics are frequently predicated on a 
distinction between religion and culture, with important consequences for 
the conceptualisation of secularity.2 Examples range from the display of 
Islamic symbols in public space (is a specific form of veiling designed and/
or perceived as an expression of religion or of culture?), through issues of 
gender and governance to patterns of consumption, aesthetics, and the arts.
Current debates in both academia and politics, on religion, culture, 
and the secular are very much concerned with the effects of power, 
hegemony, exclusion, and marginalisation. But there is another element 
relevant to these issues, which relates to flexibility rather than hierarchy. In 
contemporary conceptualisations of an Islamic social, moral, and political 
order, many Muslim speakers regard Islam as a stable religious reference 
system (although this is not the term they would commonly use), one that is 
accessible in widely different settings. These settings are frequently labelled 
‘cultural.’ Compared to those classified as religious references, cultural 
references are commonly considered to be softer, more malleable, and 
more easily negotiable.3 The same applies to the boundaries derived from 
2 My focus therefore differs from Jeanette Jouili’s in her important article “Islam and 
Culture”, where she discusses the relevance of culture discourses for Muslim subjectivities 
in the West, as well as their potential for Islam and Muslims gaining recognition within 
their respective non-Muslim majority societies: Jeanette S. Jouili, “Islam and Culture: 
Dis/junctures in a Modern Conceptual Terrain,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 61 (2019). Incidentally, I agree with Alexander Knysh that in many instances, the 
term ‘subjectivity’ is synonymous with (if not to say: identical to) ‘identity’ (Alexander 
Knysh, Sufism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 242n55).
3 During an encounter in the early 2000s, heavily veiled young female academics in 
Yemen’s capital Sanʿaʾ declared the headscarf to be religiously mandatory and non-
negotiable whereas according to them, the face veil was a cultural symbol, tied to Yemeni 
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them. The distinction that treats religion as the stable element and culture 
as flexible, however, exemplifies the very approach that many consider a 
fallacy. This approach posits what is said and prescribed by the normative 
texts, first and foremost the Qurʾan and prophetic traditions (Sunna), as 
the universal norm, corresponding to the Great Tradition (in the singular). 
By contrast, it ascribes ‘what local people just do’ the secondary rank of 
local practice, corresponding to the Little Traditions (in the plural), which 
are non-binding and non-normative.4 Yet it also refers to an established 
principle of Islamic legal reasoning that distinguishes between the stable 
and the flexible, or mobile, elements of Islam. More on this below.
As I have previously dealt with the political and legal aspects of 
secularity and secularisation in Islamic contexts, with a focus on 
the early modern and modern periods, I would like to refer readers 
to these publications rather than repeating my arguments here.5 
In the following, I will focus on particular distinctions relevant to the 
conceptualisation of religion and culture, adopting the very kind of 
approach that Shahab Ahmed rejected as misguided in his thought-
provoking, rambling, and occasionally irritating What is Islam?:
I will argue that the human and historical phenomenon of Islam is a field 
of meaning where truth is constituted, arranged, and lived in terms not 
of categories constituted by mutual exclusion, but rather by categories of 
custom and tradition, and dispensable in a different sociocultural context (such as on a 
trip to Berlin). For them, culture was possibly socially or discursively constructed but not 
religion, or what they identified as religious.
4 See, e.g., Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 255.
5 See notably Gudrun Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik: Reflexionen zeitgenössischer 
Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); 
Gudrun Krämer, “Gottes-Recht bricht Menschen-Recht: Theokratische Entwürfe im 
zeitgenössischen Islam,” in Theokratie und theokratischer Diskurs: Die Rede von der 
Gottesherrschaft und ihre politisch-sozialen Auswirkungen im interkulturellen Vergleich, 
ed. Kai Trampedach and Andreas Pečar (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); Gudrun 
Krämer, “Secularity Contested: Religion, Identity and the Public Order in the Arab 
Middle East,” in Comparative Secularities: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age, ed. 
Marian Burchardt, Matthias Middell, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2015) and Gudrun Krämer, “Piety, Politics, and Identity: Configurations of Secularity 
in Egypt,” in A Secular Age beyond the West: Religion, Law and the State in Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa, ed. Mirjam Künkler, John Madeley, and Shylashri Shankar 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Gudrun Krämer, Der Vordere Orient 
und Nordafrika ab 1500 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2016) seeks to integrate these 
questions into a broader historical narrative.
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mutual intersorption and inter-locution that run athwart and conceptually 
frustrate the secular/religious binary or religion/culture division. As such, 
the use of a vocabulary that seeks, in the first instance, to organize and 
understand phenomena by categorically distinguishing between religion 
and secular, or between religion and culture, simply does not help us clearly 
to see the human and historical phenomenon of Islam (and we should not 
imagine that the solution to this is to argue that, in Islam, everything is 
‘religion’ – or that everything is ‘culture’).6 [my emphases]
I disagree, except for the last clause, set in parentheses. I argue that for 
heuristic purposes, it is productive to retain the categories of religion and 
culture, or civilisation, and to keep them apart conceptually, especially in 
current debates on the nature of Islam. This approach prioritises analysis – 
literally taking things apart and looking at, or even for, cracks and fissures 
– over the search for an integrated whole. But I am not the only one to draw 
distinctions: Muslims past and present have done so in manifold ways. The 
difficulties inherent in the exercise are not to be underestimated: both 
religion and culture are notoriously difficult to define. There is overlap, 
ambiguity, and polyvalence, and boundaries are porous as well as shifting. 
What is more, to distinguish between categories in social and cultural 
analysis does not require setting them up as opposites, premised on mutual 
exclusion. If religion and culture are distinct, they are nonetheless entangled 
in multiple ways. The beauty of the term ‘entanglement’ lies precisely in 
the fact that it allows for distinction without assuming separation, that it 
explores the connections involved, that it is dynamic, and that it invites the 
search for actors, motives, sites, and driving forces without presupposing 
a prime mover. The following will require some engagement with Islamic 
studies, for without at least a cursory look at the theological and legal 
ramifications of the arguments exchanged, the echoes they evoke and 
the resonance they find among Muslim audiences cannot be understood. 
Without a sense of these echoes we will get no feel for what is at stake in the 
debates on religion, culture, and secularity ‘in Islam’.
6 Ahmed, What is Islam?, 116.
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2    Conceptual Issues
2.1 The Concept of Culture
Grand, sparkling, and mercurial, ‘culture’ tends to slip from the hands 
of those who seek to grasp it. Positions on the subject cover a wide range: 
there are those who still work with the assumptions of the Kulturkreis 
school, which regarded cultures as closed, homogeneous, enduring, 
and static units.7 These assumptions have been thoroughly discredited 
among academics, but they continue to inform public discourse and 
identity politics in many parts of the world. For this reason, they cannot 
be ignored. Then, there are those who reject the concept of culture as 
a product of othering, which, based on an essentialist construction of 
an ‘Other’, first fixes its character, preferably with reference to a given 
textual tradition, to then use that Other as a negative foil for the superior 
‘Self ’. Some want to abandon ‘culture’ altogether, declaring the concept 
to be irredeemably tied to essentialist assumptions. Within the wider 
field of Islamic studies, the rejectionist camp usually draws on post-
colonial theory, with Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism visibly in 
the foreground and Michel Foucault conspicuously in the back.8 A 
minority of critics go further, claiming that the term ‘culture’ serves as a 
placeholder for ‘race’,  and that boundary drawing based on perceived or 
alleged cultural differences is, in essence, racist (‘cultural racism’, ‘racism 
without race’)9. Here Frantz Fanon, Étienne Balibar, and Stuart Hall loom 
large. Except for the remaining partisans of Kulturkreis ideas, all of these 
groups are informed by post-structuralism and view boundary drawing 
primarily as a strategy of exclusion.
Social and cultural anthropology, literary studies, cultural studies, 
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, cultural sociology,10 have established 
7 Ethnologist Leo Frobenius, who coined the term ‘Kulturkreis’ (‘culture circle’ or ‘culture area’) 
in the late 19th century (Leo Frobenius, Der Ursprung der afrikanischen Kulturen (Berlin: 
Verlag von Gebrüder Borntraeger, 1898)), later distanced himself from the concept.
8 See notably Lila Abu-Lughod, “Writing Against Culture,” in Recapturing Anthropology: 
Working in the Present, ed. Richard G. Fox (Santa Fe: University of Washington Press, 
1991). For spirited defences of the concept of culture, see William H. Sewell Jr., “The 
Concept(s) of Culture,” in Beyond the Cultural Turn, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn 
Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Christoph Brumann, “Writing for 
culture: Why a successful concept should not be discarded,” Current Anthropology 40 
(1999); or Daniel Varisco, Culture Still Matters (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
9 Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, nation, classe: Les identités ambiguës 
(Paris: La Découverte, 1988).
10 Notably represented in the USA by Jeffrey Alexander and his students. For German-
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themselves as the leading fields in the academic debate (or what today is 
rather innocuously called ‘conversation’) about culture, identity, and the 
discursive construction of difference. Three of these (sub-) disciplines even 
include the term ‘culture’ in their names. My own field, Islamic studies, has 
been somewhat slow to join the debate, and its contributions have received 
little attention outside the field.11 While the construct of cultural racism, 
cast in the form of ‘anti-Muslim racism’, has been adopted and critiqued 
within cultural studies, it is largely absent from Islamic studies broadly 
understood, unless dealing with Islam in Europe and North America. 
While I follow the argument that both race and culture can be construed 
so as to suggest a solid box restricting those within in the way a prison 
confines its inmates, I question the usefulness of a concept that transfers the 
constructs of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ from their alleged biological determinants, 
from which there can be no escape, to socially constructed cultural ones, 
which may certainly be restrictive but leave the escape option open. Even 
conceding that American usage of the term race, focussing on the body, 
blood, and the experience of slavery,12 differs from continental European 
usages – in particular the German one – this transfer comes at the expense 
of precision in a very sensitive domain, and I therefore do not endorse it.
My understanding of culture owes much to the ‘cultural turn’ and 
comes close to the definition submitted by social anthropologist Andreas 
Wimmer.13 Accordingly, culture is not a sub-system with its own systemic 
language research, see Uta Karstein and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Culture,” in “Soziologie 
– Sociology in the German-speaking World,” ed. Bettina Hollstein et al., special issue, 
Soziologische Revue (2020).
11 Stefan Conermann and Syrinx von Hees, eds., Islamwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft: 
I. Historische Anthropologie. Ansätze und Möglichkeiten (Schenefeld: EB-Verlag, 2007). 
By contrast, Shahab Ahmed’s What is Islam? has already triggered critical debate; see 
Rushain Abbasi, “Did Premodern Muslims Distinguish the Religious and Secular? The 
Dīn-Dunyā Binary in Medieval Islamic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 31, no. 2 
(2020) and the discussion under the rubric of “Kitabkhana,” in Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 40, no. 1 (2020).
12 For the US concept and context, I rely on Katrin Simon, Die Erben des Malcolm X: 
Afroamerikanische Muslime zwischen Widerstand und Anpassung (Bielefeld: transcript, 
2015), esp. chap. 1. For the cultural racism paradigm, see, e.g., Tariq Modood, 
Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2005).
13 Andreas Wimmer, “Kultur: Zur Reformulierung eines sozialanthropologischen 
Grundbegriffs,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 48, no. 3 (1996) 
and along similar lines, Carola Lentz, “Culture: The making, unmaking and remaking 
of an anthropological concept,” Working Papers of the Department of Anthropology and 
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logic, or one field of human activity among others. Rather, it consists of 
a web of interpretations and representations of the self and the world, 
or cosmos. The image of the web conveys a sense of coherence, stability, 
and continuity, and yet the web and its individual threads are constantly 
changing, conditioned by time, locale, and social context. The web is elastic 
but it cannot be stretched ad libitum, and the stretching is done by humans. 
This definition builds on decades of reflection on the meaning of culture, 
including notably Clifford Geertz’s famous reference to Max Weber, 
according to which “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun”, and Geertz’s own attempts at “guessing” (his own 
term) the meaning of cultural signs and symbols.14 But the definition 
goes beyond semiotics in highlighting the practices, processes, sites, and 
structures that sustain these human-made webs of meaning(s). By the 
same token, it is considerably broader than understandings that identify 
culture with custom, tradition, and the weight of the past more generally; 
or with civilisation, refinement, and cultured behaviour; or with the arts 
and human creativity as a whole. Culture, as I understand it, pervades 
different spheres of life and informs, or even shapes, individual thought, 
emotions, and actions, as well as communal and societal order, particularly 
as it is settled and solidified in discourses, artifacts, and institutions.
This definition of culture is broad and challenging, and it calls for 
concrete examples to illustrate what exactly is meant by all those carefully 
chosen words. Some issues are particularly significant, especially in 
intercultural comparison: the relationship with nature, the body and 
sexuality, disease, age and death, time, work and technology; aesthetic 
preferences and emotional regimes; evaluations of social inequality, 
gender roles, and gender relations; notions of honour and shame; rules of 
communication and politeness; dietary prescriptions, sartorial styles, table 
manners, and forms of sociability, down to assessments of what it means 
African Studies 166 (Universität Mainz: Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, 2016). 
For an influential contribution, see Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., Beyond the 
Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Culture and Society (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999).
14 The quote is from Geertz, not Weber. Geertz was, however, not entirely lost in the pursuit 
of meaning. In his controversial study of Islam in Indonesia and Morocco he stated that 
“religion is a social institution, worship a social activity, and faith a social force” (Clifford 
Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), esp. 19). For Weber, see Hans F. Kippenberg and Martin 
Riesebrodt, eds., Max Weber’s “Religionssystematik” (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001).
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to be alone, referring to solitude rather than loneliness. Much of this is 
implicit rather than explicit, as argued by David McMahan in his study on 
Buddhist modernism, who defined “a culture’s lived world” as
the daily repertory of practices, implicit ideas, and dispositions 
that structure perception and action, allowing people to engage in 
social intercourse, know what is appropriate and inappropriate, 
understand what to expect of each other, and discern power relations.15 
In the modern period, culture has been closely tied to identity and 
identity politics. High culture, popular culture, and mass culture, if we 
want to use these aesthetic-cum-social categories at all, have their place 
under the umbrella of culture. However, they are largely irrelevant to 
the present enquiry. More relevant is the way culture, religion or moral 
philosophy, and territory have been tied together in the construct of 
regional cultures, or cultural regions: Confucian China and Korea, Shinto 
Japan, Christian Europe, the Islamic Middle East, the Islamic world. The 
case of Confucianism is especially instructive: Confucianism was and is 
predominantly understood as an ethical and moral tradition or philosophy, 
and as a constituent element of Chinese and Korean culture.16 But at times 
it was articulated in religious terms, or elevated to the status of a state cult. 
Equally, there were periods in which its founder was venerated and offered 
sacrifices in elaborate ritual.17 Through century upon century of survival, 
15 David L. McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 15.
16 For the debate, initiated by European Jesuits in the 17th century, on whether 
Confucianism is a philosophy or a religion, see Zhao Dunhua, ed., Dialogue of 
Philosophies, Religions and Civilizations (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research 
in Values and Philosophy, 2007); Anna Sun, Confucianism as a World Religion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Sébastien Billioud and Joel Thoraval, “The 
Contemporary Revival of Confucianism: Anshen liming or the religious Dimension of 
Confucianism,” China Perspectives 3 (2008). By contrast, John Lagerwey has adopted 
a very broad conception of religion that subsumes virtually every aspect of thought 
and behaviour under this rubric (John Lagerwey, Paradigm Shifts in Early and Modern 
Chinese Religion: A History (Leiden: Brill, 2019)). I thank Elliot Lee for bringing this 
important work to my attention even though I cannot seriously engage with it here.
17 Sun, Confucianism, 153–72; Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. 16–47 and 204–09 for the cult of Confucius. The 
Kong Temple in Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, in Shandong province, serves as an 
excellent illustration of these trends; see James A. Flath, Traces of the Sage: Monument, 
Materiality, and the First Temple of Confucius (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2016). To explore the shifting relations of ritual, worship, religion, and culture in China 
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adjustment, and reinterpretation, the great and variegated Confucian 
tradition proved remarkably elastic – a term, which, incidentally, I find 
more helpful than ‘fluid’ or ‘hybrid’, which are often used in this context. 
The ‘cultural region’ construct can be viewed as a nod to the Kulturkreis 
school’s ‘cultural circles’, even though the region, theoretically speaking, is 
more open than the circle.
It can of course be argued that religion is part of the web of meanings, 
representations, discourses, practices, and institutions just described, and 
for that reason is a facet of culture and not just embedded in culture. From 
an agnostic perspective, both religion and culture are created by humans 
and are thus ‘socially’ or ‘discursively constructed’. Yet one can endorse 
this position and still hold that religion does not, as it were, dissolve into 
culture, and that it is possible, productive, and in certain instances even 
necessary, to distinguish between the two, not least because practising 
adherents of the respective religions have done so in the past and continue 
to do so in the present. Significantly, theoretically informed authors such 
as David McMahan, whose focus is on religion, do not seem unduly 
worried by the entanglement: they take it for granted that religion is 
culturally embedded and inflected, and that for this reason, culture 
matters. But they do not dissolve religion in culture.18 The same is true of 
the great majority of scholars, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, researching 
Islam and Muslim or Islamicate societies.
Still, many questions remain, beginning with who is interested in 
the classification exercise, why they undertake it, and the criteria of the 
classification itself: which kinds of idea, behaviour, object, emotion, 
or institution do they register as either religious or cultural, or both? A 
fundamental question is whether within a given paradigm, one or the 
other takes precedence, providing the primary, if not the exclusive frame of 
reference. Here either religion is made the roof under which a wide array of 
phenomena can be accommodated as articulations of culture, or, conversely, 
culture is placed on top with a number of phenomena fitted as ‘local’ or 
‘religious’ under its umbrella. In either case, both the logic and function 
more deeply, I would have to engage with the work of Hubert Seiwert, which again I cannot 
do, at least not here. I have, however, benefited from his “The Dynamics of Religions and 
Cultural Evolution: Worshipping Fuxi in Contemporary China,” in Dynamics of Religion: 
Past and Present, ed. Christoph Bochinger and Jörg Rüpke (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2017).
18 McMahan, Making for Buddhist Modernism, esp. 15–19.
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of the chosen paradigm need to be examined. With the emergence of the 
modern nation state, the latter has come to predominate in many parts of 
the world, and not just in the West: collective identity has increasingly been 
defined in terms of culture, under which religious loyalties and sentiments 
have been subsumed. The court decision in the German federal state of 
Bavaria in 1995 that declared the crucifix to be a symbol not of religion 
but of Bavarian history and culture, serves to illustrate the point.19 By the 
same token, a hierarchy was established that made culture the arbiter of 
what was acceptable in public life and what was not, and who belonged 
to the community or nation and who did not. The political appropriation 
of culture features prominently in China, where Confucian values have 
been rehabilitated by the Communist leadership as the moral foundation 
of state and society, and, even more problematically, in India, where 
Hinduism is being translated into a national culture, absorbing existing 
local, moral, philosophical, and religious traditions.20 However, the trend is 
not universal, and the emergence of the modern nation state has not been 
identical with giving primacy to culture: most governments in the Muslim 
world have moved in the other direction and made religion the yardstick 
of legitimacy, authenticity, and identity. This is the case even when the 
government did not go so far as to establish Islam as the state religion, 
or Sharia as the main or exclusive source of legislation. The paradigm 
holding culture as the determining factor raises the issue of secularity in a 
particularly challenging manner. That positing religion as the determining 
element might at first sight appear simpler in this regard, falling neatly into 
the category of secularism, or rather the rejection thereof. Needless to say, 
reality is more complicated.
Significantly, Muslim debates on Islam and identity, as well as most of 
the theoretically informed literature on Islam past and present (irrespective 
of the religious affiliation of its authors), largely focus on religion rather 
19 See also: Mohammad Magout, A Reflexive Islamic Modernity: Academic Knowledge and 
Religious Subjectivity in the Global Ismaili Community (Baden-Baden: Ergon, 2020), 50–55.
20 I am aware that there is a vast corpus of literature for both countries. For China, I have 
drawn on Yee Lak Elliot Lee, “Muslims as ‘Hui’ in Late Imperial and Republican China: 
A Historical Reconsideration of Social Differentiation and Identity Construction,” in 
“Islamicate Secularities in Past and Present,” eds. Markus Dressler, Armando Salvatore, 
and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, special issue, Historical Social Research 44, no. 3 (2019) and 
for India, on Vanya V. Bhargav, “Between Hindu and Indian: The Nationalist Thought of 
Lala Rajpat Rai” (Thesis, Oxford, 2018).
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than on culture. It is no coincidence that there is hardly any research on 
pre-modern Muslim concepts of culture in the broad anthropological 
sense, rather than in the sense of culture as custom, including customary 
law (ʿurf, ʿada, adat; also ʿamal, work, practice, praxis), and culture as 
literature (adab), music, and the visual and performing arts. While culture 
stirs the imagination, religion still evokes passion. One of the questions 
asked outside of Islamic literature – narrowly defined – is whether religion 
is a valid concept to describe pre-modern Islam at all.
2.2  The Concept of Religion
Let me start with a pointed statement: Islam is a religion, formed, like 
other religions and ethical-cum-moral traditions, in the (often conflictual) 
encounter of different religious, moral, philosophical, and cultural teachings, 
practices, and actors. However unassailable and, indeed, politically correct 
this statement may appear to those invested in ‘shared’ or ‘entangled history’, 
it has been opposed both by devout Muslims who insist on Islam’s origin in 
divine revelation, and by contemporary scholars who see religion, or at least 
an abstract, generalised concept of religion, as the ‘invention’ of early modern 
European scholarship. Many among the latter are informed by post-colonial 
theory, though it was historians of (Christian) religion who traced the 
evolution of an abstract concept of Religion in Europe, and its dissemination, 
rom the 17th century onwards,21 and it was Orientalists, some of them very 
much old school, who first questioned the suitability of an abstract concept 
of religion for non-Western traditions such as Islam. Numerous titles speak 
of the ‘invention’ of a given religion, particularly Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Shinto, or of the concept of world religions, first by European scholars and 
Christian missionaries, and then by members of the respective traditions 
eager to refashion themselves in the European image.22 Islam, as we will 
21 See Reinhold Glei and Stefan Reichmuth, “Religion between Last Judgement, law and 
faith: Koranic dīn and its renderings in Latin translations of the Koran,” Religion 42, 
no. 2; Ernst Feil, Religio, 4 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986–2007) is a 
study in conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte).
22 Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, eds., Secularism and Religion-Making 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Markus Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization: 
A Constructivist Approach to Secularity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 7 (Leipzig University, 2019) have 
come up with the attractive term “religion-making”. For the inventors of invention, see 
notably Talal Asad, Timothy Fitzgerald, Russel T. McCutcheon, Tomoko Masuzawa 
(cited in Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme of the 
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see, posed more of a challenge.23 Needless to say, uncritically transplanting a 
post-Enlightenment Western understanding of religion, derived from Latin 
Christianity, to pre-modern and non-Christian contexts cannot be valid.24 But 
there are, nonetheless, several problems, too, with the invention theory. Not 
only does it construe a single modern (Western) understanding of religion 
that does not even do justice to the many manifestations of Christianity past 
and present, it also disregards, or does not consider carefully enough, pre-
modern Muslim conceptions of Islam.
The more I read and listen, the more I am puzzled by the quantities of ink 
and energy spent on demolishing, or ‘deconstructing’, an abstract concept of 
religion, quite independently of any kind of struggle against religion that 
might be based on secularist convictions. The Islamic, or Islamist, variant of 
this critique has in fact little to do with the secularist goal to dissociate state, 
law, and public order from religion and the clerical structures associated 
with it. Quite on the contrary: it aims to liberate Islam (rather than religion 
as a whole) from the shackles of the secular modern nation state to which 
it had been subjected and to return it to an earlier state of power and glory. 
Post-colonial scholars believe in the subjection story, with the modern 
nation state as the chief villain in the piece, but they do not, as a rule, dream 
imperial dreams. Rather, they seek to critique modernity and to identify 
actors and factors ‘subverting’ it, potentially including holistic ideologies 
based on religion, culture, and collective identity.25
The deconstruction drive has served to shake researchers out of 
complacency, forcing them to look more critically into the terms they 
HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities’,” Working Paper 
Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 1 
(Leipzig University, 2016), 32 as well as Nile Green and Mary Searle-Chatterjee, eds., 
Religion, Language, and Power (London: Routledge, 2008).
23 For critical readings of the invention theory focusing on Islam, see Daniel Varisco, Reading 
Orientalism: Said and Unsaid (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007); Magout, A 
Reflexive Islamic Modernity, esp. 36–42. It has been argued that Western understandings of 
Sufism were invented by late 18th-century European scholars (see, e.g., Carl W. Ernst, The 
Shambhala Guide to Sufism (London: Shambhala, 1997), 1–18, 147) and, of course, this 
makes an important difference; see Alexander Knysh, Sufism, 1–7, 238n14, 240n31.
24 See Michael Bergunder, “Was ist Religion? Kulturwissenschaftliche Überlegungen zum 
Gegenstand der Religionswissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 19, no. 1–2 
(2011), esp. 50–55. Reinhard Schulze provides a nuanced reading of the Protestantisation 
thesis in his article “Islam und Judentum im Angesicht der Protestantisierung der Religionen 
im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the Course of History: Exchange and 
Conflicts, ed. Lothar Gall and Dietmar Willoweit (Munich: R. Oldenburg, 2011).
25 Ali Mirsepassi’s critique of Foucault’s idealisation of the Islamic Republic of Iran points 
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employ. Yet, in my view, many critiques of the modern concept of 
religion are themselves flawed, offering only a reductionist portrayal of 
circumscribed religion, seeing it as represented by the Church and located 
in the heart, or conscience. This portrayal may correspond to the hopes 
and expectations of French Jacobins raising the flag of laicité, but it does 
not adequately mirror the European and North American experience in its 
diversity. The ‘Islamic’ variant ties together critiques both of the Catholic 
Church and of Protestant understandings of religion. In this view of 
Catholicism, it is the Church that supposedly controls the hearts, minds, 
and bodies of the believers (who are then often identified with Christianity 
as a whole).26 Conversely, Protestantism is held to understand religion as 
a faith exclusively located (or should we say, locked?) in the heart and, as 
it were, cut off from the world. This depiction, however, chooses to ignore 
the fact that the Catholic Church has never fully controlled even the 
Catholics, and that Protestants, while subscribing to the priority of ‘inner’ 
faith, expect themselves and others to live by this faith, and translate it into 
works large and small. For this reason, their faith cannot be fully private.
Significantly, little attention has been paid to the Protestant emphasis 
on ‘practical ethics’, which Reinhard Schulze rightly underlined in his 
critical reading of 19th-century ‘religion-making’ (not his term), mostly 
in the German context.27 Practical ethics had a far-reaching impact on 
the sociopolitical realm: Protestants have called for a sanctification of 
everyday life (Alltagsheiligung), and Weber wrote on ‘The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’. Christians who live their faith do 
not do so only in church and on Sundays and major Christian holidays. 
Hence what is portrayed as the modern, Western concept of religion as 
intensely private and narrowly confined to two sites – the Church, or a 
in this direction; Ali Mirsepassi, “Mistaken Anti-modernity,” Working Paper Series 
of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 6 (Leipzig 
University, 2019), esp. 5–6. Perhaps we should examine more closely how deconstruction 
of the concept of religion bears on conceptualisations of secularity – not so much with a 
view to the past as to the present and future.
26 The image of the Catholic Church dominating society and culture, hampering science and 
freedom of thought, figures prominently in Muslim critiques of secularism; see, e.g., Krämer, 
Gottes Staat als Republik, and Daniel Kinitz, Die andere Seite des Islam: Säkularismus-
Diskurs und muslimische Intellektuelle im modernen Ägypten (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2016), 
278. The argument that European Christians needed to invent secularism in order to 
liberate themselves from the suffocating grip of the Church, and that, for this reason, they 
banished religion to a niche, is by no means restricted to Sunni Islamists.
27 Schulze, “Islam und Judentum,” 157–58.
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comparable clerical structure, and the heart, or conscience – represents 
a secularist model of what religion is and where it belongs. It gives 
primacy to the perspective of the secular(ist) territorial state, and of 
French laicité in particular, over the self-understanding of practising 
Christians. In doing so, it misrepresents historical experiences and 
current configurations, which do not (all) conform to the secularist 
model but rather convey the many shades of secularity.
A clearer view is to be gained by distinguishing two understandings 
of religion: on the one hand, religion as a set or web of beliefs and practices 
guiding individual and possibly even collective life, which may or may not 
be tied to a community and a given clerical structure; and on the other, 
religion as a neatly defined compartment of life centred in faith, with rites 
and rituals relegated to the margins, if not altogether devalued.28 I see no 
reason why Islam should not qualify as a religion in the former sense, 
irrespective of the time period we are looking at. It has a set of beliefs, 
creeds, laws, and well-defined practices that are understood by Muslims 
as worship of a god who declares himself (there is no way of making this 
phrase gender-sensitive) to be the one and only God, un et indivisible 
(Ar., tauhid). This is not the same as a shared passion or ideology, such as 
football, nationalism, capitalism, or communism. Islam has also inspired 
a community built on this foundation, combining belief and belonging. 
Based on its normative texts, which already reflect comparison, Muslim 
scholars have systematically compared Islam to other religions and/or 
moral traditions with respect to their (alleged) tenets and practices.
Like other believers, however, Muslims have had to deal with internal 
diversity. Early on, the Muslim community fanned out (critics would say ‘split 
and splintered’) into different schools of theology and law. They developed 
distinct notions of correct belief and pious conduct, social order, political rule, 
and justice, the weight of faith as opposed to works, the correct methods of 
deriving norms from the authoritative texts, the possibility of attaining truth 
through non-textual means, the relationship of reason to revelation, and so on. 
These notions varied according to time and place. The great communities of 
Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims, with their specific visual, emotional, and memorial 
cultures (!), and their own doctrines of religious authority and legitimate rule, 
28 In adopting this shorthand for ‘religion’, I do not wish to belittle the earnest search of 
scholars of religion for their subject. At the same time, the present distinction only partially 
corresponds to Stausberg’s distinction between attributive, structural, and functional 
differentiation, as summarised by Kleine and Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme,” 20.
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are part of this diversity. The same applies to the wide stream of Sufism, which 
cuts across theological, legal, and ‘sectarian’ affiliation. 
In the attempt to capture the effects of plurality and diversity, reference 
has frequently been made to the tension between unity and diversity, and 
between continuity and change. Many of us have tired of these pairings, 
and more imaginative ways of articulating the tension are available. 
Following Clifford Geertz who had described culture as a ‘continent of 
meaning’, Shahab Ahmed argued that 
the task of conceptualizing and understanding Islam becomes precisely 
to discover and map its ‘Continent of Meaning’ and to make sense of that 
continent as a continent: as a continuous, connected and contained – if 
topographically, climatically and demographically variegated – entity. It is 
to conceptualize how that continent is elaborated, articulated, constructed, 
conceived and experienced as an undulating whole, even when its parts present 
themselves in and as apparently distinct and disconnected local topographies.29 
The image of the continent is, however, problematic, not least because Ahmed 
highlights not just coherence but containment. By contrast, the insistence on 
connectedness, or ‘connectivity’, is widely shared. Rather than evoking an 
“undulating whole”, or engaging with the complexities of signs, symbols, and 
29 Ahmed, What is Islam?, 249–50.
Sufi shrine in Hezheng, Gansu province, north-west China. Photo: Gudrun Krämer, 2015.
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significations, which abound in recent discussions of culture and religion, 
others have described Islam more soberly as a set of references. These can 
be employed to “elaborate, articulate, construct, conceive, and experience” 
Islam as an inherently plural, changeable, connected, and contingent entity.30 
Two elements are important here: the actor-centred approach, and the fact 
that the references need not be textual, let alone legal. An actor-centred 
approach does not negate the reference function of the Qurʾan, which 
Muslims take as the unmediated word of God, and the Sunna of the prophet 
Muhammad, seen as its explication and, to some extent, its realisation. But 
it does, however, shift the focus to reception and interpretation, which are 
contingent and thus temporally, spatially, socially, and culturally bounded. 
The emphasis is on what Muslims read, understand, and do rather than on 
what the Qurʾan and the prophet Muhammad say. Without going into the 
requisite depth at this juncture, this perspective could be described as a mild 
form of constructivism: meanings are socially and discursively ‘constructed’. 
The actor-centred approach was taken to its extremes by anthropologist 
Gabriele Marranci when he stated that “it is not Islam that shapes Muslims, 
but rather Muslims who, through discourses, practices, beliefs and actions, 
make Islam.”31 But as long as Muslims in their various local contexts refer 
to a shared corpus of foundational texts, they are tied to this corpus, whose 
interpretation cannot be stretched arbitrarily.
Just as significantly, the insistence on references does not consider only 
textual ones. It therefore does not suggest that Islam as text has always been 
the prevalent way of understanding and living Islam. Islam is certainly a 
discursive tradition, as Talal Asad has argued, following W. Cantwell 
Smith, but it is not exclusively so. In many settings, Islam was mediated 
through people rather than texts, and these people did not necessarily 
either authenticate their behaviour or legitimise their claims to authority 
through recital of the Qurʾan and prophetic Hadith. What Shahab Ahmed 
called the ‘legal-supremacist mode’, propagated by today’s Islamists as the 
only correct way of understanding Islam, does not adequately reflect how 
Islam was understood and lived by Muslims for centuries.32 Saints and 
Sufis were quite able to present their path to truth as valid and indeed 
30 See, e.g., Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies, Renewal proposal, 2011.
31 Gabriele Marranci, The Anthropology of Islam (Oxford: Berg, 2008), 15.
32 Ahmed, What is Islam?, esp. 80, 117–29.
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superior, defying ‘legalist’ criticism of their teachings and practices.33 The 
same holds true for philosophers, whose referral to their own body of 
texts highlights the fact that a focus on text is not necessarily the same as 
a focus on law, or Sharia in particular. Yet irrespective of past trends, the 
textual approach is the dominant one today, and it is dominated by legal 
discourse. Within this frame, the references are ultimately contained 
in, derived from, or in some way related to, the foundational texts of 
Islam. Under the conditions of globalisation and mediatisation, with the 
multiplication of means of access to the Qurʾan and the Sunna even for 
those who cannot read Arabic, or who are not fluent in the language, these 
texts constitute the one and irrefutable reference for ‘constructing’ Islam.
In their vast majority, Muslims recognise certain core references 
which give coherence and continuity to a global community that has no 
unifying clerical structures and authorities comparable to the Catholic 
Church or the great Buddhist lamas, and no communal offices, such as 
congregations, parishes, monasteries, and priests, to hold it together (in 
this respect, Islam comes closest to Judaism). I therefore subscribe to 
Ahmet Karamustafa’s summary (albeit not to every word of it):
Islam does revolve around certain key ideas and practices, but is it 
imperative to catch the dynamic spirit in which these core ideas and 
practices are constantly negotiated by Muslims in concrete historical 
circumstances and not to reify them into a rigid formula that is at once 
ahistorical and idealistic… There have always been and continues to be 
a multiplicity of perspectives among Muslims even about what the core 
ideas and practices of Islam are. Minimally, however, we can assume 
a set of beliefs (a version each of monotheism, prophesy, genesis and 
eschatology) that underwrite a set of values (dignity of human life, 
individual and collective rights and duties, the necessity of ethical 
human conduct – in short a comprehensive moral program) in turn 
ref lected in a set of concrete human acts (ranging from the necessity 
of greeting others to acts of humility like prayer). It is also necessary 
to add, though this is an obvious point, that this nucleus is believed to 
be contained in the fundamental sources of Islam, the Qurʾan and the 
exemplary life story of Muhammad. It is a version of this core that lies 
at the center of each and every one of the innumerable manifestations of 
the Islamic civilizational tradition in human history.34
33 Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, eds., Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of 
Controversies & Polemics (Leiden: Brill, 1999); Knysh, Sufism, 4, 40–42, and chap. 3 and 5.
34 Ahmet Karamustafa, “Islam: A Civilizational Project in Progress,” in Progressive Muslims, ed. 
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These beliefs, values, and practices can be affirmed, modulated and, 
within certain limits, contested. Muslims have differed in terms of their 
understanding of God, the role of the prophet Muhammad, the character 
of the Qurʾan as text, the site of religious authority, the weight of reason in 
relation to revelation, or of law in relation to Sufi and poetic experience, 
the evaluation of music and the visual arts, the definition of gender roles, 
and the implementation of justice. There is no need to equate belief in a 
certain core that constitutes Islam with essentialism. And while it may 
well be true that “Islam is always Islam to somebody”,35 it remains to 
be seen who that somebody is, how many of them there are, and what 
other Muslims have to say about them. There are more options than 
just essentialism on the one hand and unbridled relativism on the other. 
Provided ‘religion’ is not turned into a straightjacket, with the strings made 
of unbending rules enshrined in the Qurʾan and the Sunna of the prophet 
Muhammad, and which Muslims have to wear if they are to be recognised 
as Muslims, ‘religion’ seems entirely appropriate to describe Islam, or at 
least a crucial dimension of it. As we will see, when it comes to our second 
possible reading of religion, that of religion as a neatly compartmentalised 
or ‘quarantined’ aspect of life, the situation is different.
2.3   Muslim Understandings of Islam
In their painstaking deconstruction of Western constructs of ‘religion’, 
the proponents of the colonial invention thesis have largely ignored 
Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim teachings and experiences, almost as if 
Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims as ‘colonial subjects’ had no voices of 
their own, and no discursive tradition(s) with distinctive categories of 
rites, beliefs, and community.36 Talal Asad, one of the leading and most 
Omid Safi (Oxford: OneWorld, 2003), 108–09; see also below, section “Din, Iman, and Islam”.
35 Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam. Negotiating Ideology and Religious 
Inquiry (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 202. It is hard to be 
original: in 1957, Wilfred Cantwell Smith stated blandly that, “To some extent each religion 
is all things to all men… When we look beyond symbols to their meanings, we cannot but 
recognize that each world religion has, in the last analysis, as many forms as it has believers” 
(Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 8).
36 Other voices exist. For an important study that traces the interaction of Buddhists, or 
sympathisers with Buddhism, from diverse sociocultural backgrounds, including Japan, 
Sri Lanka, Tibet, Britain, and the US, see McMahan, Making of Buddhist Modernism, 
who rather than invoking ‘invention’, speaks of a “cocreation of Asians, Europeans, and 
Americans”; McMahan, Making of Buddhist Modernism, 6. Brian K. Pennington, Was 
Hinduism Invented? Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion (New 
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stimulating voices in the chorus, cannot be accused of silencing the natives 
and ignoring Islamic tradition. But his critique nonetheless raises a number 
of questions, not least because he is not particularly interested in detail, let 
alone philology. In his take on religion and Islam, we hear considerably more 
from Western authors than from Muslim ones. According to Asad, the post-
Enlightenment Western concept (and there appears to be only one) equates 
religion with interior, individual, private belief as a “distinct mental state”.37 
This he contrasts with an order in which belief is intimately linked to works, 
woven into the social fabric, and tied to power relations.
Similar views have been frequently expressed by both post-colonial 
and Islamist critics of modernity, in their respective idioms and with their 
respective agendas. Though their assessments of plurality and ambiguity in 
pre-modern Islam may diverge sharply on closer inspection, they do tend 
to agree that Islam constituted a coherent and integral whole prior to the 
irruption of colonial modernity, and the imposition of the modern nation 
state. The influential Indian Islamic author and activist Abu l-Aʿla Maududi 
(1903–79) even spoke of a ‘seamless whole’. Like a blanket, Islam had covered 
all – family and trade, gender and health, agrarian relations and urban life 
– and provided rules for everything: business and divorce, devotion and 
sociability, aesthetics and politics.38 According to the same reading, colonial 
modernity cut up this fabric to produce functional differentiation between 
religion, law, politics, culture, the economy, and the arts, replacing integrity 
and connectedness with incoherence and fragmentation. To be precise, I 
should speak of ‘integrality’, however it is integrity that is most commonly 
evoked in these critiques, used in the sense of moral uprightness, or in 
Charles Taylor’s sense of wholeness or fullness. To anyone sympathetic to the 
Romantics’ critique of modernity, this argument will surely resonate.
From a critical perspective, it is worth looking more closely at the 
work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916–2000), noted scholar of Islam and 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005) points in a similar direction. Reinhard Schulze in 
his “Islam und Judentum” equally highlights interaction rather than invention, as does 
Ammeke Kateman in her study Muḥammad ʿAbduh and His Interlocutors: The Concept 
of Religion in a Globalizing World (Leiden: Brill, 2019).
37 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45–48. He seriously engaged 
with Islamic sources in the chapter “Reconfigurations of Law and Ethics in Colonial 
Egypt,” in Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 205–56.
38 For Maududi, see Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik, 43.
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comparative religion, committed Presbyterian Christian, and one of the 
most influential contributors to the present debate. Smith firmly believed 
that religion is primarily about faith and that faith is the heart’s response to 
the Divine. In his Islam in Modern History (1957), which predates his more 
widely read The Meaning and End of Religion (1962) by several years, he 
insisted on the crucial importance of inner faith to Muslims (“The reality 
of Islam is a personal, living faith, new every morning in the heart of the 
individual Muslim”)39 and the meaning attached to “externalities”, such as 
institutions and patterns of behaviour by those “who have the faith”. But he 
also declared that Islam was a religion, one distinct from other religions, 
first and foremost (Protestant) Christianity, through its close link between 
faith, community, and practice, or what he called Islam’s “practical form”: 
The community is based on, as it is integral to, individual faith. Not only is 
Muslim society held together (as are other societies) by common loyalties 
and traditions, and by a very carefully worked out system of values and 
beliefs. Not only is it the product of a superb ideal. It pulsates with the 
vitality of a profoundly held and deeply personal conviction, a religious 
conviction that is warm and meaningful for the individual member… 
As a creed or theological system may be the expression in an intellectual 
form of a personal faith – as is often the case, particularly with Christians 
– so a social order and its activities are the expression in a practical form 
of a Muslim’s personal faith… A good Muslim is not one whose belief 
conforms to a given pattern, whose commitment may be expressed in 
intellectual terms that are congruent with an accepted statement (as is the 
case generally in Protestant Christianity), but one whose commitment 
may be expressed in practical terms that conform to an accepted code. 40 
It is indeed true that prior to the late 19th century, Muslims did not conceive of 
Islam as a clearly demarcated sub-system, constituted by, and limited to, faith 
39 Smith, Islam in Modern History, 9 and 7–8; see also 307–08. “We hold that behaviour, 
institutions, creeds, and other externalities are real and significant, but are not religion. 
At least they are not all of it, and particularly are not faith. Religion, we suggest, is what 
these things mean to men” (Smith, 8n5). Given the widespread emphasis on orientalist 
misunderstandings of other religious traditions, the respect Smith expressed for 
Islam merits attention: “For one thing, all religions, and most clearly the great world 
faiths, are quite literally infinite. There is no end to their profundity; nor to their 
ramification, their variety. For each religion is the point at which its adherent is in 
touch, through the intermediary of an accumulating tradition, with the infinitude of 
the divine” (Smith, 7). His “accumulating tradition” is obviously close to Talal Asad’s 
later notion of ‘discursive traditions’.
40 Smith, 18–19 and 20. In the same context, he stated that, “Many have recognized that the 
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and worship, detached from social life, and unaffected by power relations. It 
is also true that pre-modern Muslims did not have a concept of ‘conscience’, 
which was only elaborated from the late 19th century onwards (in modern 
Arabic, the most common terms are damir or wijdan).41 However, this does 
not mean that prior to the advent of modernity, all Muslims conceived 
of Islam as a seamless whole, covering everything. Nor does it mean that 
Muslims had no possibility of distinguishing between religious and non-
religious matters, or that they did not do so in certain contexts. To make 
such a claim is to disregard a vast body of literature written by Muslims for 
Muslims, in genres ranging from legal texts and philosophical treatises to 
religious polemics to mirrors for princes, courtly prose, and Sufi poetry.
2.4   Din, Iman, and Islam
When trying to determine whether Muslims possessed a notion of ‘religion’ 
before their encounter with Western modernity, scholars have focused on 
din, which today is mostly translated as either ‘religion’ or ‘the Islamic way of 
life’. There are several problems with this approach: firstly, din is not the only 
relevant term, and the Qurʾan is not the only relevant text; moreover, many 
contemporary authors ascribe to din a single meaning, which is precisely 
what it did not have among pre-modern Muslims.42 The term din is Qurʾanic, 
community is not only a social group but a religious body; that ‘church and state’ are one, to use 
the inappropriate language of the West” (Smith, 18). The language is indeed so inappropriate 
that it should be avoided altogether. I also do not subscribe to his characterisation, and 
indeed celebration, of the wholeness of Islam as religion, society, and culture, with religious 
law regulating “everything from prayer rites to property rights”, and the Muslim’s “entire life 
activity being organized into a meaningful whole by this divine pattern” (Smith, 29).
41 Significantly, the Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān has no entry for ‘Conscience’, and the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition refers to damir in the context of grammar, where it 
signifies a pronoun. For relevant studies, see Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Conscience in Arabic and 
the Semantic History of ‘Ḍamīr’,” Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 9 (2009); Schulze, 
“Islam und Judentum,” 155–57; and Florian Zemmin, “Validating Secularity in Islam. 
The Sociological Perspective of the Muslim Intellectual Rafiq al-‘Azm (1865–1925),” in 
“Islamicate Secularities in Past and Present,” eds. Markus Dressler, Armando Salvatore, and 
Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, special issue, Historical Social Research 44, no. 3 (2019).
42 See articles Louis Gardet, “Dīn,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 3 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1991) as well as Patrice C. Brodeur, “Religion,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 4 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004); and Clare Wilde and Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “Religious Pluralism 
and the Qurʾān” in the same volume. Stefan Reichmuth in: Glei and Reichmuth, “Religion 
between Last Judgement,” 250–60, and in “The Arabic Concept of Dīn and Islamic 
Religious Sciences in the 18th Century: The Case of Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 1791),” Oriens 
44, no. 1–2 (2016) outlines the chronological evolution as well as the semantic scope of 
the term. Linguistic closeness notwithstanding, New Persian din (Avesta daena, Middle 
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and hence Muslims have been at pains to elucidate the precise meaning of 
the relevant references. These references are numerous, and as even a brief 
survey reveals, they carry different meanings. Among the best-known 
Qurʾanic attestations of din are the famous “The right religion with God is 
Islam” (inna l-din ʿ inda llah al-islam; Sura 3:19) and “There is no compulsion 
in religion” (Sura 2:256). Beyond that, there is the din al-haqq (true religion, 
or the din of truth, i.e., God, as notably in Sura 30:30), the din Ibrahim (the 
religion/cult of Abraham), the yawm al-din (Day of Judgement), and many 
others. The example of din, therefore, serves as a reminder that the Qurʾan 
is a book of inspiration for believers, not a textbook for scholars of religion.
A number of Qurʾanic references identify din (which in Hebrew, 
Aramaic, and Arabic is linguistically tied to debt, reckoning, retribution, 
reward, and punishment) with the fulfilment of the obligations God 
imposed on his creatures, that he created so that they should worship and 
obey him. It is in this sense that Sura 5:3 is commonly understood. In the 
translation by Tarif Khalidi it reads: “Today I have perfected your religion; 
I have completed My bounty upon you; And I have sanctioned Islam as 
your religion.”43 Sura 5, of which this passage forms but a small part, draws 
the outlines of what was meant by din in this particular context: the sura 
opens by calling upon the believers to fulfil their contractual obligations 
(ʿuqud), which Khalidi translates as “legal obligations”. This is an allusion to 
Sura 7:172, which describes God’s conclusion of a covenant with humanity 
at the dawn of creation, in which they acknowledged him as their lord.44 
Sura 5 continues with a long list of prescriptions. These range from the 
particular – when to hunt, what to eat, how to pray, what kind of women to 
marry – to the general, exhorting the believers to “join hands in virtue and 
piety (birr and taqwa)” but not in “sin and aggression” (5:1), and to conduct 
themselves virtuously (bil-qist) before God, practise justice, and put their 
trust in God (5:6–11). The passage also includes what is known in Islamic 
scholarship as ‘promise and warning’: 
Persian/Pahlavi, den) is even more difficult to capture than Arabic din, ranging as it does 
from inner self, vision, or conscience to divine and human wisdom; see Mansour Shaki, 
“Dēn,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. VII, fasc. 3 (London: 1994).
43 For the relevant references, see Muhammad Fuʾad ʿAbd al-Baqi, al-Muʿjam al-mufahras 
li-alfaz al-qurʾan al-karim (repr. Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1978) entries din to mudayyinina.
44 The primordial covenant mentioned in Sura 7:172 raises a host of theological questions 
regarding the human intellect, God-given nature, and predestination; see Gerhard 
Böwering, “Covenant,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 466.
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God “promises those who believe and do good deeds (salihat) that they 
shall have forgiveness and a glorious recompense. But those who blaspheme 
(kafaru) and cry lies to Our revelations, these are the denizens of hell” (5:9). 
What emerges from these lines is a notion of din as piety (birr, taqwa, 
ihsan), which requires a consistent pattern of conduct inspired by the 
fear and love of God, well beyond the observance of specific acts and 
taboos. Thus defined, piety is very much in line with what Max Weber 
described as Lebensführung, and has been rather loosely rendered as the 
‘Islamic way of life’.
The huge body of textual and non-textual materials relating to din from 
the early Islamic period to the 18th century still awaits systematic study, 
which would require philological rigour, but should not be restricted to 
philology. Stefan Reichmuth’s scrutiny of Arabic texts provides important 
insights into the semantic shifts to be observed even within the religious 
literature, narrowly defined.45 One strand of interpretation, which gained 
salience in the context of Islamic reform, linked (Islamic) din to piety 
in general and to the ʿibadat in particular: the ‘acts of worship’ through 
which the believers express their gratefulness and obedience to the 
Creator. These acts of worship were not prescribed on a list sent down 
through the Qurʾan. Rather, it was Muslim scholars who defined them, 
notably including the so-called Five Pillars of Islam: the profession of faith 
(shahada), the five daily ritual prayers (salat), alms giving (zakat), fasting 
during the month of Ramadan (sawm), and, if physically and financially 
possible, the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). All were designed to be public 
acts that could be seen, heard, and numbered. By the same token, they 
signalled communal loyalty and affiliation. Significantly, Muslim scholars 
also declared the ʿ ibadat to be immutable and non-negotiable, forming part 
of what is fixed and stable in Islam and distinguished from ‘social relations’ 
(muʿamalat), which were said to be contingent upon time and place and, 
for this reason, more flexible and negotiable.46 I will return to this point 
45 Reichmuth, “The Arabic Concept of Dīn”, and Glei and Reichmuth, “Religion between 
Last Judgement.” I am a little surprised by Reichmuth’s conclusion that Arabic din attests 
to “direct or indirect borrowing” from Middle Persian den, and that, “This might be 
how dīn in Islam finally came out, as in Persian Religion, as a wisdom of divine origins 
anchored within Man from the very beginning of the world [my emphases]” (“Religion 
between Last Judgement,” 259). The reference is to the notion of fitra, inborn disposition 
(which he identifies with din), and the primordial covenant just mentioned.
46 The relevant technical term here is huquq Allah, the ‘rights of God’. Among the earliest 
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later. What matters here is that pre-modern Muslim scholars (and, it is 
to be presumed, many other Muslims as well) did not, in fact, identify 
Islamic din with faith as a “distinct mental state”. Rather, they viewed it as 
a web of beliefs, devotional practices, and specified acts of worship, as well 
as pious conduct and obedience to God (taʿat Allah) more generally. For 
this reason, din was more than the religio of late Republican Rome. Religio 
described the correct performance of cultic and devotional acts towards 
a deity or a number of deities, rather than describing a consistent way of 
life, a textual tradition, or a community based on belief and belonging, as 
represented by Judaism, Christianity, and eventually Islam.47
Religious scholars were, of course, not the only Muslims to reflect 
on the issue. That the scholars involved were theologians and jurists, 
however, is evident in their manner of reasoning, with subtle arguments 
predicated on fine distinctions, and many points of disagreement between 
them. Notably, too, din was not the only term available to Muslims, in 
discussing matters of belief and belonging. There was a whole array of 
relevant Qurʾanic terms at their disposal, from iman to islam and from 
scholars to classify the ʿibadat, or pious acts more generally, as ‘the rights of God’ was al-
Harith al-Muhasibi (d. 857). For the complexities of this distinction in modern writings, 
see Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik, 54–58, and below.
47 Here, I follow Jörg Rüpke, Pantheon: Geschichte der antiken Religionen (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2016), 13, 395. Rüpke defines religion in the Italic/Roman context as the situated 
communication of individuals with an entity or entities that they saw as superior but 
whose presence, agency, and existence they could not plausibly demonstrate to others 
beyond doubt. The relevant practices were dispersed and woven into different social and 
political fields, and although certain functions required specialists, such as priests, they 
were not systematised to constitute a distinctive religious field (Rüpke, 18–34, 76–77, 84, 
136, 147–48, 171, 185–91, 222–23). According to Rüpke, these practices and functions 
did not rest on a textual tradition, and it was only in the imperial age that a notion 
of religion as specialised knowledge that was also accessible through texts emerged 
(Rüpke, 166, 216, 223, 392–94). Significantly, Rüpke occasionally refers to experiences 
that might be understood as religious by us or by the actors involved, but we do not 
get a sense of what they might have consisted of. What Rüpke makes abundantly clear, 
however, is that religion is not a given and that religious ideas and practices need to 
be explained, especially when they require high investments (Rüpke, 21). In a highly 
original study of late antique and early Islamic Arabia, Ludwig Ammann made a similar 
argument with regard to the emergence of Islam: “Religion ist bei den alten Arabern 
kein Glaubenssystem, kein Ort der Reflection, sie ist im Grunde nicht mehr als ein 
käuflicher Nothelfer” (Ludwig Ammann, Geburt des Islam: Historische Innovation 
durch Offenbarung (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001), 33). Both authors support the basic 
assumption of the Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe that, to put it very simply, religion was not 
a given, let alone everything, in the pre-modern era, either in Europe or beyond (Kleine 
and Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme,” 19–20).
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ihsan to milla or even from umma to shariʿa, none of them unambiguous.48 
In addition, they employed terms that emerged only later, such as ʿaqida 
(creed or dogma) and iʿtiqad (creed, belief); for comparative purposes, 
they also used din in the plural form of adyan or diyanat, which is not to be 
found in the Qurʾan and very rare in prophetic Hadith. Some distinguished 
between din and islam, in the sense of ‘surrender’ and ‘submission’ to 
God. Others placed iman (which is normally translated as faith), ʿaqida, 
islam, and ʿibada under the rubric of din. Still others used din and iman 
synonymously, or subsumed din under iman. In the Islamic sciences, and 
argumentative theology (kalam) more particularly, the usul al-din (“the 
roots of din”) deal with dogmatics. Iman, which is almost as difficult to 
pin down as din, was crucial to definitions of belief and unbelief and to 
the question of what decided the religious status of a Muslim, and what 
excluded them from the community.49
This is not the place to go into the debate over the relative weight of 
faith and its profession, works, and consistent adherence to all obligations, 
commandments, and interdictions set down by God or the prophet 
Muhammad – a debate which preoccupied Muslims for centuries, with 
many (Sunni) Muslim scholars of theology and law defining both iman 
and islam as comprising ‘word and action’ (qawl wa-ʿamal), i.e., the 
profession of faith and praxis. This was an issue that gained added urgency 
in the context of takfir, the exclusion of Muslims from the community 
under the charge of heresy or apostasy.50  Nor is this the place to investigate 
the fine distinctions some have drawn between belief and faith (such as, 
48 For milla, see Markus Dreßler, “From ‘Religious Community’ to ‘Nation’: The 
Transformation of the Term Millet in the Late Ottoman Context,” Die Welt des Islams, 
under review (2020). As the set of ethical, moral, legal, and aesthetic rules, norms, and 
values that guide and shape individual conduct, communal life, and societal order, 
Sharia is more than the Islamic law to which it is frequently reduced, and like din, it has 
often been described as ‘the Islamic way of life’. Muslims have disagreed and continue to 
disagree on what exactly is implied by ‘guide’ and ‘shape’. Some would say ‘determine’, 
largely ruling out human agency. However, this has never been the only position, let 
alone the dominant one.
49 In the most immediate sense, iman is what makes a person a believer, muʾmin, calling for 
a substantive definition; see  Jane I. Smith, “Faith,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 2 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002).
50 Faced with intra-communal strife, many Muslim scholars past and present have argued 
that judgement on belief and disbelief should be left to God and not be passed by men 
(and women). See Camilla Adang et al., eds., Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic 
Perspective on Takfir (Leiden: Brill, 2016), esp. Hossein Modarressi, “Essential Islam: The 
Minimum that a Muslim is Required to Acknowledge;” also Smith, “Faith,” 170–72.
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‘belief ’ as the confirmation of accepted teachings, or dogma, and ‘faith’ as 
the individual’s inner feeling and experience). What matters here is that 
influential (Sunni) Muslim scholars have always insisted that professed 
belief was decisive in recognising a person as a Muslim, without denying 
the importance of praxis, comprising correct ritual performance and 
habitual pious conduct.
2.5   Din, Dunya, and Dawla
In the popular exercise of pairing and comparing, al-din/religion was 
frequently combined with, and distinguished from, al-dunya/(this) 
world.51 The pairing and comparing will take us well beyond scholarly 
circles, and into the literary salons of urban society as well as into the world 
of rulers. The Qurʾan and Muslim tradition frequently link, and just as 
often juxtapose, al-din with al-dunya, which literally speaking points to 
something spatially ‘nearer’ or ‘nearest’, but also ‘lower’ in both the physical 
and the moral sense. Here, it designates the ‘nearer abode’, ‘this world’, or 
the lowest heaven. Clearly, the two items are not of the same kind, with al-
din referring to worship and piety and al-dunya to space and cosmology. 
Significantly, al-dunya is easier to identify than its partners, al-din and 
al-akhira. Within a religious perspective, we can distinguish different 
evaluations of al-dunya and what pertains to it (al-dunyawi): a salvational 
approach devalues al-dunya as a lower sphere concerned with individual 
bodily comfort and worldly success. But there is also a strong tradition 
within theology and law that identifies the benefits of religion to individual 
wellbeing and communal welfare in this world. As this type of reasoning is 
deeply woven into Islamic theological and legal discourse, al-dunya cannot 
be simply identified with the secular.
In what I have called the salvational approach, al-dunya was most 
commonly combined with al-akhira, the ‘afterworld’ or ‘otherworld’. 
Muslims generally understood al-dunya as the (physical) world and present, 
‘lower’ life (al-hayat al-dunya) with its pleasures and desires, superficial, 
51 For theological discussions broadly understood, Rushain Abbasi in his article, “Did 
Premodern Muslims Distinguish the Religious and Secular?” demonstrates that they 
indeed did: the pairing, which was premised on a distinction, was common albeit 
controversial. Abbasi also shows that pre-modern Muslims generally assumed the dunya 
to be shared by all humankind, easily understood, and hence not in need of detailed 
description. By contrast, din was thought to be specific and in need of explication 
(Abbasi, “Did Premodern Muslims Distinguish,” esp. 193–99, 200, 203).
30
fleeting, and deceptive. The world was worldly, caught up in the pursuit 
of power, pleasure, property, or wine, life, and lust, as the prominent 14th-
century scholar Taj al-Din al-Subki put it in his Tabaqat al-Shafiʿiyya. Here, 
we also see the impact of culture, inflecting the pleasures and desires of this 
world and, by the same token, deflecting Muslims from the straight path 
leading them to God. Sura 29:64 voices a familiar theme when it states 
that, “The present life is nothing but frivolity and amusement. But the 
Abode of the Hereafter is the real life.” Sura 2:285–6 is more threatening, 
warning that, “Those who have purchased the present life in exchange for 
the afterlife, for them punishment shall not be lightened, nor shall they 
find any to help them.”52
Muslim ideas and images were not derived solely from the Qurʾan 
and the legal and theological tradition at large. There was a vast body of 
eschatological and literary texts resting on other sources, creating a rich 
tapestry of narrative as well as some visual material. As a result, Muslim 
ideas and images of the afterlife, paradise, heaven, and hell were multifaceted 
and multidimensional. To begin with, al-dunya and al-akhira have a spatial 
dimension in addition to the temporal one. Al-akhira, comprising heaven 
and hell (which in themselves are layered), stands for an ‘otherworld’ that 
exists in parallel to this world and not just as a ‘hereafter’, or ‘the world to 
come’.53 The boundaries between this world and the other are permeable: 
winds, scents, sounds, and material objects flow from one to the other, 
plants and animals can cross over, as can select men and women, either 
physically or in their dreams. But there is also a hierarchy involved, for 
the otherworld is superior to this world with its ‘lower life’. Still, it would 
be futile to search for clear lines: when Christian Lange calls religion the 
search not so much for the last things as rather for the ultimate things, 
which are not far but near, the line between the two gets blurred, given 
that, as stated earlier, al-dunya indicates the near. It is a paradox mirroring 
the assumption that God is both near and utterly removed. When Lange 
52 Trans. Tarif Khalidi; see also Sura 4:74. For the Qurʾanic references, see ʿAbd al-Baqi, 
al-Muʿjam al-mufahras and Christian Lange, Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 37–39.
53 Lange, Paradise and Hell, esp. 4–13, 37–39, 67–70. For the relevance of this understanding 
to Sufism, see Alexander Knysh, who stated that “The purpose of ascetic self-discipline 
and self-imposed strictures is, as numerous Sufi masters have argued for centuries, to 
purify the soul and to prepare it for a vision of or communion/communication with God 
here and now [my emphases]” (Knysh, Sufism, 10).
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describes al-dunya as the ‘ordinary reality’ and al-akhira as the ‘ultimate 
reality’, separated by a divide which, however, can be crossed, we obtain 
a different idea.54 When al-dunya is interpreted as “signifying everything 
that befalls humans before death or every activity that is not aimed at 
the service of God”,55  we perceive the distinction from din, or belief and 
worship. Of course, for the believer, much of what “befalls humans before 
death” is, however, decreed by God and hence of religious significance.
In the context of modern concerns, the second pairing, which combines 
al-dunya with al-din, is more immediately relevant. If al-dunya is the 
mundane and ordinary sphere, then it stands to reason that al-din denotes 
something else. This is commonly identified as otherworldly, spiritual, 
religious, and/or devoted to the service of a deity or a number of deities. 
Muslim scholars have written at length on the subject, especially from the 
11th century C.E. onwards, elaborating on the respective properties of din 
and dunya, and the proper ways of dealing with them. Drawing notably on 
the noted scholar and bureaucrat Abu l-Hasan al-Mawardi (d. 1048), with 
his influential Adab al-din wa-l-dunya, Sunni religious and legal scholars 
attempted to delineate the fields of din and dunya. In the 13th century, 
Muhammad b. al-Mansur Ibn al-Haddad tersely described them as follows: 
There are two kinds of administration: the administration of dīn and the 
administration of dunyā. The administration of dīn is that which brings 
about the execution of (religious) obligations, and the administration of 
dunyā is that which brings about the prosperity of the earth.56
Several points make this statement relevant to modern concerns (and to 
dismantling unfounded assumptions regarding pre-modern conceptions of 
religion and its others): for one thing, it takes the existence of distinct but 
interrelated fields as a given without theorising about this distinction.57 It 
54 Lange, Paradise and Hell, 12–13.
55 Lutz Wiederholt, “Profane and Sacred,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 4 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004), 283r.
56 Ibn al-Haddad, Al-Jawhar al-nafis fi siyasat al-raʾis, ed. Ridwan al-Sayyid (Beirut: Dar 
al-Taliʿa li-l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1983), 61–62, quoted from Abbasi, “Did Premodern 
Muslims Distinguish,” 218.
57 I entirely agree with Rushain Abbasi in seeing what at some point he calls the “interactive 
dīn and dunyā dynamic” (Abbasi, 190) as precisely that: dynamic and premised on a 
distinction but as a rule not presupposing a separation. Unfortunately, Abbasi occasionally 
undercuts his own argument by using the terms ‘separation’ and ‘separate’. At the same 
time, he oversimplifies when he refers to divine law as one of the ‘things’ falling within the 
32
does not spell out the limits to religious obligations, but it at least clarifies 
that in this particular combination, din cannot signify an ‘Islamic way 
of life’ encompassing everything, as many would have it. If that were the 
case, al-din would have swallowed up al-dunya, or at least made positive 
reference to it impossible. Yet this is precisely what was happening: 
the scholars and bureaucrats creating the relevant discourse may have 
regarded al-dunya as the sphere of the mundane and ordinary, but they 
did not devalue it. Rather, they carefully considered the religious (dini) and 
worldly (dunyawi) benefits deriving from specific actions and institutions 
to the individual and the community, including notably their safety and 
prosperity. Both were taken seriously.58 The political logic underpinning 
this discourse closely intersected with legal reasoning, which discussed 
(and continues to discuss) the benefits (masalih, manafiʿ) of individual 
acts, techniques, and institutions for the welfare of the individual and, 
even more so, the community and society at large. For this reason, al-
maslaha al-mursala and al-maslaha al-ʿamma have frequently been 
translated as public interest.59
We are fortunate in that we do not have to explore the din-dunya 
relationship solely through the lens of religious and legal scholars, which 
tend to dye and all too often discolour our perception of Muslim social, 
cultural, and political life. A mass of non-religious textual and material 
religious field: “My paper will demonstrate that the medieval dīn-dunyā binary represented 
a conceptual separation of the world into distinct religious and non-religious spheres 
analogous to the modern religious-secular, with things like worship, prayer, and divine law 
on one side and all worldly matters on the other” (Abbasi, 191). As he himself shows, and as 
I have argued repeatedly, ‘divine law’ does not fall squarely within a religious sphere, and by 
the same token, it is not outside the non-religious sphere; see above, n. 5.
58 In his characteristic high-flying style, Wilfred Cantwell Smith emphasised the dual 
obligation: “Our thesis has been that Islam is essentially a religion, and as such profoundly 
personal and also finally transcending all particularities and the confines of this mundane 
world and all its affairs; nonetheless that is has been distinctively characterized by a deep 
concern for these affairs. It has had a central conviction that the true Muslim life includes 
the carrying out in this world of the divine injunction as to how mankind, individually 
and corporately, should live… At its fullest, this conviction has risen to the vision of 
building the ideal society” (Smith, Islam in Modern History, 39). For a superb case study 
on the promotion of agriculture and irrigation as encouraged in Islamic advice literature 
and put into practice by Timurid rulers in 15th-century north-east Iran (Khurasan), see 
Maria E. Subtelny, Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in 
Medieval Iran (Leiden: Brill, 2007), chap. 4.
59 For pre-modern (‘classical’) debates, see Felicitas Opwis, Maṣlaḥa and the Purpose of Law 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010). I cannot go into the vast and controversial modern debate on utility, 
maslaha, and the ‘finality of Sharia’, or maqasid al-shariʿa.
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evidence allows us to go much further. Names, sobriquets, and titles 
provide an excellent entrance point, and they happen to have been a 
favourite object of historical study in previous decades, frequently in 
conjunction with epigraphy and numismatics.60 In contradistinction 
to their Umayyad predecessors (r. 661–750), who had refrained from 
adopting regnal titles, the ʿAbbasid and Fatimid caliph-imams adopted 
titles that highlighted their special relationship with God, be it in a 
passive role (al-Mutawakkil ʿala llah, ‘the one who trusts in God,’ al-
Mustansir bi-llah, ‘the one who is victorious through God,’ al-Mahdi bi-
llah, ‘the divinely guided one’) or in a more active one (al-Qa’im bi-amri 
llah, ‘he who implements God’s command’). From the mid-10th century 
C.E. onwards, when the ʿAbbasids had become desperately dependent 
on military men of Turkic origin (commonly referred to as ‘the Turks’) 
within their realm, and were threatened by military forces of Iranian, 
Turkic, or Arab origin from abroad, they granted titles including the 
elements din, dawla (rotation, dynasty, dynastic realm),61 mulk (realm, 
dominion, kingdom), milla and umma (religion, religious community, 
Muslim community) to the military commanders and heads of the civil 
administration on whom they relied. Whereas religious scholars tended 
to hold titles including din, courtiers, generals, military strongmen, and 
high-ranking bureaucrats (‘secretaries’, kuttab) were given honorifics 
marking them out as the pillar, support, friend, sword, glory, sun, or star 
of din, dawla, mulk, or milla: Salah al-Din (Saladin), Sharaf al-Dawla, 
Nizam al-Mulk, Qiwam al-Milla, and so forth.
The significance of the specific element selected should not be 
overstated: in spite of some attempts on the part of chancery scribes and 
bureaucrats to correlate titles to rank and functions (e.g., military or 
60 For the following, see C.E. Bosworth, “Laḳab,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition, 
vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 1998); for more detail, see, notably, Johannes H. Kramers, “Les noms 
musulmans composés avec Dīn,” in Acta Orientalia 5 (1927); Hasan al-Basha, al-Alqab 
al-islamiyya fi l-taʾrikh wa-l-wathaʾiq wa-l-athar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda, 1957); 
Albert Dietrich, “Zu den mit ad-dīn zusammengesetzten islamischen Personennamen,” 
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 110 (1960). Bosworth also points 
to the fact that the granting of titles was a major source of caliphal income and, for that 
reason, they had to be paid for in one way or another. Heribert Busse in his Chalif und 
Großkönig. Die Buyiden im Irak (945–1055) (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004) provides detailed 
evidence for the Buyid period (r. in Iraq 945–1055).
61 In Ismaʿili (Sevener) Shiʿi thought, to which the Fatimids adhered, dawla had a 
cosmological and soteriological meaning and should be translated as ‘aeon’ rather than 
‘realm.’ I am grateful to Sarah Stroumsa for alerting me to this fact.
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civil), no consistent pattern emerged between the 10th and 15th centuries.62 
One and the same man could be awarded the title of Rukn al-Dawla 
(‘pillar of the realm’) one year and Rukn al-Din the next. The various 
elements could be strung together in ever longer chains, for example in 
the honorifics varying the dawla element, carried by all leading male 
members of the Buyid clan, Persian-speaking Shiʿi warlords from the 
region of Daylam, on the southern shore of the Caspian, who, in 945/46 
C.E. imposed their protectorate over the Sunni caliphs (Buyid rule was 
also known as dawlat al-Daylam). The practice reached a peak with ʿ Imad 
al-Din Sharaf al-Dawla Muʾayyid al-Milla Mughith al-Umma Safi Amir 
al-Muʾminin (pillar of religion, honour of the realm, supporter of the 
community and its provider, and true friend of the commander of the 
faithful, i.e., the caliph). Rien ne va plus. The artillery of titles was clearly 
meant to impress, eagerly coveted and dearly paid for. Title mania was, 
however, also censured by the pious and ridiculed by the urbane.
In the mid-11th century, the Iranian Shiʿi Buyids were displaced by the 
Turkic Sunni Seljuks, who imposed themselves even more forcefully on 
the ʿAbbasid caliphs and adopted the title of sultan, which a few decades 
previously had been introduced by Mahmud of Ghazna (d. 1030). By 
that time, the Arabic title malik (king), which in earlier times had been 
denounced as un-Islamic, had been rapidly gaining in popularity and 
was either granted to, or arrogated by, a growing number of military 
strongmen. ‘King’ could be topped by ‘king of kings’, either in Arabic or 
in Persian. The Buyids had already adopted the ancient Persian title of 
shahanshah, ‘king of kings’, underlining a claim to power that was based 
on Iranian cultural heritage and kingship.63 Several Buyids and Seljuks 
forced the caliph to crown them in a Sasanian-style ceremony and to 
confer high-sounding titles on them, including ‘king in, or of, the east 
and the west’ (malik fi or al-mashriq wa-l-maghrib).
62 The scribe who finished Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatname after the author’s death tried to 
impose a firm distinction between titles given to military men (x al-dawla) and civilian 
bureaucrats (y al-mulk)(Nizāmulmulk, Siyāsatnāma: Das Buch der Staatskunst, trans. 
Karl Emil Schabinger Freiherr von Schowingen (Zurich: Manesse, 1987) esp. chap. 41). 
He failed, as one would learn from looking at the titles of Seljuk dignitaries.
63 Busse, Chalif und Großkönig, 159–84, and Wilferd Madelung, “The assumption of the 
title Shāhanshāh by the Būyids and ‘The reign of the Daylam’ [Dawlat al-Daylam],” 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies 27 (1969).
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The Seljuks also seem to be the first to have been granted honorifics 
pairing al-dunya and al-din, such as Muʿizz or Jalal al-Dunya wa-l-Din for 
Sultan Malik-Shah (r. 1072–92).64 The combination of dunya and din echoed 
an ancient Iranian trope according to which ‘religion and government are 
twin brothers’. This idea was vigorously adopted by Muslim ‘theorists’ of 
government, first and foremost the famous Seljuk vizier Abu l-ʿAli Hasan 
Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092).65 The trope was, of course, not uniquely Islamic. 
For Western Europe, it has perhaps been best studied with regard to 
early modern England and France, and brought to life in Hilary Mantel’s 
acclaimed trilogy on Henry VIII’s powerful counsellor and chancellor 
Thomas Cromwell (d. 1540).66 In the Islamic context, the formula could be 
read as a broadening of the scope: dunya suggested more than either dawla 
or mulk, which in the Sunni tradition referred to the realm controlled by 
a ruler, and by the same token designated the recipient as his servant. In 
the late 12th and early 13th centuries, a number of Turkic rulers more or less 
arrogated these titles to themselves. Among them, the Khwarezm Shahs 
posed the greatest threat to the caliphate until their fall to the Mongols in 
the early 1220s, followed some three decades later by the Mongol conquest 
of the ʿAbbasids themselves. 
64 All Seljuk sultans, as well as their chief consorts/wives and sons, were addressed with 
honorifics modulating the dunya wa-din formula (pillar, saviour, reviver, support, etc. of 
al-dunya wa-l-din); see Nizāmulmulk, Siyāsatnāma, 384.
65 Nizāmulmulk, Siyāsatnāma. See notably Shaul Shaked, “From Iran to Islam: Notes on some 
themes in transmission. 1. ‘Religion and sovereignty are twins,’ in Ibn al-Muqaffa’s theory of 
government,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 4 (1984); Noah Feldman, “The Ethical 
Literature: Religion and Political Authority as Brothers,” Journal of Persianate Studies 5, 
no. 2 (2012); Neguin Yavari, Advice for the Sultan: Prophetic Voices and Secular Politics in 
Medieval Islam (London: Hurst, 2014), 29–37; Safi, Politics of Knowledge, 3–7, 106, 119. Safi 
also documents the trenchant critique of the trope by the exciting figure of ʿAyn al-Qudat 
Hamadhani (d. 1131) (Safi, chap. 6, esp. 182–89). For the reign of Nizam al-Mulk, dubbed 
“al-dawla al-Nizamiyya” by Muslim observers, who in his capacity as vizier and atabeg 
combined administrative, fiscal, and military responsibilities, see Safi, chap. 2.
66 Hilary Mantel, Wolf Hall (London: Fourth Estate, 2009); Bring Up the Bodies (London: 
Fourth Estate, 2012); and The Mirror & the Light (London: Fourth Estate, 2020).
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Coins and medallions minted for the Khwarezm Shahs declare them to 
rule both, din and dunya, as distinct units harmoniously brought together 
under their aegis.67
After the fall of the Ismaʿili (Sevener Shiʿi) Fatimids in Egypt, both the 
Sunni Ayyubids (r. 1171–1250) and the Sunni Mamluks, former military 
slaves who displaced the Ayyubids and ruled until they were defeated 
by the Ottomans in 1516–17, similarly used the dunya wa-din formula. 
Baibars al-Bunduqdari, the de facto founder of the new political order 
(which was not strictly speaking a dynasty), who had risen to power 
through murder and cunning, called himself “the sultan, the king, the 
victorious, pillar of al-dunya and al-din (al-sultan al-malik al-zahir 
rukn al-dunya wa-l-din)”. He managed to stay in power for seventeen 
years (1260–77).
67 For more detail, see Lutz Richter-Bernburg, “Zur Titulatur der Ḫwārezm-Šāhe aus der 
Dynastie Anūštegīns,” Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, n. s., 9 (1976).
Coin of the Khwarezm Shah Sultan ʿAla l-Dunya wa-l-Din Muhammad b. Tekish (r. 1200–20).
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Gold dinar of Sultan Baibars, title shown above the emblem of the leopard. Source: wikimedia.
Only rarely was din directly combined with dawla, as in the case of 
Mahmud of Ghazna’s father Sebüktekin (Nasir al-Din wa-l-Dawla) or of 
Aybak (Qutb al-Dawla wa-l-Din). Both were manumitted military slaves 
who served a dynasty before founding de facto independent sultanates in 
present-day Afghanistan and northern India.68 What we see more frequently 
is strings of titles carrying either din or dawla, such as Taj al-Din ʿAlaʾ 
al-Dawla, or Jamal al-Din Sharaf al-Dawla. It would seem that the trope 
that religion and government were twin brothers was generally expressed 
through mulk rather than dawla, which may still have carried too much 
of the dynastic association, at least for Sunni Muslims. It was only in the 
20th century, when dawla simply signified ‘state’, having long since shed its 
dynastic associations and even more so its soteriological ring, that Islamists 
proclaimed that ‘Islam is religion and state’ (al-Islam din wa-dawla), with a 
fully developed political theory of its own.
Many Western observers have identified din/dini with ‘the spiritual’ and 
dunya/dunyawi with ‘the temporal’. This includes prominent Islamicists such 
as Henri Laoust and Louis Gardet who assigned to the realm of the spiritual 
what was based on revelation and to the temporal what was not.69 At best, 
this interpretation is misleading. It evokes the mediaeval European doctrine 
of the two swords: a spiritual one held by the Church, and a temporal one 
wielded by lay rulers. As the conflict over the investiture of bishops and 
abbots in 11th- and 12th-century Europe serves to show, things were more 
68 Bosworth, “Laḳab,” 622, 623, and 629 is not entirely consistent. A Seljuk courtier carried the 
title Kamil al-Dawla wa-l-Din (Safi, Politics of Knowledge, 190–91). The Delhi sultan Iltutmish 
(r. 1211–36) held the title of Shams (‘sun’) al-Dunya wa-l-Din. However, in each instance the 
title was frequently shortened to “al-Din,” dropping either al-Dawla or al-Dunya.
69 Louis Gardet, “Dīn,” 295v; see also Gardet, “Religion and Culture.”
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complicated, and not only because the feudal order itself was so complex, 
defying all efforts at neat categorisation.70 Beginning with the Emperor of 
the Holy (!) Roman Empire, a number of princes claimed not only to have 
been appointed through the grace of God but to have been anointed by 
God. Even in mediaeval Europe, the lines separating the temporal from the 
spiritual were thus far from clear, and frequently disputed.
Similar points hold for the Near East: the men who from the 10th 
century C.E. onwards made their way to power as amirs and sultans did 
not uniformly see themselves as temporal rulers complementing the 
spiritual authority of the Sunni caliph. The great Abu Rayhan al-Biruni 
(d. 1048) did report in his “Chronology of Ancient Nations” that certain 
astrologers had described the caliph as a mere figurehead with religious 
authority (al-Biruni called it dini and iʿtiqadi) rather than temporal power 
(mulk dunyawi).71 Al-Biruni was, however, not a ‘political theorist’, and 
he referred to the political realities of mid-10th century Iraq, rather than 
caliphal theory. Regardless, one should be cautious of giving undue weight 
to his words, given the intricacy and instability of the context and power 
configuration he describes. To begin with, the concept of the caliph as a 
purely ‘spiritual’ figure is ill-founded. The ʿAbbasid caliphs laid claim to 
genealogical charisma (as defined by Max Weber) through their descent 
from the house of the prophet Muhammad, and were widely seen as the 
head of the (Sunni) Muslim community, or Umma. They were able to use 
their aura of religious legitimacy to confer legitimacy on other rulers, who 
were in theory subject to them. The caliph’s function was to ‘uphold Islam’ 
and to ward off heresy and disbelief; some transmitted prophetic hadiths, 
others issued creeds carrying their names. The fuzziness of boundaries 
notwithstanding, religious (here: doctrinal and legal) authority must be 
distinguished from religious function.
70 I will not go into the dispute over whether the term ‘feudal’ is heuristically valid, whether 
anything like a ‘feudal order’ ever existed, what vassalage entailed, what the status of 
bondage and serfdom implied, and whether the categories of Roman Law fitted social 
reality. In the present context, the vital point is that bishops and abbots, in addition to 
being high Church clergy, were also fief holders and vassals, and hence had to swear 
loyalty to two masters, the Pope and their prince. These loyalties, and the status of the 
prince vis-à-vis ordained clergy, were seen quite differently by lawyers of the Church and 
diverse emperors or kings, respectively.
71 See Abbasi, “Did Premodern Muslims Distinguish,” 216.
39
Contrary to what al-Biruni may have thought, caliphal claims to religious 
authority were diffuse and disputed.72 In the so-called mihna (‘tribulation’, 
inquisition) of the first part of the 9th century, the caliphs failed in their 
attempt to impose a specific doctrine on the scholars of theology and law 
(ʿulamaʾ), despite the latter’s lack of corporate institutionalisation and the 
independent material resources tied to it. From the second half of the 9th 
century onwards, the Sunni ʿulamaʾ were widely portrayed as the ‘heirs of 
the prophets’, qualified to rule on religious and legal issues, on the basis of 
the authoritative textual sources. Still, in their majority they continued to 
affirm the caliph’s role as guardian of the faith and the Muslim community. 
Muslim philosophers from al-Farabi (d. 950) to Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037) 
to Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), working and reworking important strands 
of Greek tradition, offered their own understandings of caliphal authority 
by variously identifying prophets, imams, and the philosopher king.73 
By the 12th century, Sufi shaykhs, saints, and brotherhoods had emerged as 
additional players in the field, adding yet another element to what was already 
a complicated configuration. As a result, religious authority was dispersed, 
with considerable potential for competition, tension, and negotiation, even 
while the rhetoric of collaboration was studiously preserved.
Unlike the ʿAbbasid caliphs, the Buyids, Seljuks, and Khwarezm Shahs 
lacked genealogical legitimacy, as defined by Muslim religious scholars. 
Additionally, they did not meet many of the other eligibility criteria the 
same scholars had fixed, such as religious knowledge; many of them did 
not even speak Arabic. Nonetheless, they were Muslims, and they wielded 
power (shawka). The deficiency concerning their genealogy and religious 
qualification did not impair their capacity to uphold both social order and 
correct religion. 11th-century Sunni scholars and bureaucrats eventually went 
as far as to assert that what ultimately counted was order and justice, and not 
72 Muhammad Qasim Zaman emphasised cooperation rather than conflict between caliph 
and ʿulamaʾ (Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics under the Early ʿAbbāsids: 
The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī Elite (Leiden: Brill, 1997), esp. 101–18, 201–13). Ira 
M. Lapidus spoke of ‘tacit collaboration’ and a ‘tacit bargain’ (Ira M. Lapidus, A History 
of Islamic Societies, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 264–65). His 
“Separation of State and Religion” no longer reflects current research. See also: Gudrun 
Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, eds., Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim 
Societies (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Krämer, “Gottes-Recht bricht Menschen-Recht,” and below.
73 For a spirited contribution to a contested field, see Patricia Crone, God’s Rule – 
Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), chap. 14.
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whether the ruler was a Muslim.74 How these rulers placed themselves vis-
à-vis the caliph and the ʿulamaʾ depended on time and circumstance:75 the 
Shiʿi Buyids showed themselves remarkably flexible in adjusting to changing 
circumstance, exchanging mutually binding oaths of loyalty with the Sunni 
caliphs, who in theory they should have considered illegitimate usurpers 
of an imamate rightfully belonging to selected male descendants of ʿAli 
alone. The Seljuk Tughril Bey (r. 1055–63) started off by portraying himself 
as the loyal sword rescuing his caliph from Shiʿi oppression at home and 
abroad, while taking on the titles of ‘exalted sultan’, padshah (emperor), and 
shahanshah. Both the caliph and the Seljuks granted honorifics including 
din, dawla, and mulk to the military and civilian elites serving them. Thus the 
famous Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk (‘order of the realm’), whose given name 
was Hasan, eventually added Qiwam al-Din (‘pillar of religion’) and Radi 
Amir al-Muʾminin (‘the one with whom the caliph is pleased’) to his titles. 
The Seljuk Sultan Malik-Shah (r. 1072–92) went furthest by appropriating 
caliphal prerogatives and titles (notably khalifat Allah, God’s deputy, and 
‘the shadow of God on earth’), and like several of his Turkic and Buyid 
predecessors, endeavoured to rid himself of the caliph altogether.
The further we move from the writings of Muslim scholars of theology 
and law, to consider other narrative genres, chancery documents, law in 
practice, and major expressions of art and culture, the more clearly we 
discern the power of a monarchical tradition, in which princes sought 
religious legitimacy, and made considerable efforts to be viewed as pious, 
but were nonetheless quite willing to assert themselves, even overriding 
religious laws and regulations if necessary. Disdain for worldly pursuits 
and pleasures was not the rule for rulers. If it had been, Muslim history 
and historiography would have been very different.76 What is evident is 
74 Omid Safi traces the remarkable shifts of the celebrated scholar and Sufi Abu Hamid al-
Ghazali (d. 1111), who ended up legitimising any ruler provided he upheld justice (as it 
was understood in his time and milieu) (Safi, Politics of Knowledge, chap. 4).
75 For the Buyids, see Heribert Busse, Chalif und Großkönig, notably 57–60, 103–04, 131–59, 185, 
203–21, 261–74, 294–95; for the Seljuks, Safi, Politics of Knowledge, 3–7, 19, 21–22, 26–31, 35–42, 
61–62, 75–76, 79. For Nizam al-Mulk, see the Seljuk secretary and historian Anushirvan b. 
Khalid (d. 1137), quoted in the Introduction to Nizāmulmulk, Siyāsatnāma, 58.
76 In addition to the titles already cited, see Aziz al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in 
Muslim, Christian and Pagan Polities (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001) and, with a focus on the Maghreb, 
Jocelyne Dakhlia, Le divan des rois: Le politique et le religieux dans l’islam (Paris: Aubier, 1998); for 
Timurid Iran and Moghul India, see A. Azfar Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and 
Sainthood in Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
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that, irrespective of the precise arrangement, there was no neat separation 
of powers between ʿAbbasid caliphs, Buyid amirs, and Seljuk sultans: they 
were all held responsible for din and dunya, ‘upholding Islam’, securing 
peace and prosperity at home, and expanding the borders of Islam abroad. 
Titles and power configurations changed with the early modern empires 
of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Moghuls. The pattern of collaboration and 
competition did not.
3     Religion, Culture, and the Islamicate
3.1  Islam and Community-Building
It is one thing to ask whether Islam was historically understood by Muslims 
as a religion. It is a different matter to investigate under which conditions 
a religious community emerged, that was clearly recognisable as Muslim/
Islamic and demarcated from others: in its immediate sense, islam refers to 
an attitude and an act rather than to a distinct community of believers. Islam 
denotes ‘surrender’ (to God and his decree). One may translate ‘Islam’ as 
‘submission’, as Michel Houellebecq notoriously did, and as many Muslims 
and students of Islam have done before him. However, one should then 
equally read the Lord’s Prayer as an act of submission (“Thy will be done, 
on Earth as it is in heaven”).77 The relevant sources, including first and 
foremost the Qurʾan, suggest that Muhammad and his followers initially 
had an open, inclusive understanding of islam and that all people who 
‘devoted themselves’ to the God of Muhammad and his followers could 
be accepted as ‘believers’ (Arab., muʾminun).78 The question of how open 
the gates were in reality, and whether they actually let in Jews, Christians, 
and other seekers of the Divine (sing., hanif) defining ‘belief ’ according to 
77 Evidently, this is not a comment on Houellebecq’s novel Soumission which has been 
variously read as utopia, dystopia, satire, and/or a culturally racist critique on Islam. 
Houellebecq’s novel featured on the cover of Charlie Hebdo the day it was attacked by 
militant Islamists.
78 For philology see notably: James Robson, “‘Islām’ as a Term,” The Muslim World 44 
(1954): 101–09; and D.Z.H. Baneth, “What did Muhammad mean when he called his 
religion ‘Islam’? The original meaning of aslama and its derivatives,” Israel Oriental 
Studies 1 (1971). For the historical narrative and theological analysis, see Fred M. 
Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam (Cambridge MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and 
Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), chap. 1, esp. 32–35, and Smith, “Faith,” esp. 167–70.
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their own criteria, remains unresolved, however. Whether this inclusive 
approach applied to the entire prophetic era, i.e., the two decades between 
610 and 632 C.E., is better left for specialist discussion. By contrast, the 
distinction between believers and Muslims (muʾminun and muslimun) 
retained its relevance and continues to be discussed to the present day.  
Certain echoes of the more open understanding of Islam lingered on. 
For example, in Islamic renderings of the Alexander legend, as incorporated 
into the poetic works of Nizami and others, Iskandar/Alexander the Great 
was shown making the pilgrimage to Mecca. I will return to this issue later.
The historical record evidences a community built on a different basis, a 
fact relevant to discussion of the nexus between religious bond and political 
loyalty and, by extension, the potential for secularity ‘in Islam’. According to 
Muslim tradition, shortly after the journey (hijra) of Muhammad and his 
followers from Mecca to Yathrib in 622 C.E., the Muslim refugees entered 
into a treaty alliance with several of Yathrib’s pagan and Jewish clans. Among 
Muslims, Yathrib came to be known as Medina (madinat al-nabi, city of 
Iskandar/Alexander at the Kaʿba in 
Mecca. Nizami, Khamsa 1560–61. Paris: 
Bibliothèque nationale de France. BNF 
Supplément persan 1956 f. 212v.
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the Prophet). Muhammad headed the community in his dual capacity 
as prophet among the believers (muʾminun, and only in a few instances 
muslimun) and arbitrator among the hostile local clans. The alliance was 
formally laid down in the so-called ‘Constitution of Medina’79 and was 
based on a distinction between religious and political affiliation, although 
this distinction was not elaborated in any theoretical manner. Muhammad’s 
claim to religious authority was valid only in the eyes of the believers. To 
everyone else, he had to prove himself as a political leader – one reason 
among others not to equate community building with identity construction. 
The alliance sought by the Muslim refugees in their new environment was 
based on politics, not cult and belief.
Some Muslims continue to invoke the alliance established in Medina 
as the ultimate model of state- and community-building in Islam. Many 
believe that in Medina, Muhammad created what resembled a modern 
state, and that Muslims wrote the first constitution in human history. The 
assertion serves an obvious function in the competition over primacy and 
superiority of claims, but it does nothing to elucidate what went on in 
Medina in the 620s. Muslim historians tell us that the Medinan alliance 
was short-lived. Within a few decades, Islam emerged as a community 
(umma) of its own, clearly distinguishable from that of the Jews, the 
Christians and the God-seeking hanifs, to which one either belonged or 
not. The so-called Pact of ʿUmar, attributed to the second Sunni caliph 
ʿUmar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–44) but only fully elaborated several centuries 
later, was framed as a contractual agreement the Christians of Damascus 
had sought from their Muslim conquerors. It prohibited non-Muslims 
from dressing as Muslims did, wearing their hair and beards in a similar 
fashion, teaching their children the Qurʾan, or practising their cult in 
areas inhabited by Muslims. Some of these clauses could easily be read 
as cultural. By the same token, the Pact fixed the social ascendency of 
Muslims over non-Muslims in minute detail. The principle of rendering 
religious difference visible could also be read as a strategy of conflict 
prevention, a dual function that was carried into the modern era.80 If, in 
79 There is no extant copy of the document that came to be known as the “Constitution of 
Medina” (the text itself refers to a sahifa, a ‘book’ or ‘sheet of paper’) but it is widely considered 
to be authentic, even among critical historians; see Michael Lecker, The Constitution of 
Medina: Muḥammad’s First Legal Document (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 2004).
80 Albrecht Noth, “Abgrenzungsprobleme zwischen Muslimen und Nicht-Muslimen: Die 
‘Bedingungen Umars’ (aš-šurūṭ al-ʿumariyya) unter einem anderen Aspekt gelesen,” 
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the process, the external walls were raised, the gates still remained open to 
those who were prepared to undergo the rather simple act of conversion. 
However, the gates were only open in one direction: conversion was 
declared irreversible, and abandoning Islam amounted to regressing to 
an inferior status of belief or even disbelief. Apostasy led not only to social 
ostracism, it was subject to severe punishment under Islamic law.
3.2   Muslims and Others
The basic structure of Islamic theological, ethical, moral, aesthetic, and 
legal teachings, practices, and institutions was erected over the course of 
some three centuries, particularly in the urban centres of Syria, Iraq, and 
Egypt rather than in Mecca and Medina. For that reason, Islam was not the 
Arab desert warrior religion it was portrayed to be by European scholars up 
to Max Weber.81 What emerged as ‘Islam’ resulted from continued exchange 
with representatives of other religious, ethical, moral, and philosophical 
traditions, notably Jews and Christians, with the Qurʾan placing itself 
squarely within the monotheistic tradition.82 While it would be fascinating 
to systematically explore the sites, types, and conditions of interaction, 
the persons involved, and the tools and mechanisms employed, I shall not 
do so here. What matters here is that in the course of these encounters, 
Muslim scholars elaborated in greater detail their understanding of the 
‘religion of truth’ (din al-haqq) and the properties of other cults and beliefs, 
leading to sophisticated taxonomies that went way beyond the unsystematic 
Qurʾanic references and prophetic hadiths. Qurʾanic verses such as, “You 
have your religion, and I have mine” (Sura 109:6), and “It is He Who sent 
His Messenger with Guidance and the religion of truth, that He may exalt 
Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 9 (1987); and Gudrun Krämer, “Moving Out 
of Place: Minorities in Middle Eastern Urban Societies, 1800–1914,” in The Urban 
Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950, ed. Peter Sluglett (Syracuse NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2008).
81 For Weber, who never dealt with Islam systematically, see Wolfgang Schluchter, ed., 
Max Webers Sicht des Islams: Interpretation und Kritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1987); and Gudrun Krämer, “Islam, Kapitalismus und die protestantische Ethik,” in 
Kapitalismus: Historische Annäherungen, ed. Gunilla Budde (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2011).
82 The Qurʾan speaks of its own place in the chain of revelations; see Daniel Madigan, 
The Qur’ân’s Self-Image: Writing and Authority in Islam’s Scripture (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), and Stefan Wild, ed., Self-Referentiality in the Qurʾān (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2006).
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it above all religions [al-din kullihi], even if the idolaters find it abhorrent” 
(Sura 9:33), point to an acute awareness of plurality, competition, and the 
determination to establish a hierarchy. Thus Sura 3:110 famously declared, 
“You are the best community [umma] ever brought forth among mankind, 
commanding virtue and forbidding vice, and believing in God,” and 
Muhammad was credited with stating that “Islam is exalted, and nothing is 
exalted above it” (al-Islam yaʿlu wa-la yuʿla).83
Scholarly elaborations on din in the singular and adyan or diyanat in 
the plural, or on milla (pl. milal) as religious community/communities, 
and on orthodoxy, heresy, and apostasy make it abundantly clear that for 
the authors involved Islam was a religion comparable to, indeed superior 
to, other religions.84 While Iranian traditions85 infused with Zoroastrianism 
had a notable impact on Islamic law, administration, religious practices, and 
broader cultural ideas, it was Jews and Christians that constituted the most 
relevant other in the authoritative religious literature. In modern Arabic 
parlance, the ‘heavenly religions’ (al-adyan al-samawiyya) comprising 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam correspond to the ‘Abrahamic religions’ of 
Western tradition. The ambivalent relationship between Muslims, Jews, and 
Christians was deeply significant to Muslim self-understanding and to the 
continuity of a community that rested on, and in turn demanded, belief and 
belonging. This relationship allowed for connection as well as distancing, 
and for the recognition of commonality as well as claims to superiority.86
Based on Qurʾanic references, Muslim religious and legal scholars 
expressed this claim to superiority in the shape of a pyramid: Muhammad 
83 For the hadith, see Sahih al-Bukhari, kitab al-janaʾiz 79, no. 79 (Edition Beirut: Dar al-
Arqam, s.d.), 284; for the axiom and its legal ramifications, see Friedmann, Tolerance and 
Coercion, esp. 35–39.
84 Out of the extensive literature, see again Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion, chap. 2, who 
among other things shows (without explicitly addressing this claim) that the assertion 
that the plural adyan was only created in the modern period is wrong.
85 I cannot go into the long and unresolved debate over whether to speak of ‘Iran’ (with the 
emphasis on territory) or of ‘Persia’ (with the emphasis on language, ethnicity, and rule 
by ethnic Persians) for the period under consideration. Here as in many other contexts, 
naming is not innocent. Rather, the debate is deeply embedded in cultural and political 
battles; for a summary, see Sarah B. Savant, The New Muslims of Post-Conquest Iran: 
Tradition, Memory, and Conversion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
8–12; see also below for discussions of a ‘Persianate’ sphere.
86 For the normative aspects, see Wilde and McAuliffe, “Religious Pluralism and the 
Qurʾān” and Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion; my article “Pluralism and Tolerance,” in 
Islamic Political Thought: An Introduction, ed. Gerhard Bowering (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015) considers contemporary positions in more detail.
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received the ultimate revelation correcting Jewish and Christian deviations 
from, and outright falsifications of, the genuine heavenly revelations of earlier 
prophets. Through this ultimate revelation, God “perfected” the religion 
(din) of Muhammad and the believers and made it “complete” (Sura 5:3); 
hence rendering Islam the perfect religion. Difference translated seamlessly 
into hierarchy. The parallels with the equally ambivalent relationship of 
Christians to Jewish tradition, which also allows for both connection and 
a claim to superiority, are evident. It would be all the more interesting to 
explore the Chinese concept of sanjiao, the ‘three teachings’, which describes 
the multifaceted, occasionally tense but generally harmonious relationship 
between Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism.87 It is important to note that 
coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims could extend far beyond 
the original triad of Muslims, Jews, and Christians, to include communities 
that the majority of Muslim theologians and legal scholars did not recognise 
as believers and hence denied the possibility of peaceful coexistence to. 
Buddhists and Hindus in the Indian subcontinent as well as Confucians 
and Daoists in East Asia are the most conspicuous examples. Some Muslim 
theologians and jurists, applying their understanding of the Qurʾan, 
Sunna, and Sharia, tried to work out rules that would enable interreligious 
coexistence. Many other Muslims, first and foremost Sufis, did not bother 
with such exercises and simply acknowledged the diversity of humankind, 
blithely stating the possibility that there was more than one path to truth 
and the Divine. The ecumenical approach reflected a profoundly religious 
approach, with no hint of a secular outlook. A number of philosophers, both 
Muslim and non-Muslim, went further in asserting that all religions shared 
a common ground and indeed were equally true. However, the philosophers 
also argued that religion was for the masses, whereas an intellectual elite 
attained truth through rational philosophy – a patently secular argument, 
which was consequently denounced by religious scholars, who questioned 
the philosophers’ status as believers.88
87 See Joachim Gentz, “Die Drei Lehren (sanjiao) Chinas in Konflikt und Harmonie: 
Figuren und Strategien einer Debatte,” in Religionen nebeneinander: Modelle religiöser 
Vielfalt in Ost- und Südostasien, ed. Edith Franke and Michael Pye (Münster: Lit, 2006) 
and Xinzhong Yao, Introduction to Confucianism, 223–44.
88 These critics declared the claim that all religions were equivalent (takafuʾ al-adyan) to 
equal godlessness (Sarah Stroumsa, “Comparison as a Multifocal Approach: The Case 
of Arab Philosophical Thought,” in Comparative Studies in the Humanities, ed. Guy G. 
Stroumsa (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2018), 135–40).
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Alongside the possibility of recognition, tolerance, and inclusion, Muslims 
have always had the option of non-recognition, intolerance, and exclusion. 
The latter could go well beyond discursive othering, and ‘submission’ to God 
could entail fighting those who resisted the Muhammadan call (daʿwa). Just as 
the Medinan alliance had served to defend the community against hostilities 
from both outside and within, religiously sanctioned warfare (jihad) could be 
directed against members of other religious communities as well as against 
men and women who self-identified as Muslims. In the latter case, such 
conflict required that the target first be excluded from the community (takfir) 
because of ideas and practices they either espoused or were said to espouse, a 
requirement that left ample room for slander and defamation. In many cases, 
this involved the charge of worshipping people at the expense of worshipping 
God alone, which was equated with polytheism (shirk, ‘association’), violating 
the core tenet of Islam that there is only one God (tauhid). Charges could also be 
based on ideas and behaviour that the men and women concerned considered 
perfectly legitimate within their own understanding of Islam, or that they 
attributed to culture, custom, and tradition: festive celebrations and mourning 
rituals, the consumption of alcohol and drugs, shared prayer with non-
Muslims in times of drought and military threat, matrilineal succession, and 
so on. There was disagreement over whether a particular notion or behaviour 
constituted a mere misdemeanour (‘minor sin’), which did not challenge the 
individual’s status as a Muslim, or a ‘grave sin’, which excluded them from the 
community and even justified taking up arms against them. These debates do 
not concern us here, except that they highlight the importance of correct belief 
and that they could be related to custom and culture.
3.3   Islam and the Islamicate
Under the influence of Michel Foucault and Talal Asad, scholars of Islam have 
been preoccupied, if not obsessed with the workings of power and exclusion, 
particularly within the framework of the modern nation state. Yet power 
entered the stage much earlier. Within the Islamic ecumene, the strongest 
influence was Islam itself. As stated previously, Islam was formed in continuous 
encounter with existing traditions, but this encounter did not occur in a 
power vacuum. Islam, in the dual sense of a community of Muslims and of 
a religious tradition in the making, established itself as hegemonic very early 
on, in contrast to foundational developments in most religious and/or moral 
traditions, including Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism and 
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Christianity. Two decades after Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., Arab Muslims 
ruled over a vast geographical expanse between what is today Morocco and 
north-east Iran, containing a demographic majority of non-Muslims and a 
growing number of converts.89 The latter were integrated into the community 
through the tribal institution of patronage (walaʾ), in which non-Arab converts 
attached themselves as ‘clients’ (mawali) to Arab Muslim patrons.90 Ethnicity 
should not have been a factor in conversion, as discrimination on such lines 
ran directly counter to both Qurʾanic teachings and certain sayings of the 
prophet Muhammad that declared all believers to be equal (“like the teeth of a 
comb”) and piety to be the only marker of distinction recognised under Islam. 
In this regard, modern scholars who celebrate Islam as having been global and 
cosmopolitan from the very beginning, skipping over a parochial period that 
Judaism and Christianity passed through, have a point.91 But they overlook 
the inequalities in power, social standing, and revenue derived from conquest 
that non-Arab Muslims experienced in the early period. The Mawali made 
important contributions to many fields of Islamic knowledge, including Arabic 
grammar and lexicography. By the mid-9th century C.E. the taint attached to 
client-status had largely faded into the background, although it could still 
be traced through the names of fathers, grandfathers, and other forebears. 
Memories of Arab superiority were never entirely obliterated, though, as 
evidenced by the pride taken by Muslims from Senegal to Singapore in a pure 
Arab lineage (which as a rule, was only ‘pure’ if one wrote out the women).
Within the Muslim empire, Islamic references shaped power, law, and 
administration at both the imperial and, to varying degrees, the local level. 
Hegemony, which initially derived from the role of Islam as the religion of 
the ruling class, gained a broader base as more and more people converted 
to Islam, both within the empire and increasingly beyond its borders. In the 
Middle East, this process was by and large completed by the 14th century. From 
then on, Muslims constituted not only the ruling class, but also the majority 
of the subjects of Muslim rulers. Similar processes later occurred in Central 
89 Wilfred Cantwell Smith tied Muslim attitudes concerning the separation of religion and state 
(secularity would have been the better term but was not yet in use) to their early success: 
whereas Christianity had been a “religion of adversity”, Islam had characteristically been the 
“religion of triumph in success” (Smith, Islam in Modern History, esp. 28–32, here 31).
90 See Monique Bernards and John Nawas, eds., Patronate and Patronage in Early and 
Classical Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Ulrike Mitter, Das frühislamische Patronat: Eine 
Studie zu den Anfängen des islamischen Rechts (Würzburg: Ergon, 2006).
91 Again, Shahab Ahmed serves as a prominent example (What is Islam?, 144).
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and Southeast Asia as well as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, though not in the 
Indian subcontinent, where even under Islamic rule, Muslims continued to be 
outnumbered by non-Muslims almost everywhere.
In his contribution to the Cambridge History of Islam, published in 1970, 
Louis Gardet cautiously asked
whether a distinction should be made between a Muslim culture proper, inspired 
by Islamic values and particularly by the text of the Qur’an, and a culture which 
existed in Muslim territory, and which either interpreted the religious beliefs of 
Islam in its own way, or ignored them or even opposed them.92
He tentatively answered this question with the well-known trope (not fully 
shared by me) that “Islam is, in its deepest sense, dīn wa-dawla, ‘religion and 
city’, and too rigid a classification into separate sections would not be true to the 
historic reality”.93 At roughly the same time, the historian Marshall Hodgson’s 
monumental three-volume-study The Venture of Islam, significantly subtitled 
Conscience and History in a World Civilization, was posthumously published. 
In this work, Hodgson introduces the term ‘Islamicate’ to characterise a 
context impregnated with Islamic references (my words not his) by Muslims 
as well as non-Muslims, without being bound to religion and the normative 
Islamic tradition at large. I do not completely support his classification of 
religion, culture, and society as Islamic, Islamicate, and Islamdom, respectively, 
especially not in the distinction he makes between society and social relations 
(“Islamdom”) on the one hand, and culture (“Islamicate”) on the other. Hodgson 
himself is not entirely consistent here, for only one page after introducing these 
terms, he sums them up as follows: 
 
‘Islamicate’ would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and 
cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among 
Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims.94 [my emphases]  
 
Consequently, the following interpretation is inspired by Hodgson but 
reflects subsequent thinking including my own. 
In the pre-modern Islamicate societies that evolved over time, it was 
Islamic norms and conventions that had the greatest impact on how people 
92 Gardet, “Religion and Culture,” 601.
93 Where Gardet speaks of a ‘Muslim’ culture, I use ‘Islamic’. And, as shown above, I do not 
subscribe to the din wa-dawla thesis.
94 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 
3 vols. (Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1974), vol. 1:57–60, here 59.
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thought and lived, affecting aesthetic preferences and social practices even 
among those who did not belong to the Muslim community (though it 
should perhaps be repeated that affecting, shaping, inspiring, and informing 
is not the same as ‘determining’). This was true not only for domains in 
which one might have expected a certain degree of adjustment to Islamic 
law, such as business, trade, and the establishment of pious foundations 
(waqfs). It could also be seen in language, clothing, architecture, and the 
art of the book, where such an adjustment was not necessarily required. 
On the contrary, as mentioned above, during the early conquests, Muslims 
had insisted on clearly marking religious affiliation, in order to be able to 
distinguish the Muslim from the non-Muslim at first glance. The ‘Pact of 
ʿUmar’ was designed to prevent the emergence of an Islamicate entity, in 
which Muslims and non-Muslims, believers and non-believers mixed freely 
and could not easily be distinguished from one another.
Shahab Ahmed has made a passionate case that for Muslims in what he 
called the Balkans-to-Bengal complex in the half-millennium stretching 
from 850 to 1350, the poetry of Hafez, the love of beardless youths, wine-
drinking, rationalist philosophy, and Sufi illuminationist thought, which all 
stood in flagrant contradiction to certain unequivocal legal injunctions in 
the Qurʾan and Hadith, were not culture, or one locally or culturally bounded 
expression of Islam among others, but Islam:
. . .  it has been to plant the seed in the mind of the reader that these 
contradictions cannot meaningfully be understood, as they generally 
are, by separating them out as differences between the religious and 
cultural (or religious and secular) spheres of something called Islam, 
with integral Islam obtaining in a somehow self-evidently ‘religious’ 
space… Rather, I suggest that these contradictions call for – indeed, 
demand and require – a suspension of these received categories of 
distinction in order to reconceptualize Islam as a human and historical 
phenomenon in new terms which map meaningfully onto the import of 
the prolific scale and nature of the contradictory normative claims made 
in history by Muslims about what is Islam.95  
Leaving aside its idiosyncratic style, this passage provides much food for 
thought – and query. The picture Ahmed draws of Islam as the experience 
of Muslims is immensely attractive: open and generous, loving and 
95 Ahmed, What is Islam?, 73. In a similar vein, he stated that “it is not at all clear how ‘culture’ is to 
be filtered out of ‘religion,’ or ‘religion’ distilled out of ‘culture’. Indeed, it would appear that the 
Muslim practitioners of art, literature and politics… are going out of their way not so much as to 
make a conscious distinction as to confuse or confound any distinction – or if they are making a 
distinction, they are being confoundingly confusing about it.” (Ahmed, 165, and chap. 1 and 6).
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sensitive, daring but also modest, embracing ambiguity and contradiction, 
prepared to agree to disagree, eager to explore, and keen to welcome new 
possibilities.96  There can be no doubt that what he describes is not just a 
figment of his imagination but reflects lived experiences as documented in 
poetry, paintings, courtly prose, and Sufi writings. Less exuberant authors, 
such as Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen and Luca Patrizi have similarly stated 
that, “The wine-obsessed libertine does not belong to another culture than 
the puritan ʿālim. He merely makes different choices.”97 Point well taken 
– but not accepted as a general rule; for what may have been true for the 
Balkans-to-Bengal gentleman, or the Arab libertine, was not necessarily 
true for their non-Muslim neighbours or their fellow Muslims in other 
times and places, as illustrated by centuries of argument over love, music, 
and the female voice, modesty and decency, ambiguity and certainty. 
And did the wine-loving Muslims that they place so noticeably 
in the foreground generally think of their ‘choices’ as not just normal 
but normative, as Ahmed has argued with reference to major poets, 
philosophers, and Sufi figures: 
The primacy that is given to the constitutive determinacy of legal discourse 
over other discourses serves to distort our perspective and effectively 
prevents us even from recognizing – let alone understanding – that, 
historically, Muslims have constructed normative meaning for Islam in 
terms that allowed them to live by and/or with norms other than and at 
odds with those put forward by legal discourse.98 
96 On the final pages of his book, Ahmed makes it clear that his aim is not to engage in 
nostalgia or to paint a rosy picture of Islam, with the “Sufi-philosophical amalgam” 
serving as the “soft” face of Islam (Ahmed, 539). His statement would go some way 
to placate (Western) scholars of Sufism, such as Bernd Radtke and Alexander Knysh, 
who take issue with the romanticising approach to Sufism as the epitome of the 
Muslim’s search for love and beauty, as represented by noted (Western) scholars such as 
Annemarie Schimmel; see Bernd Radtke, Neue kritische Gänge: Zu Stand und Aufgaben 
der Sufikforschung (Utrecht: M.Th. Houtsma Stichting, 2005); Knysh, Sufism, esp. 41–42.
97 Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen and Luca Patrizi, “Introduction,” in Ethics and Spirituality in 
Islam: Sufi adab, ed. Francesco Chiabotti et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 19.
98 Ahmed, What is Islam?, 121; also 44–45, 80, 94–101, 117–29. Reading Nizam al-Mulk’s 
Siyasatname, it becomes clear that for this ‘Order of the realm’ and ‘Pillar of religion’, 
drinking was perfectly normal for kings and caliphs, although they should avoid giving 
out orders while drunk, but that respectable scholars did not drink; see esp. chap. 17 
and 29, which deal with the ruler’s boon companions (sing. nadim) stating that they 
should be entertaining, able to keep a secret, know large parts of the Qurʾan by heart, 
and master chess and games of dice. Moderation is the word here as in all other affairs; 
see notably chap. 50. Nizam al-Mulk also expands on the trope that heretics engage in 
52
Ahmed shows little interest in the social site of these positions. As an 
aside, there is not a single woman in his picture: writing or listening 
to poetry, holding a glass of wine, or making love to a youth. Perhaps 
more immediately relevant to discussions of the Islamicate: what Ahmed 
at some point calls “a common paradigm of Islamic life and thought”99 
may have been Islam for many Muslims. But it cannot have been so for 
non-Muslims who took part in the ‘paradigm’ without being part of the 
Muslim community. He is also wrong when he claims that for Hodgson 
and his followers, ‘Islamicate’ equals ‘less Islamic’ and hence less pure 
and authentic than Islamic.100 Hodgson was not a Salafist, and those who 
use ‘Islamicate’ today are not concerned with purity and authenticity 
but with inclusion, that is to say with the recognition that pre-modern 
Islamicate culture was created by Muslims, non-Muslims, and possibly 
some agnostics too. Ahmed misses the point entirely when he asserts 
that Muslims “consciously constitute… their faith by incorporating and 
synthesizing the ideas and behaviours of non-Muslims”, affirming that 
Islam is there to “prune, correct, purge and complete” (their faiths), as 
Kenneth Cragg put it so well.101 The point is not that Islam “incorporates” 
and “synthesizes” other faiths but that living Christians, Jews, Hindus, 
and Zoroastrians participated in a society dominated by Muslims, and to 
some degree shaped by their socio-legal rules and aesthetic preferences. 
It is when we move beyond the Muslim perspective that the necessity to 
distinguish between religion and culture comes out most clearly.
3.4   Writing the Islamicate
Exchange resulting from encounters could take many forms, and the 
discursive strategies employed varied greatly. Exchange could involve 
competition in which individual elements were adopted and adapted so as to 
turn them against the other; it could be portrayed as the retrieval of ideas and 
drink, drugs, and debauchery, esp. incest and the exchange of women; see notably chap. 
47. For the Turco-Mongol Timurids, who tended to drink heavily, see Subtelny, Timurids 
in Transition, 27–28, 78. It is clear from anthologies of Arabic poetry that drinking wine 
was not the preserve of Turks, Persians, and Turco-Mongols.
99 Ahmed, What is Islam?, 75.
100 Ahmed, 171.
101 Ahmed, 173–74. The reference is to the Anglican bishop and noted scholar of Islam 
Kenneth Cragg’s (1913–2012) The House of Islam (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1975), 5–6.
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practices the other had preserved; or it could be appropriated, or outright 
stolen so as to rebuild one’s own community (nostrification). Exchange could 
be seen as a joint venture aimed at erecting a common edifice. Frequently, 
exchange was not formally acknowledged or went unnoticed (“unintentional 
borrowing”) but nonetheless left its trace.102 Among critical scholars, 
terms suggesting unilateral action, such as ‘influence’, ‘appropriation’, or 
‘borrowing’ have come to be viewed with suspicion. ‘Inspire’ and ‘inform’ 
have largely taken their place, accompanied by ‘flow’ and ‘conversation’. 
‘Assimilation’ is completely out. To highlight the multidirectional and 
frequently unintentional character of exchange, the term ‘crosspollination’ 
has been introduced by literary scholars, notably in translation studies.103 All 
these terms are doubtlessly subtle, attributing considerable agency to those 
involved, but they are also liable to masking the element of power, which 
both rests on and sustains asymmetrical relationships. Cultural flows do not 
occur in neutral space, and the wind does not necessarily blow with equal 
strength in all directions. By the same token, the notions of ‘shared space’ and 
‘shared history’, attractive though they are, need to be treated with caution so 
as not to fall into the trap of romancing. Most golden ages have been shown 
to be less glittering than assumed. If there is one field in which equality 
was established among educated men across religious and confessional 
boundaries, it was philosophy, at least at certain times and in certain places. 
Sarah Stroumsa has persuasively argued that within Islamicate contexts, 
philosophy constituted an extra-territorial sub-culture with remarkable 
staying power. She also came up with the suggestive image of the whirlpool, 
in which “each drop contributes to the character of the whole body of water, 
its own color changing in the turbulence.”104 But, and this is my image, it was 
also possible for different parties to draw from the same fountain to water 
their own separate garden plots, barring entry to others.
102 Tacit appropriation has been shown to be common in the philosophical field, especially 
as regards Muslim lendings from non-Muslims; see Sarah Stroumsa, “Comparison.” For 
“unintentional borrowings”, see Philip Ivanhoe, “The Shifting Contours of the Confucian 
Tradition,” review of Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng and John B. Henderson (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1994)”, Philosophy East and West 54, no. 1 (2004): 84.
103 See e.g. Anna Akasoy, James Montgomery and Peter Pormann, eds. Islamic Crosspollinations: 
Interactions in the Medieval Middle East (Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007).
104 See her articles “Comparison” (the whirlpool image appears on p. 143) and “The Literary 
Genizot: A Window to the Mediterranean Republic of Letters,” Intellectual History of the 
Islamic World 8, no. 2–3 (2020).
54
Contact, exchange, transmissions, and flows were ubiquitous in the pre-
modern realm of the ‘Islamicate’. A number of fields have allowed us to get 
a better sense of the sites, processes, discursive strategies, and outcomes of 
the relevant encounters. Rational philosophy has just been mentioned as 
one of the domains in which Muslims, Jews, and Christians engaged jointly, 
sometimes in competition with one another, but more often working on the 
edifice together. Translation has been best studied for the 8th to 10th centuries 
C.E., and is commonly referred to as ‘Greek-into-Arabic’, even though it 
also involved other languages, such as Syriac, Middle Persian (Pahlavi), and 
Sanskrit. Empirical science rested on even wider networks of exchange. The 
religious field, conventionally understood, is particularly rich. Pilgrimage 
was a fertile source of such cross-pollination. While Mecca and Medina were 
exclusively reserved for Muslims, there were numerous shared sites, such as 
Jerusalem or the innumerable tombs and shrines of holy men and women, 
which were thought to be impregnated with their blessing power (baraka). 
Sufism has been a prime field in which to study productive encounters, 
from the inspiration Muslim ascetics and mystics received from Christian 
neighbours to the impact of Sufi notions and practices on Near Eastern 
Jewish pietists,105 and the encounters of Sufis, dervishes, Brahmins, and yogis 
in the Indian subcontinent and the wider Persianate sphere. Overall, Jewish-
Muslim encounters have perhaps been studied most intensively, covering 
material as well as intellectual culture, from shared business and devotional 
practices to joint engagement with mysticism, philosophy, theology, and 
law. Shlomo Dov Goitein’s six-volume Mediterranean Society serves as a 
prime example of what the Islamicate means and implies.106 Goitein spoke 
of a “Jewish Arab symbiosis”,107 though writing before the term ‘Islamicate’ 
105 See Nathan Hofer, “Training the Prophetic Self: Adab and riyāḍa in Jewish Sufism,” in 
Ethics and Spirituality in Islam: Sufi adab, ed. Francesco Chiabotti et al. (Leiden: Brill, 
2017) and Elisha Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt: A 
Study of Abraham Maimonides and His Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
106 The Mediterranean horizon Goitein invoked has since been filled by other scholars 
who, following in Braudel’s steps, explored ideas and anxieties shared by men and 
women in early modern Europe and the adjacent areas of the Islamic(ate) world. Cornell 
Fleischer’s study of eschatology (“A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in 
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 61 (2018)) is a brilliant example of the inclusive approach.
107 S. D. Goitein’s Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1974) and A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the 
World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, 6 vols. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1967–93). For critical comment on the concept of symbiosis, see 
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became widely known. Subsequently, ‘symbiosis’, too, has gone out of 
fashion to be largely replaced by convivencia. Jewish-Muslim convivencia in 
mediaeval Egypt, Syria, and most of all in Muslim Spain, al-Andalus, has 
brought forth some of the most sophisticated work in this domain, followed 
by a growing interest in the Ottoman experience.
Yet it was not only non-Muslims who adjusted to Islamic patterns. 
Muslims, too, adapted to local customs and sensibilities, even in regions 
they dominated. The Delhi sultans and the Mughal emperors of India are 
no doubt the best-known examples of far-ranging acculturation: as Sunni 
Muslims of Turco-Mongol origin, they ruled over an overwhelmingly non-
Muslim majority, and in the Indian subcontinent the pull of Islam proved 
to be weaker than it had been in the Middle East and in Africa. In Iran 
and adjacent territories, Muslim conquerors and their successors adapted 
to the language and culture of their subjects. From the 12th to the 18th 
centuries, the Persianate cultural sphere stretched from Anatolia through 
Central Asia to South, East, and Southeast Asia. To describe a cultural 
sphere largely defined by the principle language of court culture, Marshall 
Hodgson spoke of a Persianate civilisation, Bert Fragner coined the term 
Persophony (Persophonie), and Robert Canfield referred to Turco-Persia.108 
The Mongol Ilkhans of the 13th century and, to an even greater extent, the 
Turco-Mongol Timurids of the 14th and 15th centuries provide the most 
striking examples of these processes in areas as diverse as administration, 
irrigation, music, poetry, and the art of the book.
Cultural exchange in the Persianate sphere was especially complex 
as it offered a pool of prestige terms, goods, and institutions that could 
easily compete with (Arab) Islamic ones outside of the religious sphere, 
narrowly defined. Yet it also serves to illustrate an important dimension 
of cultural encounter: retrojection into the past rather than preservation 
of a legacy of the past, as carefully studied by Sarah Bowen Savant.109 Shaul 
Stroumsa, “Comparison,” 137–38, 144–45, and Stroumsa, “The Literary Genizot.”
108 Hodgson, Venture of Islam, 2:293. His term has since been widely accepted; see, e.g., 
Abbas Amanat and Assef Ashraf, eds., The Persianate World (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Bert 
Fragner, Die Persophonie: Regionalität, Identität und Sprachkontakt in der Geschichte 
Asiens (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1999); Robert L. Canfield, ed., Turco-Persia in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). To avoid giving 
preference to one language over the others, Shahab Ahmed preferred to speak of the 
Balkans-to-Bengal complex (Ahmed, What is Islam?, esp. 32, 73–85).
109 For the following, see notably Savant, The New Muslims, 92; also 21–25, 34–37, 39–47, 
72–73, 101–02, and chap. 4. Marshall Hodgson, too, commented on the elements of loss, 
56
Shaked had earlier described the circularity of scholarly argument that first 
traced a given theme to its (presumed) Iranian origins to then postulate an 
Iranian influence on the theme concerned. Faintly echoing Savant, Neguin 
Yavari concluded that, “The Muslims chose and carefully crafted an image 
of Sasanid lore that suited their own ends, and presented the result as a 
‘self-image’, a partially domesticated wellspring of ethical teachings and 
political traditions.”110 For modern scholars, the pre-Islamic Iranian past 
is difficult to access, as most of the relevant sources in Avestan and Middle 
Persian have been lost, making it very difficult to establish either the 
continuity or modification of religious ideas and cultural patterns, from 
pre-Islamic to Islamic times. To Muslims and non-Muslims living after the 
destruction of the Sasanian Empire in the 660s, more material seems to 
have been available. In any event, most of the texts we have today were 
compiled and written down in the Islamic era, and most of the authors who 
wrote, reconstructed, or imagined the history, culture, and ‘wisdom’ of the 
Achaemenids, Seleucids, Parthians, and Sasanians were Muslims. The 
great compendium of Zoroastrian law and ethics, the Denkard (“Acts of 
religion”) was probably written down by Zoroastrians, in Middle Persian, 
in the 9th or 10th century C.E, that is, during the ʿAbbasid period.111 The 
famed Shahname, the ‘Book of Kings,’ the most powerful source of moral 
example, political doctrine, and entertaining lore in the Persian-speaking 
world, was composed around 1000 C.E. by a Muslim author, Abu l-Qasim 
Firdawsi, and dedicated to a Turkic Muslim ruler, Mahmud of Ghazna (who 
cared little for it). Persian andarz (‘good precepts’ and ‘practical wisdom’), 
which drew on Parthian, Sogdian, and Persian sources and shared many 
features with adab, was in large part written down in New Persian in the 
14th century C.E., again in an Islamicate setting.112 
3.5  The Many Uses of Adab
This takes us to the protean concept of adab. If Sufism is an ocean, 
adab is a sea with moving shores. Adab is one of the pillars of Islamicate 
culture and is especially relevant here, as it draws attention to the fine 
retrieval, and reconstruction (Hodgson, Venture of Islam, 1:43–44).
110  Shaked, “From Iran to Islam,” 62 and 75–76; Yavari, Advice for the Sultan, 35.
111 See Philippe Gignoux, “Denkard,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. VII, fasc. 3 (London: 1996).
112 See Shaul Shaked and Zabihollah Safa, “Andarz,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. II, fasc. 1 
(London: 1987).
57
distinctions between culture and religion that existed before the irruption 
of modernity, and as it was reconfigured as essentially secular in the 19th 
century. In a nutshell, adab is knowledge put into exemplary practice as 
good manners and proper behaviour, setting forth examples of how to 
live a life of moral uprightness and refined civility, pleasing in the eyes 
of God and one’s fellow humans. More precisely, pre-modern adab in 
the singular and the plural (ādāb, rules of adab) stands for the efforts 
to cultivate and practise a behaviour that is appropriate to a given role 
or setting, be it as a judge, a prince, a physician, a craftsman, a lover, or 
a Sufi.113 (I use the male form on purpose: adab literature was written 
by men for men. Modern celebrations of adab as the foundation of a 
cosmopolitan secular humanism tend to gloss over the gender dimension.) 
What is deemed correct and proper is to a large extent socially and culturally 
conditioned. Adab could define the ethics and conduct of the pious seeker of 
the Divine, modest, unassuming, and ascetic, or it could invoke the ideal of 
the cultivated, courteous, and urbane urbanite, elegant in his way of speech, 
dress, and gesture. In all its broad variety, adab was almost universally 
appreciated as a cultural asset.
Irrespective of the precise context and definition, adab connects the 
exterior with the interior, relating bodily comportment, outer appearance, and 
praxis with inner states and dispositions. To obtain adab requires education, 
taming, and training, which discipline the body, the mind, and the self. At 
the same time, adab denotes the media used to instil the desired virtues and 
habits. At least outside a religious field, narrowly defined, these media were 
meant to educate, edify, and entertain, combining wit and erudition. They did 
so, not through systematic exposition of a given theme, but through series of 
113 The relevant literature is growing fast. For a brilliant introduction with extensive 
referencing, see Peter Heath, “Al-Jāḥiẓ, Adab, and the Art of the Essay,” in Al-Jāḥiẓ: A 
Muslim Humanist for our Time, ed. Arnim Heinemann et al. (Würzburg: Ergon, 2009). 
The following titles are indispensable for the pre-modern period: Barbara D. Metcalf, 
ed., Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984); Francesco Chiabotti et al., Ethics and Spirituality 
in Islam; Knysh, Sufism, 137–48, and the following entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
Three: Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, “Adab a) Arabic, early developments,” fasc. 2014–3; 
Susanne Enderwitz, “Adab b) and Islamic scholarship in the ʿAbbāsid period,” fasc. 
2013–4; Thomas Bauer, “Adab c) and Islamic scholarship after the ‘Sunnī revival’,” fasc. 
2013–4; and Erik S. Ohlander, “Adab, in Ṣūfism,” fasc. 2009–1. Also Armando Salvatore, 
“Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shariʿa, from Pre-colonial to Colonial,” Working 
Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 3 
(Leipzig University, 2018), 7–15.
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anecdotes, sententia, and reported statements meant to illustrate ‘how to do 
things’.114 The ‘invitation to the banquet’ (maʾduba), to which linguists have 
traced the origin of the term,115 was richly laid out. Some of its practitioners 
included poetry and music, others restricted it to prose literature, though 
as a rule this, too, would include ample quotations from poetry. Even when 
restricted to prose, adab literature was extremely wide-ranging, comprising 
elegant prose, moral discourse, handbooks of courtly and of Sufi etiquette, 
bald humour and satire, expressions of Sufi sensibilities, religious critique, 
indifference, and agnosticism, the elaboration of cultured refinement, and the 
celebration of eccentric and even outrageous behaviour. If religious scholars 
tried to control adab through defining its ādāb, then they failed.
The position of adab between culture and religion is of particular interest. 
The concept and practice of adab was shared by Middle Eastern speakers of 
Arabic, Persian, and other languages irrespective of their ethnic and religious 
affiliation, though they might conceive of its origins and properties in different 
ways. Attempts to stake an exclusive claim on adab, declaring it to be wholly 
derived from either Arab or Irano-Persian tradition were common, reflecting 
the long-standing competition between Arabs and ‘Persians’.116 These claims 
were largely expressed in terms of ethnicity, cultural superiority, and temporal 
precedence (who was first, and who took what from whom?). Nonetheless, they 
were also not free from religious connotation: for many Arab Muslims, Arab 
stood for Muslim, and for many Iranians, Persian also meant Zoroastrian. That 
adab drew on ancient Greek, Indian, and Persian ‘wisdom’ literature was widely 
acknowledged.117 The celebrated littérateur al-Jahiz (d. 868/9), whom many 
saw as the Arab humanist par excellence, described adab as the “accumulation 
of the wisdom and the learning of the past nations and generations.”118
At the same time, many valued elements of adab did not necessarily derive 
from an ancient treasure trove to be appreciated by later generations. Instead 
114 Peter Heath compared this method to a slide show (Heath, “Al-Jāḥiẓ, Adab, and the Art 
of the Essay,” 155 and 163).
115 Mayeur-Jaouen and Patrizi, “Introduction,” 3–4, 35.
116 Known as shuʿubiyya (from Ar., shuʿub, “peoples”, “nations”) and hotly contested; for a brief 
introduction, see Savant, New Muslims, 27–28, 51–52.
117 For Greek paideia and Indian ‘wisdom’, see Louise Marlow, “Among kings and sages: Greek 
and Indian wisdom in an Arabic mirror for princes,” Arabica 60 (2013); for India, see also 
Yavari, Advice for the Sultan, 56–64.
118 Hämeen-Anttila, “Adab,” 6; Mayeur-Jaouen and Patrizi, “Introduction,” 16–25. In spite of its 
title, Arnim Heinemann et al., eds., Al-Jāḥiẓ: A Muslim Humanist for our Time (Würzburg: 
Ergon, 2009) remains reserved regarding the claim to pre-modern Arab or Islamic humanism.
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they were attributed to Greek, Indian, and Persian kings and sages to lend them 
added prestige, irrespective of whether these elements had ever formed part of 
their ‘wisdom’. They stood for a retrojection into the past, not a legacy of this 
past. Courtly literature of ‘mirrors for princes’ and heroic epics defined good 
conduct through the combination of wisdom, virtue, and in the case of rulers, 
strength and beauty. The exemplars of such conduct were kings and caliphs, 
sages, physicians, ascetics, viziers, and prophets, irrespective of language, 
ethnicity, and religion. Examples are manifold: Aristotle and Alexander the 
Great; the Sasanian kings Anushirvan, Ardashir, Feridun, and Kay Khusraw; 
Borzuye and Buzurgmihr the Wise; Moses and the prophet Muhammad; 
ʿUmar b. al-Khattab, the second caliph recognised by the Sunni Muslims, ʿAli 
b. Abi Talib and his son Husayn, but also the first Umayyad caliph Muʿawiya, 
whom the Shiʿis detest; the ascetic Hasan al-Basri; the ʿAbbasid caliph al-
Maʾmun, the Buyid amir ʿAdud al-Dawla, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, the 
Seljuk sultan Sanjar, and many others. Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatname, written 
at the very end of the 11th century, serves as an excellent illustration of this 
virtue parade. Women are conspicuous in their virtual absence, except as 
sources of socio-political disorder and moral corruption.119
The study of adab takes us back to Gardet’s statement that Islam 
“absorbed these cultures, and assimilated itself to them in various ways, 
to a far greater extent than it attempted to supplant them.”120 If we replace 
‘assimilate’ by ‘adapt and adopt’ we get closer to current perceptions. In 
any event, crossing or simply disregarding boundaries is not the same 
as transgressing them, let alone subverting them. Adab is not per se 
a subversive genre. What matters here is that adab was largely seen as 
part of culture, be it in the shape of a specific culture, either shared or 
particular, or as the repository of a great tradition of wisdom and learning 
shared by humanity.
Significantly, most of the Muslim scholars, Sufis, and littérateurs 
practising adab distinguished it from the religious sciences, suggesting 
a separate field of Islamic religious studies.121 The same seems to have 
119 For Nizam al-Mulk’s misogyny, see esp. Siyāsatnāma, chap. 43. As Omid Safi has shown, 
his lashing out against ‘the veiled ones’ should also be seen in the context of his power 
struggle with Malik-Shah’s powerful wife Tarkan Khatun (Safi, Politics of Knowledge, 67–
74). Contextualisation is always welcome. Misogyny, however, is resilient and survived 
the demise of our subjects.
120 Gardet, “Religion and Culture,” 569.
121 Louis Gardet explicitly speaks of a religious field made up of Islam’s ‘religious sciences’ and 
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applied to Jews and Christians with regard to their respective religious 
disciplines. Compared to the religious sciences, adab was more open in its 
themes, formats, methods, and authors. Modern scholars have considered 
it parallel to the ideals of urbanitas and humanitas of Antiquity and the 
Renaissance. Some portrayed it as the core of an Islamic humanism 
that was essentially secular and separate from the ‘scholasticism’ of 
the religious scholars. Yet treating adab as separate from the religious 
sciences did not necessarily amount to removing it from the purview 
of religion. Adab could incorporate religious norms and maxims, and 
draw on the Qurʾan, Hadith, and the rich body of Islamic lore; many 
of its practitioners were (also) ʿulamaʾ. For this reason, Charles Pellat’s 
verdict that adab literature was “clearly profane” and as such constituted 
the “core of Islamic culture”, is untenable.122
In the pre-modern era, dissociating adab from religion was a 
possibility but not a general rule. By the late 19th century, the lines 
had been more firmly drawn: as literature, adab was largely restricted 
to belles-lettres, specially in Arabic.123 At the same time, it was 
increasingly understood as an alternative, non-religious register of 
cultured refinement, one not primarily inspired by the Qurʾan and 
prophetic example. For this reason it was considered essentially secular. 
This shift in understanding came not from Western orientalists but 
from some of the leading lights of the ‘Arab Renaissance’ (Nahda), such 
as Jurji Zaydan (1861–1914), who, it should be added, was a Christian 
intellectual. Within the new discourse on civilisation, and the ethics 
and practices upholding it, adab was to an extent displaced by akhlaq, 
religious morals and morality. This, though, takes us well beyond the 
present enquiry. Suffice to say that even in the twentieth and the early 
learning (Gardet, 600).
122 Charles Pellat, “Variations sur le thème de l‘adab’,” Correspondances d’Orient 5–6 (1964), 
quoted from Mayeur-Jaouen and Patrizi, “Introduction,” 17. George Makdisi was perhaps 
the most prominent advocate of this view: The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the 
Christian West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990). For critical comment, see 
Heinemann et al., Al-Jāḥiẓ.
123 For the following, see the monumental conference volume Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, ed., 
Adab and Modernity: A ‘Civilising Process’? (Sixteenth-Twenty-First Century) (Leiden: Brill, 
2020) which ventures far beyond the Arab world. For Arabic adab in general, see also Boutros 
Hallaq, “Adab e) modern usage,” in Encyclopedia of Islam Three, fasc. 2014–2; Anne-Laure 
Dupont, Ğurğī Zaydān 1861–1914 (Damascus: ifpo, 2006) and her more recent article, “Un 
adab des classes modernes,” in Mayeur-Jaouen, Adab and Modernity.
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21st century, Sufi and religious adab, broadly defined, continued to 
f lourish in familiar as well as in entirely new formats.
3.6   Illustrating the Islamicate
Within the Muslim empire, many non-Muslims who did not convert to 
Islam despite powerful incentives to do so, nonetheless adjusted culturally 
to an environment that was politically dominated by Muslims. Adjustment 
could cover a broad range: from simple borrowings that caused little 
change in the prevalent patterns of thinking and living, to various types of 
adaptation, to manifest acculturation. For an example from the religious 
sphere narrowly understood, Syrian Bibles and homiletic texts written in 
the 13th and 14th centuries closely resemble manuscripts of the Qurʾan in 
their aesthetic design.124
Borrowing even occurred in regions not under Muslim rule, inspired by 
the power, prestige, and aesthetic appeal associated with imperial Islamic 
culture. Phillip Wagoner illustrated this phenomenon in his study of the 
South Indian kingdom of Vijayanagara, where in the 15th century, the king 
and court adopted what they identified as Islamic dress and titles.125
Adaptation could also affect ‘sacred architecture’. A prominent example 
is the Armenian Vank Cathedral built on the orders of Shah ʿAbbas (r. 
124 See Meliné Pehlivanian, Christoph Rauch, and Ronny Vollandt, eds., Orientalische 
Bibelhandschriften aus der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – PK: Eine illustrierte Geschichte (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2016) or Barbara D. Boehm and Melanie Holcomb, eds., Jerusalem 1000–1400: 
Every People Under Heaven (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). Exhibition catalogue.
125 Phillip B. Wagoner, “‘Sultan among Hindu Kings’: Dress, Titles and the Islamicization 
of Hindu Culture at Vijayanagara,” Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996).
The Gospel according to St. 
Matthew, copied in Palestine 
in 1336. British Library Add. 
MS. 11856 f. 1v-2r
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1589–1618 in New Julfa (today a district of Isfahan) for the local Armenian 
community, which the shah had forcefully deported from their home 
town of Julfa at great cost of lives and goods. The cathedral’s decoration 
was decidedly Christian (including European-style putti) but its domed 
interior was designed to resemble a mosque by its Muslim architect.126 
In other instances, the ‘Islamic imprint’ went well beyond simple 
borrowing. 19th-century Armenian Christian women wearing a face veil 
in an Ottoman environment are a case in point. This example, however, 
highlights the ambiguities inherent in the process, for while veiling could 
be seen as a result of acculturation, it could also be read as a desire to escape 
notice as non-Muslims and to become invisible in public space. As such, 
it ran directly counter to the overall aim of the ‘Pact of ʿUmar’, which had 
been to render religious difference visible.
126 For the larger picture, see Mohammad Gharipour, ed., Sacred Precincts: The Religious 
Architecture of Non-Muslim Communities Across the Islamic World (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
Dome of the Armenian Vank Cathedral, New 
Julfa, Isfahan. Photo: Gudrun Krämer, 2016.
63
Entanglements were often complicated: the long-established Jewish 
communities in Iran spoke and wrote Judeo-Persian. Between the 
17th and the 19th centuries, Jews, Armenians, and Zoroastrians were 
repeatedly exposed to strong government pressure including forced 
conversion. Given that the ruling Shiʿi elite also suppressed Sunni 
Muslims, Sufis, and various other Muslim groups and sects, however, 
their policies cannot be seen as directed solely against non-Muslims, 
let alone Jews. At the same time, Jewish patrons had the biblical 
stories written by Jewish Persian poets illustrated with motifs drawn 
from non-Jewish Iranian sources. These included the great epic 
poems, as well as popular stories of Muhammad and other prophets 
recognised by Islam. A 17th-century illustrated manuscript of Shahin-i 
Shirazi’s ‘Book of Moses’ (Musaname) depicted Moses according to 
contemporary Muslim convention, with a nimbus of fire and a veil 
Chevalier Auguste de Henikstein: Turques, Arménienne, Grecques (Turkish women, an Armenian 
woman and two Greek women). Album, 1825. Source: Wiki Commons (Romanian Academy 
Library, via europeana.eu)
64
covering his face.127 In Imrani’s ‘Book of Conquest’ (Fathname), Joshua, 
the Israelite leader who conquered the Promised Land, is depicted as a 
Safavid Iranian hero, again with a halo of fire surrounding his head.128 
In post-Mongol iconography, the nimbus of fire primarily marked the 
prophet Muhammad, other prophetic figures, and the Shiʿi imams, 
and was probably adapted from China.
In these examples, a pre-Islamic Persian literary and aesthetic tradition 
was crossed with an Iranian Islamic one, with Chinese influences added to 
the blend, to illustrate constitutive 
episodes of Jewish collective 
memory that could easily be 
classified as religious. There are 
certain caveats, though, as almost 
none of the extant Judeo-Persian 
manuscripts were signed, and 
there is some speculation among 
art historians as to whether 
the Jewish patrons may have 
commissioned the illustrations in 
Muslim ateliers. 
127 Shahin-i Shirazi’s Musaname was written around 1327 and illustrated in 1686; see Vera 
Basch Moreen, In Queen Esther’s Garden: An Anthology of Judeo-Persian Literature (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) and Dennis Halft OP, “Das ‘Buch der Bücher’ auf 
Persisch,” in Orientalische Bibelhandschriften, ed. Pehlivanian, Rauch, and Vollandt.
128 The Fathname by the Judeo-Persian poet Imrani (1454–1536) was composed in Isfahan 
in around 1474. Illustrated manuscripts from the 17th and early 18th centuries are held 
at the British Library (Ms. Or. 1704) and the Ben-Zvi Institute of the Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem; on the Jerusalem manuscript, see Vera Basch Moreen, The Bible as a 
Judeo-Persian Epic: An illustrated manuscript of ‘Imrani’s Fath-Nama’ (Jerusalem: Ben 
Zvi Institute for the Study of Jewish Communities in the East, 2016).
Moses and the Angel of Death. Shahin-i 
Shirazi, Musaname, Iran 1686. British 
Library Ms. Or. 1704
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In the context of this discussion, however, this is of secondary import. 
Irrespective of whether the artists were Jews or Muslims, they illustrated 
manuscripts that were clearly marked as Jewish. Jews participated in 
Islamicate culture in Iran as much as did Zoroastrians, Armenian 
Christians, and Muslims of non-Shiʿi denomination. Cultural 
participation, however, said little about hierarchies and inclusion in the 
social and political spheres, in which (Shiʿi) Muslim dominance was 
clearly expressed – one more reason to keep religion and culture apart. 
For Muslims, adoption, adaptation, and acculturation were not 
limited to intermittent borrowings; they sometimes extended deep into 
the religious imaginary. In Ibn Husam Khvafi’s Khavaranname, written 
around 1426 C.E., ʿAli b. Abi Talib (d. 661 C.E.) – cousin and son-in-law 
of the prophet Muhammad, fourth ‘rightly-guided’ caliph of the Sunni 
and first legitimate imam of the Shiʿi Muslims, and one of the iconic 
figures of Muslim memory and imagination – accomplishes the deeds 
of the ancient Iranian heroes, as celebrated in the Shahname and other 
Persian heroic epics.
ʿAli slays a dragon. Ibn Husam 
Khvafi: Khavaranname. Bu- 
khara, 15th century. Tehran, Reza 
ʿAbbasi Museum. Photo: Gudrun 
Krämer, 2016.
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Sarah Savant has explored the many ways Iranian/Persian heroes, events, and 
locales were “written into” prophetic history.129 Echoes of such operations can 
be found, for example, in 16th- to 19th-century manuscripts of the Shahname 
depicting the great hero Isfandiyar thanking God after having slain a dragon, 
or escaped from a deadly snowstorm. Here, entanglements run deep: while 
Islamic prayer may to some extent have been patterned on Zoroastrian 
precedent,130 Zoroastrians pray standing, whereas Muslims alternately stand 
and kneel. In several Kashmiri manuscripts from the 19th century, Isfandiyar 
and his paladins clearly pray in an Islamic style. In the Khavaranname, by 
contrast, it is not Iranian tradition that is being Islamised, with Rustam and 
other noble warriors made “honorary Muslims”.131 The reverse is true: ʿAli, the 
Islamic warrior-hero par excellence, is embedded in the Iranian tradition. The 
Khavaranname is far from obscure: translations into a variety of languages 
spoken by Muslims, including Turkish, testify to its popularity, as does the 
significant number of extant manuscripts from the 15th to 19th centuries.132 
Even more threads were woven into ‘The Chronology of Ancient 
Nations’ (al-Athar al-baqiya ʿan al-qurun al-khaliya) by the Shiʿi polymath 
129 Savant, New Muslims, e.g., 59–60. The Iskandar/Alexander praying at the Kaʿba in Mecca 
shown above serves as another example.
130 Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 32–33.
131 As Shahab Ahmed has argued with regard to descriptions of Muslim rulers as replicas of the 
evil king Zahhak (Ar., al-Dahhak), and their enemies mirroring good king Feridun, one of 
the most popular heroes in the Shahname, who ultimately defeated and executed Zahhak 
(Ahmed, What is Islam?, 442–44). The links connecting ancient Iranian and Shiʿi ideas 
and rituals are difficult to trace. The evidence to support speculations that the mourning 
odes and rituals for ʿAli’s martyred son Husayn were inspired by the mourning for the pure 
and innocent martyr prince Siyavush is inconclusive. Yann Richard, L’islam chi’ite (Paris: 
Fayard, 1991), 132–33, is slightly more detailed than Heinz Halm, Die Schia (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), 180; see also Mehr Ali Newid, Der schiitische 
Islam in Bildern: Rituale und Heilige (Munich: Edition Avicenna, 2006), esp. 94–117.
132 Ibn Husam Khvafi or Khusfi lived 1381–1470; see Julia Rubanovich, “ḴĀVARĀN-NĀMA 
i. The Epic Poem,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2017, available at http://www.
iranicaonline.org/articles/khavaran-nama-1 and Raya Shani, “ḴĀVARĀN-NĀMA ii. 
The Illustrated Manuscripts,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2017, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/khavaran-nama-illustrations; also Raya Shani, “The 
Shahnama Legacy in a Late 15th-Century Illustrated Copy of Ibn Husam’s Khavaran-nama, 
The Gulistan Palace Library, Tehran Ms. 5750,” in Shahnama Studies III: The Reception of 
the Shahnama, ed. Gabrielle van den Berg and Charles Melville (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Pages 
of a manuscript of the Khavaranname, illustrated in the so-called Turkman Commercial 
Style in Shiraz 1476–87, are available online from the Metropolitan Museum of Art and 
the Brooklyn Museum, New York. For a broader sweep, showing ʿAli as the quintessential 
Islamic warrior and icon of sacred kingship, see Moin, Millennial Sovereign, 37–55.
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Abu Rayhan al-Biruni (d. 1048). In this work, al-Biruni tells the story of 
Ahriman, the Zoroastrian embodiment of evil, and Mashya/Mishi and 
Mashyana/Mishiyana, the children of Gayumarth133, first man, or rather the 
“prototype of humanity”, according to Zoroastrian cosmogony. By the 11th 
century, Zoroastrian motifs had been liberally crossed with biblical, Qurʾanic, 
and prophetic ones, relating Ahriman to Iblis/Satan and Mashya and Mashyana 
to Adam and Eve. The latter are included in the Qurʾan, which, however, 
concentrates entirely on Adam 
and mentions his companion 
only anonymously; Eve’s Arabic 
name Hawwa is post-Qurʾanic. 
Islamic tradition subsequently 
embellished the story.
An illustrated manuscript of the 
‘Chronology of Ancient Nations’ 
from the early 14th century shows 
Ahriman/Iblis/Satan appearing as 
an old man in a garden (the text 
speaks of the mountains) to tempt 
the naked human couple with 
fruit, after they had gone without 
food and drink for fifty years. Even 
with the biblical apple exchanged 
for a pomegranate, Muslims, Jews, 
and Christians had no problem 
identifying the scene.
133 Boyce, Zoroastrianism, 12–13. For the Qurʾanic story, see Cornelia Schöck, “Adam and 
Eve,” Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001); for the link to Zoroastrian 
tradition, see Savant, New Muslims, 140–50, and 42–45, 57–59, and Albert de Jong, “First 
Man, First Twins. The Origins of Humankind in Zoroastrianism,” in Religious Stories in 
Transformation: Conflict, Revision and Reception, ed., Albertina Houtman et al. (Leiden: 
Brill, 2016). For al-Biruni’s story, the English translation (pp. 107–09) of the relevant 
passage in Eduard Sachau’s German annotated edition (Leipzig 1878) is considerably 
longer than what is found in the illustrated mss. held in Edinburgh and the Bibliothèque 
nationale de France. BNF Ms. ar. 1489 f. 32v. There are also various spellings for the 
names: in the Edinburgh and Paris mss., it is Maishi and Maishiyana.
Al-Biruni, Kitab al-athar al-baqiya. Illustrated ms. 
dated 1307–8. Edinburgh University Library, Ms. 
161 f. 48v. Copyright The University of Edinburgh.
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There is always another turn of the screw, and the results could stretch 
the notion of the Islamicate to its limits: the Arabic inscription on the tomb 
stone for the Turco-Mongol conqueror Timur (d. 1405), in Samarkand, 
identified a son of ʿAli b. Abi Talib as the ‘being of light’ that according 
to Turco-Mongol lore, entered Alanqoa, the virgin ancestress of Chengiz 
Khan and Timur. The inscription also quoted Qurʾan 19 (Surat Maryam), 
verses 17 and 20, which speak of Mary’s immaculate conception of Jesus.134 
With Alanqoa set in parallel to Maryam/Mary, and with a son of ʿ Ali named 
as their ancestor, the Mongols were written into Islamic salvational history 
without sacrificing their claims to the most illustrious Mongol genealogy.
The entanglements and transpositions presented here did not alter 
the communal affiliation of the respective artists, scholars, and their 
audiences. However, they create challenges in demarcation with regard 
to cultural affinity, which for non-Muslims was not bound up with 
their religious affiliation, and even for Muslims was less clear-cut than 
is often presumed. Religion and culture, belonging and identity did not 
necessarily coincide in this period, and they do not always do so today.
4     Continuities, Ruptures, and New Vistas
4.1  Text and Context
In line with the perspective of ‘entangled history’, the historical-critical method 
applied here to the formation of Islam as a religion and community showed 
Islam to be the result of continuous exchange and friction. This approach 
stands in marked contrast to the convictions of most Muslims past and 
present. They see Islam as grounded in revelation, with an archetype of ‘the 
book’ preserved in Heaven and ‘sent down’ to Muhammad in its definite form 
in Arabic.135 From the believer’s perspective, the Qurʾan is the word of God, 
134 Moin, Millennial Sovereign, 37.
135 See Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Qurʾān (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). I cannot go into the dispute, culminating in the 9th 
and 10th centuries C.E., over the createdness of the Qurʾan, which declared God’s word 
to either be eternal and uncreated, or created by God. At the time, the dispute had a 
political dimension in addition to the theological one; see Gerhard Böwering, “God and 
his Attributes,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2002). For the doctrine 
of iʿjaz, the inimitable linguistic beauty of the Qurʾan constituting the miracle his sceptical 
contemporaries demanded from Muhammad to prove his prophethood, see Matthias 
Radscheit, Die koranische Herausforderung (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1996) and Richard C. 
Martin, “Inimitability,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
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not the product of human creativity. It is God who is speaking in the Qurʾan, 
not Muhammad in dialogue with the community of believers. Switching to 
a different register, Islam is the result of a top-down rather than a bottom-up 
process. It is not a social construct. When Muslims write of the Qurʾan being 
‘compiled’, they are not describing a creative process of editing oral and written 
materials, but of ‘collecting’ the revelations received by Muhammad over the 
course of two decades, providing Muslims with a book equal to what the Jews 
and Christians already had. Significantly, Jews and Christians are referred to in 
the Qurʾan as the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab).
According to Islamic doctrine, the Qurʾanic revelation occurred in 
a specific time and place, and thus necessarily a sociocultural context; its 
message, however, is not tied to this context. It is of universal and eternal 
validity. Belief in revelation therefore did not spare Muslims the challenge of 
how to resolve the tension between the assumed unchanging character of the 
‘message’ on the one hand and its ever-changing ‘realisations’ on the other. 
If God was addressing a specific audience, this audience had to be 
linguistically and mentally capable of understanding what he said (this 
view is also shared by those studying Islam from a believer’s perspective). 
To be understood, revelation therefore had to be phrased, or even 
framed, in the language of the audience, which in this case consisted of 
the townsfolk, oasis farmers, and nomadic herders on the north-western 
World time and local time. Great Mosque 
of Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, Central 
China. Photo: Gudrun Krämer, 2015.
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Arabian coastal strip in the 7th century C.E., that is to say late Antiquity. 
Revelation was not only conveyed through the Arabic language, it was 
also inevitably tied to this sociocultural setting and its prevalent cultural 
code, or idiom (on this point, ‘critical’ Islamic studies part from the 
believer’s perspective). If Islam, however, was to continue to be relevant 
to all people over space and time, then as with other religions and moral-
cum-ethical traditions and philosophies, its adherents had to either 
distance themselves from the original sociocultural milieu (‘Arab Islam’), 
or try to reshape their own environment so as to fit their conception of 
the original setting.136 This was not merely a theoretical challenge. It was 
debated through the centuries, creating one of the great dividing lines 
within the Muslim community. If there were those who looked back to 
what they imagined the early community to have been, others understood 
Islam from their own sociocultural and political contexts and adapted it 
to these where necessary.
In the modern period, identity and identity politics could and can be tied 
to both the defence of ‘local’ expressions of religion and culture and the notion 
of an original, unchanging Islam solely inspired by revelation. Both could and 
can be used to draw boundaries around the group and enforce conformity 
within it. Resistance against any kind of adjustment, which was well known 
in the pre-colonial era, intensified in colonial and post-colonial settings. 
Today it is represented by Salafists, who consider any attempt to adjust Islamic 
theology and law to post-prophetic conditions to be an illegitimate innovation 
(bidʿa) if not apostasy and disbelief. By the same token, they call for a faithful 
emulation of the prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims 
(the salaf salih, the ‘pious predecessors’) down to the minute details of daily 
conduct.137 The conduct of the salaf largely reflected the norms and customs 
of the Arabian Peninsula and adjacent territories in late Antiquity. Critics of 
emulation did not always present a consciously articulated and theoretically 
underpinned alternative, distinguishing religion from culture, custom, or a 
secular sphere. Most simply lived as Muslims and considered what they did 
and thought to be Islam. But there were also those who sought to reinvigorate 
Islam, or rather the Muslim community, through a reading of the message that 
136 Hodgson, Venture of Islam, 1:34; for a different context, see Gardner, Confucianism, 48.
137 See Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s 
New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meier (London: Hurst, 2009) and Daniel Lav, Radical 
Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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reflected contemporaneous concerns, rather than seeking to resuscitate the 
original Arab community in another location. Under modern conditions, this 
effort could not avoid affecting conceptions of ‘identity.’ 
The presence and global influence of Salafi theologians and activists, who, 
citing the Qurʾan and the Sunna of the prophet Muhammad, seek to unify 
Muslims on the basis of their understanding of original (Arab) Islam, have been 
assisted by funding from powerful donors in the Arab Gulf. By the same token, 
the Salafi agenda has also provoked resistance from those who defend their 
own understanding of Islam from external influence, Muslim as well as non-
Muslim, by referring to local custom, culture, and tradition. Examples include 
Islamic movements in northern Nigeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Indonesia, which 
do not pursue liberal ideals, but invoke their own role models, including anti-
colonial jihad movements of the 18th and 19th centuries. These movements 
reject the influence of Arab Gulf States as culturally alienating and politically 
patronising, if not neo-colonial. The defenders of local religious and cultural 
traditions also include some of those who propagate a vision of a liberal, 
‘enlightened’ Islam.
Female members of the revivalist piety movement Tabligh-i Jamaat in India. Source: Agnès De 
Féo, “Behind the Veil, In the Ranks of the Tablighi Jamaat,” August 18, 2017. https://talesoftheveils.
wordpress.com/2017/08/18/3994/
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To return once more to the invention-of-religion thesis: it is true that from 
the late 19th century onwards, Islam was rethought in the encounter with 
Western notions of religion, culture, and civilisation, which challenged 
Islam’s status as a religion and civilisation capable of promoting reason, 
science, and progress.138 Some responded by calling for a return to the 
foundations of Islam as a religion and civilisation, or ‘way of life.’ Others 
advocated a clear break not just from the Islamic tradition as a human-
made edifice erected on the foundations of true Islam, but from Islam as a 
religion and civilisation. A number of Sunni reformers did, in fact, adjust 
to a Protestant understanding of ‘real’ and ‘true religion’, one centred in 
‘inner’ faith, without, however, discarding ‘outward’ ritual altogether.139 
They insisted on communal worship, epitomised by the Five Pillars, as an 
indispensable marker of Muslim identity. However, they denounced much of 
what had hitherto been Islam to millions of Muslims, including their social 
elites, as being articulations of popular religion and superstition, which had 
rendered Muslims passive and impotent and had debased Islam in the eyes 
of the world. Sufism, unless expressed ‘soberly’ as refined spirituality, served 
as a primary target of reformist zeal. Reform in the shadow of modernity did 
entail new ways of looking at the foundational texts and Islamic tradition at 
large, but it did not ‘invent’ Islam on the Protestant model.
In this context, it would be worth investigating the attempts of Muslim 
scholars in 17th- and 18th-century China to portray Muhammad as a sage 
from the West analogous to the Confucian and Daoist masters of the East, 
all of whom could claim authority and respect within their own sphere, and 
to depict Islam as a moral tradition analogous to Confucianism (the “Dao 
of Muhammad”).140 These efforts were noteworthy because, in a conscious 
138 For relevant case studies, see Birgit Schäbler, Moderne Muslime: Ernest Renan und die 
Geschichte der ersten Islamdebatte 1883 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016) and 
Kateman, Muḥammad ʿ Abduh and his Interlocutors. For concrete examples, see Muhammad 
ʿAbduh, “al-Din al-islami, aw: al-islam,” in al-Aʿmal al-Kamila 3:465–501 and adopting a 
secular perspective, Rafiq al-ʿAzm, as analysed in Zemmin, “Validating Secularity.”
139 See Gudrun Krämer, “Renewal and Reform in Sunni Islam,” in The Protestant 
Reformation in a Context of Global History: Religious Reforms and World Civilizations, ed. 
Heinz Schilling and Silvana Seidel Menchi (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2017) and with 
different emphases Schulze, “Islam und Judentum,” and above.
140 See Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late 
Imperial China (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); James D. Frankel, 
Rectifying God’s Name: Liu Zhi’s Confucian Translation of Monotheism and Islamic Law 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011).
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effort to be accepted as an integral part of Chinese civilisation and society, 
they presented Islam in terms of Chinese conceptions of ethics, morality, 
and cultured behaviour. In the Chinese context, this was not an exceptional 
occurrence: the first Buddhists who arrived in China portrayed the Buddha 
as a Confucian sage or Daoist deity. Even after Buddhism had become 
more clearly understood in China, the analogy of Buddha and sage was 
still occasionally invoked.141 At the same time, the Muslim rapprochement 
to prevalent Chinese patterns was not altogether different from portraying 
Islam as part and parcel of modern civilisation and society. In any event, it 
represented a significant step towards adapting religion to (the dominant) 
culture. The Chinese case is revealing in that the Muslim scholars ultimately 
failed to convince the majority of Chinese-speaking (Hui) Muslims and Han 
Chinese, who as a rule, showed little interest in their religious teachings. 
While hurting themselves in the face of the Han Chinese bureaucracy, they 
also appear to have overtaxed the imagination of Chinese Muslims who 
conceived of Islam as more than a moral philosophy.142
4.2 The Stable and the Flexible
In his influential study, What is Islam?, W. Montgomery Watt illustrated 
the tension between the idea of Islam as a unified and unifying whole, and 
the flexibility built into its fabric. Watt started off by saying:
The word translated ‘religion’ is dīn, which in Arabic commonly refers to 
a whole way of life… which permeates the whole fabric of society in a way 
of which men are conscious. It is – all in one – theological dogma, forms 
of worship, political theory, and a detailed code of conduct, including even 
matters which the European would classify as hygiene or etiquette.143
 
At this point Watt gives us the widest possible stretching of din/Islam, as 
it was invoked in the past and even more so in modern Islamic discourse. 
141 The interaction of the great traditions, which beyond the three teachings (sanjiao) would 
have to include popular religion/cults and Christianity, is much too complex to be dealt 
with here, particularly by a non-specialist; for the Buddhist experience, I have relied on 
Xinzhong Yao, Introduction to Confucianism, 233–37.
142 For a nuanced assessment of the situation under the Qing dynasty, see, however, Tristan 
S. Brown, “A Mountain of Saints and Ages: Muslims in the Landscape of Popular Religion 
in Late Imperial China,” T’oung Pao 105 (2019). I am again grateful to Elliot Lee for 
having brought this paper to my attention.
143 Montgomery Watt, What is Islam?, 2nd ed. (London: 1979), 3.
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Regarding political theory, he is simply wrong, as would be shown in any 
serious study of the topic not written by a contemporary Islamist. Watt 
himself modified his statement when he went on to say:
In general it will be found that the Islamic vision permeates and informs 
the whole life of society and individuals in the Islamic world. This does not 
mean that the vision or religious belief absolutely determines the whole 
of life, for there are various aspects which have a relative autonomy, but it 
exercises a certain control or pressure on the whole. Such a conception of the 
function of religion is closer to the Muslim conception of dīn than to the 
usual occidental conception.144 [emphases mine] 
 
The “relative autonomy” within the boundaries of the “Islamic vision” 
points to an established principle of Islamic theology and law, which 
distinguishes between immutable and moving elements, or, as it is 
commonly put, the stable and the flexible (al-thabit wa-l-mutaghayyir).145 
Combined with the legal concept of indifferent issues and neutral spaces, 
this distinction has the potential to create significant room for manoeuvre. 
By declaring certain acts or institutions to fall within what they defined 
as the morally “indifferent” domain (al-mubah), or neutral space, Muslim 
scholars did not remove or separate them from the purview of Islam.146 
Rather, they carved out spaces that could be regulated by human-made 
rules, provided that those rules did not openly violate Islamic norms 
and values (which, of course, could be a matter of contention). These 
rules could then be designed to cater to the specific requirements of the 
situation. The concept of the morally indifferent aspects or neutral space, 
regulated by their own particular rules, is deeply relevant to conceptions 
of both culture and secularity. It is also exceedingly complex, intersecting 
with the considerations of public interest and individual benefits (maslaha, 
masalih), which are integral to Islamic legal reasoning, though they did 
not carry as much weight in the pre-modern period as they do today. It 
also touches on the sacred-profane binary dear to Western analysts but 
notoriously difficult to apply to Islam. The least problematic way to capture 
the ‘profane’ within a normative Islamic framework may be to characterise 
144 Watt, What is Islam?, 4.
145 The distinction between the stable and the flexible is generally traced back to Taqi al-Din 
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), one of the most influential authorities for modern Islamists. For 
modern Muslim debates, see Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik, esp. 54–65.
146 They did, however, step on a slippery slope, for linguistically, mubah is closely related to 
ibaha, which also signifies licentiousness, or libertinage.
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it ex negativo as certain times, acts, states, objects, and places that are 
not subject to specific taboos regulated by Sharia.147 In this regard, the 
‘profane’ overlaps with both al-dunya as the ‘ordinary’, ‘lower world’ and 
the neutral space defined as mubah, but it is not identical to either. Islam, 
as the religious scholars understood it, remained the ultimate arbiter of 
the rules of the game. Its guardians decided on the size and place of the 
holes in the fabric. But this is only part of the picture. Even in the pre-
modern era, Muslims took it upon themselves to define the scope of their 
room to manoeuvre. We would expect artists, Sufis, and freethinkers to 
be at the forefront of those trying to enlarge their breathing space. In a 
stimulating study of Islam and science, Ahmad Dallal has argued that in 
the 11th century C.E., Muslim scientists and intellectuals developed an 
understanding of science as a neutral space: freed from the epistemological 
hegemony of religion, science was able to claim validity for its findings on 
the basis of empirical observation and secular reason, independently of 
religious reason and revelation.148 Accordingly, scientists observed nature 
not in order to unravel the marvels of divine creation, confirm the truth 
enshrined in the Qurʾan, and prove the existence of God, but instead 
analysed natural phenomena for their own sake. This was not a subversive 
act, and indeed many of the scientists involved were religious scholars. As 
emphasised by Dallal, this was not a matter of establishing a new hierarchy, 
with religion being subordinated to science. But the elements of autonomy 
and dissociation must not be underrated, either.
5   Concluding Remarks
There are many Muslims today who seek to liberate Islam from the 
accumulated weight of the legal tradition, with its detailed rules and 
regulations, to reconstruct Islam as an ethical and moral message. They 
do not look to reproduce the sociocultural structures and values of late 
147 Azfar Moin is not the only one to have signalled that in Islamicate contexts, the normative 
Sharia approach is by no means the only one, and that very different notions of the sacred 
may hold sway, not only among the masses but also among the social, cultural, and 
political elites.
148 Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010), 147–48.
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antiquity Arabia, but instead respond to modern ideals of justice, freedom, 
human rights, and human creativity.149 There are those, especially in Europe 
and North America, who cast Islam as a fount of ‘spirituality’ for a society 
that cannot live on constitutional patriotism alone. Some self-identify as 
‘cultural Muslims’. Very few openly embrace secular positions (the term 
‘secularity’ is virtually untranslatable in the majority of languages spoken by 
Muslims outside the West). With their emphasis on the ethical and moral 
character of Islamic teachings, Muslim reformers face challenges similar to 
those of oriental Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists, who 
equally strove to make their respective traditions ‘modern’.150 The translation 
of Sharia into a set of ethical and moral principles may be easy to convey 
to those Muslims who focus on piety and religious experience rather than 
the strict observance of the law. These Muslims do not necessarily self-
identify as Sufis. By contrast, it may prove harder to convince the majority of 
those Muslims who, while possibly disregarding many of the injunctions of 
Sharia in their own behaviour, cannot envisage parting entirely with its legal 
provisions. In this instance, work is required to satisfy their demand for textual 
proof. The requisite tools are nonetheless available, ranging from Qurʾanic 
hermeneutics to sophisticated methods of legal interpretation (maslaha, the 
‘finality of Sharia’, ‘pragmatic eclecticism’) which, at least today, are designed 
to widen the scope of flexibility and, by the same token, of Muslim agency.151 
They favour what they identify as the overarching values of the message, and 
the ‘spirit of the law’, over its letter. In doing so, they draw on the relevant 
scholarly traditions rather than discarding them, while recalibrating them in 
subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways. Not only have the relevant methods 
been honed in small reformist circles, but they have also been applied by the 
highest judicial authorities in Muslim majority societies.  
The contextualisation of Qurʾanic references and prophetic hadiths, 
which treats them as valid but contingent, opens up the possibility of 
149 Out of a huge body of literature, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim, Toward an Islamic 
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990).
150 The literature is growing. In addition to the studies of McMahan on modern Buddhism and 
Pennington on modern Hinduism, see e.g., Monica M. Ringer, Pious Citizens: Reforming 
Zoroastrianism in India and Iran (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
151 Again, I cannot go into this matter here. For maslaha, see Opwis, Maṣlaḥa and the Purpose 
of Law; for pragmatic eclecticism, see Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Pragmatism in Islamic Law: 
A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015).
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distinguishing even more sharply between belief, faith, or ‘spirituality’, 
on the one hand, and law, custom, and culture on the other. If this 
process sounds like a translation of Islam into the type of privatised, 
compartmentalised, secularised religion its critics have identified as 
modern, Western, and essentially Christian, this is indeed a possibility. 
But it is not a given. For most Muslims, the mandatory acts of worship 
are not to be abandoned: Islam will not be cut down to inner faith and 
rendered invisible. Sharia will not be abolished in its entirety but instead 
refashioned as a moral and ethical frame that accords with the universal 
values of justice, peace, and compassion. In the process, the external walls 
sealing off the Muslim community will be lowered, commonalities with 
other religious, moral, and philosophical traditions enhanced, and the 
claim to religious superiority muted. If developed consistently, this process 
could ultimately overcome the equation of Islam, Sharia, and identity, 
which has been reinforced under the combined pressure of colonisation 
and globalisation. It could normatively support internal plurality and 
cultural adjustment, which in many places have always been the reality, 
and accommodate an understanding of secularity that allows all to breathe, 
devout Muslims, non-Muslims, and agnostics alike.
Tehran shop window. 
Photo: Gudrun Krämer, 2016.
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To come back to the conceptual challenges addressed by the Centre 
for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”, this paper confirms 
several of the assumptions shared by many, albeit not all, members of the 
group: for pre-modern configurations of Islam (in its broadest sense), it does 
make sense to distinguish between processes of differentiation on the one 
hand and conceptual distinctions on the other. Distinctions are not only 
obvious to the modern observer; they were made by pre-modern Muslims 
and non-Muslims living in Islamicate contexts and expressed in textual 
as well as in non-textual form. Pre-modern Muslims did have a concept 
of religion, which was not limited to din in all its semantic variety. By the 
same token, they distinguished between din/religion and dunya/world. 
Concerning governance, they differentiated between din, mulk, and dawla, 
with the latter two referring to princely rule, or dynasties,152 rather than the 
state in the modern sense. The legal and moral injunctions of Islam, and 
Sharia more particularly, were frequently ignored or openly flaunted, and 
not just by the powerful. Muslim scholars of theology and law elaborated 
concepts of ‘neutral space’ of indifferent moral and religious status, which 
could be claimed by princes, merchants, artists, scientists, as much as by 
‘ordinary people’. It would be a complete misunderstanding of pre-modern 
Muslims and their lifeworld to imagine that religion covered and regulated 
every aspect of it. At the same time, challenges to religion in general, and to 
Islam in particular, from within the Muslim community (I am not speaking 
about interreligious polemics here) were rarely openly voiced.153
When we ask about religion’s others in an Islamic context, we are for the 
most part talking about Islam’s others. The others existed, but they are not 
easy to identify: they could be understood as culture, custom, or neutral space, 
or, if religion is narrowed down to Islam, shared space, or indeed the secular. 
Even when secular values, customs, and traditions were openly invoked, they 
were not as a rule set up as rivals or opposites to religion, or to Islam more 
specifically. Adab, morality, good governance (‘justice’), and the empirical 
sciences are cases in point. In addition, non-religious actors and domains 
tended to be even less firmly institutionalised than Islamic ones: there existed 
no independent secular academies and no secular scientific institutions able to 
152  As mentioned above, Ismaʿili notions differed from the Sunni concepts described here.
153  See Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers in Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, 
and Their Impact on Islamic Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
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survive the changing moods of princes. The adjudication of conflict in courts 
set up by the rulers, or even headed by them (notably the so-called mazalim 
courts), formed a major exception. While it might be worthwhile searching for 
the ‘reference problems’ addressed in specific contexts, and I would suspect 
that balancing religious diversity and enabling the autonomous development 
of functional domains of society would have some role to play, I see little use in 
constructing ideal types for the pre-modern period.
Secularity existed at certain times, rather than at specific junctures, and 
within specific fields. It did not, however, evolve into an overarching ‘guiding 
idea’ anchored in specific groups of society, with resilient autonomous 
institutions to rely upon. Still, such secularity as existed was rich enough to 
be taken up and refashioned in the modern period, when it was propagated 
for the sake of individual rights and liberties, balancing religious diversity, 
societal and national integration and development, securing the autonomous 
development of functional domains of society, or a special blend of all these. 
Its advocates were thus able to refer to local traditions, or even Islam, rather 
than acquiring a secularity package from the West.154
154 See Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular: Multiple 
Secularities and Pathways to Modernity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 2 (Leipzig University, 2017), 20–24; 
Kleine and Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme,” 15.
80
6  Bibliography
EI2 The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New 
Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1954–2004.
EI3 The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. 
Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007–
EIr Encyclopædia Iranica
EQ Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Edited 
by Jane Dammen McAuliffe, 6 vols. 
Leiden, Boston, Cologne: Brill, 
2001–2006.
Abbasi, Rushain. “Did Premodern 
Muslims Distinguish the Religious 
and Secular? The Dīn-Dunyā Binary 
in Medieval Islamic Thought.” 
Journal of Islamic Studies 31, no. 2 
(2020): 185–225.
ʿAbd al-Baqi, Muhammad Fuʾad. 
al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfaz al-
qurʾan al-karim. 1407; repr. Cairo: 
Dar al-Hadith, 1978.
ʿAbduh, Muhammad. al-Aʿmal al-kamila 
lil-imam al-shaykh Muhammad 
ʿAbduh. Edited by Muhammad 
ʿImara, 5 vols; repr. Cairo: Dar al-
Shuruq, 2006.
Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Writing Against 
Culture.” In Recapturing Anthropology: 
Working in the Present. Edited by 
Richard G. Fox, 137–62. Santa Fe: 
University of Washington Press, 1991.
Adang, Camilla, Hassan Ansari, Maribel 
Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke, eds. 
Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A 
Diachronic Perspective on Takfir. 
Leiden: Brill, 2016.
Ahmed, Shahab. What is Islam? The 
importance of Being Islamic. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016.
Akasoy, Anna, James Montgomery, 
and Peter Pormann, eds. Islamic 
Crosspollinations: Interactions in the 
Medieval Middle East. Cambridge: 
Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007.
Ammann, Ludwig. Die Geburt des 
Islam: Historische Innovation durch 
Offenbarung. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001.
An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed. Toward an 
Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, 
Human Rights, and International Law. 
Syracuse NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1990.
Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003.
Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Al-Azmeh, Aziz. Muslim Kingship: Power 
and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian 
and Pagan Polities. London, New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2001.
Al-Basha, Hasan. al-Alqab al-islamiyya 
fi l-taʾrikh wa-l-wathaʾiq wa-l-athar. 
Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda, 1957.
Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel 
Wallerstein. Race, nation, classe: 
Les identités ambiguës. Paris: La 
Découverte, 1988.
Baneth, D.Z.H. “What did Muhammad 
Mean When he Called his Religion 
‘Islam’? The original meaning of 
aslama and its derivatives.” Israel 
Oriental Studies 1 (1971): 183–90.
Bauer, Thomas. “Adab c) and Islamic 
scholarship after the ‘Sunnī revival’.” In 
Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Fasc. 2013–
4:38–42. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013.
Benite, Zvi Ben-Dor. The Dao of Muhammad: 
A Cultural History of Muslims in Late 
Imperial China. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005.
81
Bergunder, Michael. “Was ist Religion? 
Kulturwissenschaftliche Überlegungen 
zum Gegenstand der Religionswissen-
schaft.” Zeitschrift für Religionswissen-
schaft 19, no. 1–2 (2011): 3–55.
Bhargav, Vanya V. “Between Hindu and 
Indian: The Nationalist Thought of 
Lala Rajpat Rai.” Thesis, Oxford, 2018.
Billioud, Sébastien, and Joel Thoraval. 
“Anshen liming or the Religious 
Dimension of Confucianism.” China 
Perspectives 3 (2008): 88–106.
al-Biruni, Muhammad b. Ahmad Abu 
Rayhan. Kitab al-athar al-baqiya ʿ an al-
qurun al-khaliya. Edinburgh University 
Library Ms. 161 (1307–8); Paris: 
Bibliothèque nationale de France. BNF ar. 
1489 (16th-century copy). English transl. 
of Eduard Sachau’s German annotated 
edition (Chronologie der orientalischen 
Völker von Alberuni, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 
1878): The Chronology of Ancient 
Nations. London: William D. Allen and 
Co., 1879.
Boehm, Barbara D. and Melanie 
Holcomb, eds. Jerusalem 1000–1400: 
Every People Under Heaven. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2016. 
Exhibition catalogue.
Böwering, Gerhard. “Covenant.” In 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
1:464–67. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Böwering, Gerhard. “God and his Attributes.” 
In Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
2:316–31. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Bonnell, Victoria E., and Lynn Hunt, 
eds. Beyond the Cultural Turn: New 
Directions in the Study of Culture 
and Society. Berkeley, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1999.
Bosworth, C.E. “Laḳab.” In Encyclopaedia 
of Islam. New Edition. Vol. 5:618–31. 
Leiden: Brill, 1986.
Boyce, Mary. Zoroastrians: Their 
Religious Beliefs and Practices. 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge, 2001.
Brodeur, Patrice C. “Religion.” In 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
4:395–98. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 
Brown, Tristan S. “A Mountain of Saints 
and Ages: Muslims in the Landscape 
of Popular Religion in Late Imperial 
China.” T’oung Pao 105 (2019).
Brumann, Christoph. “Writing for 
Culture: Why a Successful Concept 
Should Not Be Discarded.” Current 
Anthropology 40 (1999): 1–27.
Busse, Heribert. Chalif und Großkönig: 
Die Buyiden im Irak (945–1055). 
Würzburg: Ergon, 2004.
Canfield, Robert L., ed. Turco-Persia in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Chiabotti, Francesco, Eve Feuillebois-
Pierunek, Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen 
and Luca Patrizi, eds. Ethics and 
Spirituality in Islam: Sufi adab. 
Leiden: Brill, 2017.
Conermann, Stefan, and Syrinx von Hees, 
eds. Islamwissenschaft als Kultur-
wissenschaft: I. Historische Anthropo-
logie. Ansätze und Möglichkeiten. 
Schenefeld: EB-Verlag, 2007.
Crone, Patricia. God’s Rule – Government 
and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval 
Islamic Political Thought. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004.
Dakhlia, Jocelyne. Le divan des rois: Le 
politique et le religieux dans l’islam. 
Paris: Aubier, 1998.
Dallal, Ahmad. Islam, Science, and the 
Challenge of History. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010.
de Jong, Albert. “First Man, First Twins: 
The Origins of Humankind in 
Zoroastrianism.” In Religious Stories 
in Transformation: Conflict, Revision 
82
and Reception. Edited by Albertina 
Houtman, Tamar Kadari, Marcel 
Poorthuis and Vered Tohar, 52–65. 
Leiden: Brill, 2016.
de Jong, Frederick, and Bernd Radtke, 
eds. Islamic Mysticism Contested: 
Thirteen Centuries of Controversies & 
Polemics. Leiden: Brill, 1999.
Dietrich, Albert. “Zu den mit ad-dīn 
zusammengesetzten islamischen 
Personennamen.” Zeitschrift der 
Deutschen Morgenländischen 
Gesellschaft 110 (1960): 43–54.
Donner, Fred M. Muhammad and the 
Believers: At the Origins of Islam. 
Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2010.
Dreßler, Markus. “Modes of 
Religionization: A Constructivist 
Approach to Secularity.” Working 
Paper Series of the CASHSS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, 
Beyond Modernities” 7. Leipzig 
University, 2019.
Dreßler, Markus. “From ‘Religious 
Community’ to ‘Nation’: The 
Transformation of the Term Millet in 
the Late Ottoman Context.” Die Welt 
des Islams, under review (2020). 
Dressler, Markus and Arvind-Pal S. 
Mandair, eds. Secularism & Religion-
Making. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011.
Dunhua, Zhao, ed. Dialogue of Philoso-
phies, Religions and Civilizations in 
the Era of Globalization. Washington, 
D.C.: The Council for Research in 
Values and Philosophy, 2007.
Enderwitz, Susanne. “Adab b) and Islamic 
scholarship in the ʿ Abbāsid period.” 
In Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Fasc. 
2013–4:34–38. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013.
Ernst, Carl W. The Shambhala Guide to 
Sufism. London: Shambhala, 1997.
Feil, Ernst. Religio. 4 vols. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986–2007.
Feldman, Noah. “The Ethical Literature: 
Religion and Political Authority 
as Brothers.” Journal of Persianate 
Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 95–127.
Fleischer, Cornell H. “A Mediterranean 
Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire 
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Centuries.” Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 61 
(2018): 18–90.
Fragner, Bert G. Die Persophonie: 
Regionalität, Identität und 
Sprachkontakt in der Geschichte Asiens. 
Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1999.
Frankel, James D. Rectifying God’s Name: 
Liu Zhi’s Confucian Translation of 
Monotheism and Islamic Law. Hono-
lulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011.
Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and 
Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations 
in the Muslim Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Gardet, Louis. “Dīn.” In The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition. 
2:293–96. Leiden: Brill, 1991.
Gardet, Louis. “Religion and Culture.” 
In The Cambridge History of Islam: 
2B Islamic Society and Civilization. 
Edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. 
Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 
569–603. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970.
Gardner, Daniel K. Confucianism: A Very 
Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015.
Geertz, Clifford. Islam Observed: 
Religious Development in Morocco 
and Indonesia. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968.
Gentz, Joachim. “Die Drei Lehren 
(sanjiao) Chinas in Konflikt und 
Harmonie: Figuren und Strategien 
83
einer Debatte.” In Religionen 
nebeneinander: Modelle religiöser 
Vielfalt in Ost- und Südostasien. 
Edited by Edith Franke and Michael 
Pye, 17–40. Münster: Lit, 2006.
Gharipour, Mohammad, ed. Sacred 
Precincts: The Religious Architecture 
of Non-Muslim Communities Across 
the Islamic World. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
Gignoux, Philippe. “Denkard.” In 
Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. VII, fasc. 
3:284–89. London: 1996; an updated 
version is available online at http://
iranicaonline.org/articles/denkard 
(accessed on 12 January 2021).
Glei, Reinhold, and Stefan Reichmuth. 
“Religion between Last Judgement, 
law and faith: Koranic dīn and its 
renderings in Latin translations of 
the Koran.” Religion 42, no. 2 (2012): 
247–71.
Goitein, S.D. Jews and Arabs: Their 
Contacts Through the Ages. 3rd ed. 
New York: Schocken Books, 1974.
Goitein S.D. A Mediterranean Society: The 
Jewish Communities of the World as 
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo 
Geniza, 6 vols. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967–93.
Green, Nile. Terrains of Exchange: Religious 
Economies of Global Islam. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014.
Green, Nile and Mary Searle-Chatterjee, 
eds. Religion, Language, and Power. 
London: Routledge, 2008.
Halft, Dennis OP. “Das Buch der Bücher auf 
Persisch.” In Orientalische Bibelhand-
schriften aus der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 
– PK: Eine illustrierte Geschichte. Edited 
by Meliné Pehlivanian, Christoph Rauch, 
and Ronny Vollandt, 150–54. Wiesba-
den: Harrassowitz, 2016.
Hämeen-Anttila, Jaakko. “Adab a) Arabic, 
early developments.” In Encyclopaedia 
of Islam Three. Fasc. 2014–3:4–14. 
Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014.
Hallaq, Boutros. “Adab e) modern usage.” In 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Fasc. 
2014–2:10–11. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014.
Halm, Heinz. Die Schia. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988.
Haykel, Bernard. “On the Nature of 
Salafi Thought and Action.” In 
Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious 
Movement. Edited by Roel Meier, 
33–51. London: Hurst, 2009.
Heath, Peter. “Al-Jāḥiẓ, Adab, and the Art 
of the Essay.” In Al-Jāḥiẓ: A Muslim 
Humanist for our Time. Edited by 
Arnim Heinemann, John L. Meloy, 
Tarif Khalidi and Manfred Kropp, 
133–72. Würzburg: Ergon, 2009.
Heinemann, Arnim, John L. Meloy, Tarif 
Khalidi, and Manfred Kropp, eds. 
Al-Jāḥiẓ: A Muslim Humanist for our 
Time. Würzburg: Ergon, 2009.
Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of 
Islam: Conscience and History in a 
World Civilization, 3 vols. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1974.
Hofer, Nathan. “Training the Prophetic 
Self: Adab and riyāḍa in Jewish 
Sufism.” In Ethics and Spirituality in 
Islam: Sufi adab. Edited by Francesco 
Chiabotti, Eve Feuillebois-Pierunek, 
Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen and Luca 
Patriz, 325–55. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
Ibrahim, Ahmed Fekry. Pragmatism in 
Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual 
History. Syracuse NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2015.
Ivanhoe, Philip. “The Shifting Contours of 
the Confucian Tradition.” Review of 
Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confu-
cian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics. 
Edited by Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng 
and John B. Henderson. Albany NY: 
State University Press of New York, 
84
1994. In Philosophy East and West 54, 
no.1 (2004): 565–71.
Jouili, Jeanette S. “Islam and Culture: Dis/
junctures in a Modern Conceptual 
Terrain.” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 61 (2019): 207–37.
Karamustafa, Ahmet. “Islam: A 
Civilizational Project in Progress.” In 
Progressive Muslims. Edited by Omid 
Safi, 98–110. Oxford: OneWorld, 2003.
Karstein, Uta, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, 
“Culture.” In “Soziologie – Sociology 
in the German-speaking World.” 
Edited by Bettina Hollstein, Rainer 
Greshoff, Uwe Schimank and Anja 
Weiß. Special issue, Soziologische 
Revue (2020).
Kateman, Ammeke. Muḥammad ʿAbduh 
and His Interlocutors: The Concept 
of Religion in a Globalizing World. 
Leiden: Brill, 2019.
Kinitz, Daniel. Die andere Seite des Islam: 
Säkularismus-Diskurs und muslimische 
Intellektuelle im modernen Ägypten. 
Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016.
Kippenberg, Hans F. and Martin Riese-
brodt, eds. Max Weber’s “Religionssyste-
matik”. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001.
Kleine, Christoph, and Monika Wohlrab-
Sahr. “Research Programme of the 
HCAS Multiple Secularities – Beyond 
the West, Beyond Modernities.” 
Working Paper Series of the CASHSS 
“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the 
West, Beyond Modernities” 1. Leipzig 
University, 2016.
Knysh, Alexander. Sufism: A New History of 
Islamic Mysticism. Princeton, Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2017.
Krämer, Gudrun. “Gottes-Recht bricht 
Menschen-Recht. Theokratische 
Entwürfe im zeitgenössischen Islam.” 
In Theokratie und theokratischer 
Diskurs. Edited by Kai Trampedach 
and Andreas Pečar, 493–515. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013.
Krämer, Gudrun. Gottes Staat als Republik: 
Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu 
Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999.
Krämer, Gudrun. “Islam, Kapitalismus 
und die protestantische Ethik.” 
In Kapitalismus: Historische 
Annäherungen. Edited by Gunilla 
Budde, 116–46. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011.
Krämer, Gudrun. “Moving Out of Place: 
Minorities in Middle Eastern Urban 
Societies, 1800–1914.” In The Urban 
Social History of the Middle East, 
1750–1950. Edited by Peter Sluglett, 
182–223. Syracuse NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2008.
Krämer. Gudrun. “Piety, Politics, and 
Identity: Configurations of Secularity 
in Egypt.” In A Secular Age Beyond 
the West: Religion, Law and the State 
in Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa. Edited by Mirjam Künkler, 
John Madeley, and Shylashri Shankar, 
295–316. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018.
Krämer. Gudrun. “Pluralism and 
Tolerance.” In Islamic Political 
Thought: An Introduction. Edited by 
Gerhard Bowering, 169–84. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015.
Krämer, Gudrun. “Renewal and Reform 
in Sunni Islam.” In The Protestant 
Reformation in a Context of Global 
History: Religious Reforms and World 
Civilizations. Edited by Heinz Schilling 
and Silvana Seidel Menchi, 133–48. 
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2017.
Krämer, Gudrun. “Secularity Contested: 
Religion, Identity and the Public 
Order in the Arab Middle East.” In 
Comparative Secularities: Religion 
85
and Modernity in the Global Age. 
Edited by Marian Burchardt, 
Matthias Middell, and Monika 
Wohlrab-Sahr, 121–37. Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2015.
Krämer, Gudrun, and Sabine Schmidtke, 
eds. Speaking for Islam: Religious 
Authorities in Muslim Societies. 
Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Kramers, Johannes H. “Les noms 
musulmans composés avec Dīn.” 
Acta Orientalia 5 (1927): 53–67.
Lange, Christian. Paradise and Hell 
in Islamic Traditions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Lapidus, Ira M. A History of Islamic 
Societies. 3rd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Lapidus, Ira M. “The Separation of State 
and Religion in the Development of 
Early Islamic Society.” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 6 
(1975): 363–85.
Lav, Daniel. Radical Islam and the Revival 
of Medieval Theology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Lecker, Michael. The Constitution of 
Medina: Muḥammad’s First Legal 
Document. Princeton: The Darwin 
Press, 2004.
Lee, Yee Lak Elliot. “Muslims as ‘Hui’ in 
Late Imperial and Republican China: 
A Historical Reconsideration of 
Social Differentiation and Identity 
Construction.” Historical Social 
Research 44, no. 3 (2019): 226–63.
Leirvik, Oddbjørn. “Conscience in 
Arabic and the Semantic History of 
‘Ḍamīr’.” Journal of Arabic and Islamic 
Studies 9 (2009): 18–36.
Lentz, Carola. “Culture: The Making, 
Unmaking and Remaking of an 
Anthropological Concept.” Working 
Papers of the Department of 
Anthropology and African Studies 166 
(Mainz: Institut für Ethnologie und 
Afrikastudien Johannes Gutenberg-
Universität, 2016).
Madelung, Wilferd. “The assumption of 
the title Shāhanshāh by the Būyids 
and ‘The reign of the Daylam’ 
[Dawlat al-Daylam].” Journal of Near 
Eastern Studies 27 (1969): 84–108.
Madigan, Daniel. The Qurʾān’s Self-Image: 
Writing and Authority in Islam’s 
Scripture. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 
Magout, Mohammad. A Reflexive Islamic 
Modernity: Academic Knowledge and 
Religious Subjectivity in the Global 
Ismaili Community. Baden-Baden: 
Ergon, 2020.
Marlow, Louise. “Among Kings and 
Sages: Greek and Indian Wisdom 
in an Arabic Mirror for Princes.” 
Arabica 60 (2013): 1–57.
Marranci, Gabriele. The Anthropology of 
Islam. Oxford: Berg, 2008.
Martin, Richard C. “Inimitability.” In 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
2:526–36. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, ed. Adab and 
Modernity: A ‘Civilising Process’? 
(Sixteenth-Twenty-First Century). 
Leiden: Brill, 2020.
Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, and Luca 
Patrizi. “Introduction.” In Ethics 
and Spirituality in Islam: Sufi adab. 
Edited by Francesco Chiabotti, Eve 
Feuillebois-Pierunek, Catherine 
Mayeur-Jaouen and Luca Patrizi, 
1–44. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
Masuzawa, Tomoko. The Invention of 
World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism was Preserved in the 
Language of Pluralism. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2005.
86
McAuliffe, Jane Dammen, ed. The 
Cambridge Companion to the 
Qurʾān. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.
McMahan, David L. The Making of 
Buddhist Modernism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008.
Metcalf, Barbara D., ed. Moral Conduct 
and Authority: The Place of Adab 
in South Asian Islam. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984.
Mirsepassi, Ali. “Mistaken Anti-modernity: 
Fardid after Fardid.” Working Paper 
Series of the CASHSS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond 
Modernities” 6. Leipzig University, 2019.
Modarressi, Hossein. “Essential Islam: 
The Minimum That a Muslim 
Is Required to Acknowledge.” In 
Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A 
Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr. 
Edited by Camilla Adang et al., 
393–412. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2016.
Moin, A. Azfar. The Millennial Sovereign: 
Sacred Kingship and Sainthood 
in Islam. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014.
Moreen, Vera Basch. In Queen Esther’s 
Garden: An Anthology of Judeo-
Persian Literature. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000.
Moreen, Vera Basch, with Orit Carmeli. 
The Bible as a Judeo-Persian Epic: An 
Illuminated Manuscript of Imrani’s Fath-
Nama. Jerusalem: Benzvi Institute, 2017.
Newid, Mehr A. Der schiitische Islam in 
Bildern: Rituale und Heilige. Munich: 
Edition Avicenna, 2006.
Nizāmulmulk, Siyāsatnāma: Das Buch 
der Staatskunst. Translated by Karl 
Emil Schabinger Freiherr von 
Schowingen. Zurich: Manesse, 1987.
Noth, Albrecht. “Abgrenzungsprobleme 
zwischen Muslimen und Nicht-
Muslimen: Die ‘Bedingungen Umars’ 
(aš-šurūṭ al-ʿumariyya) unter einem 
anderen Aspekt gelesen.” Jerusalem 
Studies in Arabic and Islam 9 (1987): 
290–315.
Ohlander, Erik S. “Adab, in Ṣūfism.” In The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Fasc. 2009–
1:40–43. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009.
Opwis, Felicitas. Maṣlaḥa and the 
Purpose of Law. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Pehlivanian, Meliné, Christoph 
Rauch and Ronny Vollandt, eds. 
Orientalische Bibelhandschriften aus 
der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – PK: 
Eine illustrierte Geschichte. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2016.
Pellat, Charles. “Variations sur le thème 
de l’‘adab’.” Correspondances d’Orient 
5–6 (1964), 19-37. 
Pennington, Brian K. Was Hinduism 
Invented? Britons, Indians, and the 
Colonial Construction of Religion. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
The Qurʾan. A New Translation by Tarif 
Khalidi. London: Penguin, 2008.
Radscheit, Matthias. Die koranische 
Herausforderung. Berlin: Klaus 
Schwarz, 1996.
Radtke, Bernd. Neue kritische Gänge: 
Zu Stand und Aufgaben der 
Sufikforschung. Utrecht: M.Th. 
Houtsma Stichting, 2005.
Reichmuth, Stefan. “The Arabic Concept of 
Dīn and Islamic Religious Sciences in 
the 18th Century: The Case of Murtaḍā 
al-Zabīdī (d. 1791).” Oriens 44, no. 1–2 
(2016): 94–115.
Richter-Bernburg, Lutz. “Zur Titulatur 
der Ḫwārezm-Šāhe aus der Dynastie 
Anūštegīns.”Archaeologische Mitteilungen 
aus Iran, n.s. 9 (1976): 179–205.
Robson, James. “‘Islām’ as a Term.” The 
Muslim World 44 (1954): 101–09.
87
Rubanovich, Julia. “ḴĀVARĀN-NĀMA 
i. The Epic Poem.” In Encyclopædia 
Iranica, online edition, 2017, available 
at http://www.iranicaonline.org/
articles/khavaran-nama-1 (accessed on 
22 December 2020).
Rüpke, Jörg. Pantheon: Geschichte der antiken 
Religionen. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016.
Russ-Fishbane, Elisha. Judaism, Sufism, 
and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt: A 
Study of Abraham Maimonides and 
His Times. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015.
Safi, Omid. The Politics of Knowledge in 
Premodern Islam: Negotiating Ideology 
and Religious Inquiry. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 
2006.
Sahih al-Bukhari. Beirut: Dar al-Arqam, s.d.
Salvatore, Armando. “The Islamicate Adab 
Tradition vs. the Islamic Shariʿa, from 
Pre-colonial to Colonial.” Working 
Paper Series of the CASHSS “Multiple 
Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond 
Modernities” 3. Leipzig University, 
2018.
Savant, Sarah Bowen. The New Muslims 
of Post-Conquest Iran: Tradition, 
Memory, and Conversion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Schäbler, Birgit. Moderne Muslime: 
Ernest Renan und die Geschichte der 
ersten Islamdebatte 1883. Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016.
Schluchter, Wolfgang, ed. Max Webers Sicht 
des Islams: Interpretation und Kritik. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987.
Schöck, Cornelia. “Adam and Eve.” In 
Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
1:22–26. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Schulze, Reinhard. “Islam und Judentum 
im Angesicht der Protestantisierung 
der Religionen im 19. Jahrhundert.” 
In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in 
the Course of History: Exchange and 
Conflicts. Edited by Lothar Gall and 
Dietmar Willoweit, 139–65. Munich: 
R. Oldenbourg, 2011.
Seiwert, Hubert. “The Dynamics of 
Religions and Cultural Evolution: 
Worshipping Fuxi in Contemporay 
China.” In Dynamics of Religion: Past 
and Present. Edited by Christoph 
Bochinger and Jörg Rüpke, 9–30. 
Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.
Sewell, William H. Jr. “The Concept(s) of 
Culture.” In Beyond the Cultural Turn. 
Edited by Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn 
Hunt, 35–61. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999.
Shaked, Shaul. “From Iran to Islam: Notes 
on some themes in transmission: 
1. ‘Religion and sovereignty are 
twins?’ in Ibn al-Muqaffa’s theory of 
government.” Jerusalem Studies in 
Arabic and Islam 4 (1984): 31–67.
Shaked, Shaul and Zabihollah Safa. 
“Andarz.” In Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. 
II, fasc. 1:11–22. London: 1987; an 
updated version is available online at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/
andarz-precept-instruction-advice 
(accessed on 12 January 2021).
Shaki, Mansour. “Dēn.” In Encyclopædia 
Iranica. Vol. VII, fasc. 3:279–81. London: 
1994; an updated version is available 
online at http://iranicaonline.org/articles/
den (accessed on 12 January 2021).
Shani, Raya. “ḴĀVARĀN-NĀMA ii. 
The Illustrated Manuscripts.” In 
Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 
2017, available at http://www.
iranicaonline.org/articles/khavaran-
nama-illustrations (accessed on 
22 December 2020).
Shani, Raya. “The Shahnama Legacy in 
a Late 15th-Century Illustrated Copy 
of Ibn Husam’s Khavaran-nama, The 
88
Gulistan Palace, Tehran, Ms. 5750.” In 
Shahnama Studies III: The Reception of 
the Shahnama. Edited by Gabrielle van 
den Berg and Charles Melville, 216–65. 
Leiden: Brill, 2018.
Smith, Jane I. “Faith.” In Encyclopaedia 
of the Qurʾān. Vol. 2:162–72. Leiden: 
Brill, 2002.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Islam in Modern 
History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957.
Stroumsa, Sarah. “Comparison as a 
Multifocal Approach: The Case of 
Arab Philosophical Thought.” In 
Comparative Studies in the Humanities. 
Edited by Guy G. Stroumsa, 133–52. 
Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities, 2018.
Stroumsa, Sarah. Freethinkers in Medieval 
Islam: Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr 
al-Rāzī, and Their Impact on Islamic 
Thought. Leiden: Brill, 1999.
Stroumsa, Sarah. “The Literary Genizot: 
A Window to the Mediterranean 
Republic of Letters.” Intellectual History 
of the Islamic World 8, no. 2–3 (2020): 
163–87.
Subtelny, Maria E. Timurids in 
Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and 
Acculturation in Medieval Iran. Leiden: 
Brill, 2007.
Sun, Anna. Confucianism as a World 
Religion. Princeton, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.
Varisco, Daniel. Culture Still Matters. 
Leiden, Brill: 2018.
Varisco, Daniel. Reading Orientalism: Said 
and Unsaid. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2007.
Wagoner, Phillip B. “‘Sultan among 
Hindu Kings’: Dress, Titles and the 
Islamicization of Hindu Culture at 
Vijayanagara.” Journal of Asian Studies 
55, no. 4 (1996): 851–80.
Watt, W. Montgomery. What is Islam? 2nd 
ed. London: Longman, 2002.
Wiederholt, Lutz. “Profane and Sacred.” 
In Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Vol. 
4:278–84. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Wild, Stefan, ed., Self-Referentiality in the 
Qurʾān. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006.
Wilde, Clare, and Jane Dammen McAuliffe. 
“Religious Pluralism and the Qurʾān” 
In Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, vol. 
4:398–419. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Wimmer, Andreas. “Kultur: 
Zur Reformulierung eines 
sozialanthropologischen 
Grundbegriffs.” Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 48, no. 
3 (1996): 401–25.
Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika, and Marian 
Burchardt. “Revisiting the Secular: 
Multiple Secularities and Pathways to 
Modernity.” Working Paper Series of 
the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – 
Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 
2. Leipzig University, 2017.
Yao, Xinzhong. An Introduction to 
Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000.
Yavari, Neguin. Advice for the Sultan: 
Prophetic Voices and Secular Politics in 
Medieval Islam. London: Hurst, 2014.
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. Religion and 
Politics under the Early ʿAbbāsids: The 
Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī Elite. 
Leiden: Brill, 1997.
Zemmin, Florian. “Validating Secularity 
in Islam: The Sociological Perspective 
of the Muslim Intellectual Rafiq 
al-ʿAzm (1865–1925).” In “Islamicate 
Secularities in Past and Present.” 
Edited by Markus Dressler, Armando 
Salvatore, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. 
Special issue, Historical Social Research 
44, no. 3 (2019): 74–100.
89
